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Abstract
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are important tools helping the network and
system administrators to detect intrusions, but have the drawback of many false
positives. Due to increasing bandwidth, an IDS must process a vast amount of
data, which results in an ever increasing amount of alarms. For a system ad-
ministrator to be able to handle the alarms they must be aggregated, correlated
and ordered into a manageable form and presented in a way which is easy to
overview.
In this thesis we study aggregation, correlation, filtering and ranking as methods
for managing alarms from IDSs. We have implemented a ranking functionality
in the graphical user interface Snorby, a front end to the open source IDS Snort.
Each alarm starts with a basic rank of 0 and the user is able to prioritize or
down prioritize the alarm by pressing either a ’+’ button or a ’-’ button, thus
influencing its current rank. The rank is calculated from several features, i.e.
source IP, destination IP, destination port and alarm signature.
Based on our studies we suggest that ranking systems supported by user votes
have several advantages. First, they allow the user to dynamically change the
way the IDS lists the alarms through a very simple means. Second, it shortens
the time required to locate the more important ones, thus reducing the likelihood
that a serious attack will be missed.
Keywords: intrusion detection, IDS, correlation, fusion, aggregation, filtering,
ranking, alarm management
Sammanfattning
Intr˚angsdetekteringssystem (IDS) a¨r ett viktigt verktyg som hja¨lper na¨tverks-
och systemadministrato¨rer att uppta¨cka och fo¨rebygga intr˚ang, men har en nack-
del i m˚anga falsklarm. P˚a grund av den va¨xande bandbredden ma˚ste ett IDS
bearbeta en stor ma¨ngd data, vilket resulterar i ett sta¨ndigt o¨kande antal larm.
Fo¨r att en na¨tverks- eller systemadministrato¨r ska ha en mo¨jlighet att bearbeta
detta m˚aste larmen aggregeras, korreleras och ordnas till en hanterbar form och
presenteras p˚a ett sa¨tt som a¨r la¨tt att ta till sig.
I den ha¨r rapporten studerar vi agregering, korrelering, filtrering och rankning
som metoder fo¨r att hantera alarm fr˚an ett IDS. Vi har implementerat ett rank-
ningssystem i det grafiska gra¨nssnittet till Snorby, som a¨r ett web-gra¨nssnitt
till Snort. Varje alarm bo¨rjar p˚a rank 0 som anva¨ndaren av systemet sedan
kan ho¨ja eller sa¨nka med hja¨lp av tv˚a knappar: ’+’ och ’-’. Varje alarms prio-
ritet baseras p˚a fyra egenskaper: ka¨ll-IP, destinations-IP, destinations-port och
alarmsignatur.
Baserat p˚a vad vi har kommit fram till i v˚art arbete kan vi dra slutsatsen
att ett system som rankar alarm baserat p˚a hur anva¨ndarna ro¨star har flera
fo¨rdelar. Fo¨r det fo¨rsta l˚ater det anva¨ndaren dynamiskt p˚averka hur IDS:et
listar alarmen, genom va¨ldigt enkla medel. Fo¨r det andra minskas tiden det
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Definition 1. Aggregation is the process of grouping alarms together based
on certain user-defined criteria found in alarms. (p. 27)
Definition 2. Correlation is the process of building data models from alarms
using external knowledge not found within the information carried by the alarms
themselves. (p. 28)
Definition 3. An important alarm, also referred to as a clicked alarm,
is an alarm with attributes of interest to the user. When the user spots this
alarm, she is surmised to click on it, showing her interest. (p. 58)
Definition 4. An unimportant alarm, sometimes referred to as an unclicked
alarm, is an alarm lacking attributes of interest to the user. When the user
spots this alarm, she is surmised to leave it unclicked, showing her disinterest.
(p. 58)
Definition 5. The density D(i), of ranked alarm position i, is the ratio of
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D(i) =
# important alarms at positions 1 to i
# alarms at positions 1 to i
Definition 6. Collateral ranking is the act of awarding unimportant at-
tributes with higher rank due to their association with important attributes. That
is, unimportant attributes get points by simply being present in the same alarms







Since 1966, the syrupy sweet song “It’s a small world after all” have been sung
over and over again in the Disney theme parks by the little dolls in the attraction
bearing the same name as the song [33]. This sentiment is truer today than
ever. The birth of Internet has let us bridge physical distance with the click of
a button. Whether you live in Australia, South Africa or the UK makes little
difference, as with the click of a button millions of computers can be attacked
and infected by malware. By the same notion that the world is getting smaller
it is also growing; unfathomable proportions of information is being pumped
into networks connected to the Internet. Individuals, companies, organizations
and governments store their lives, financial records, data and secret documents
on social communities and databases.
Much has happened in the world of malware since the Morris worm in 1988 [17].
Where Morris operated out of curiosity there are now multi-million dollar opera-
tions organized by criminal networks all over the world. Tools for attacking and
penetrating networks are easily bought over the Internet. The “small world”
we now live in and the illegal industry dealing in malware and hacking tools all
make it dangerous to simply connect a network cable to your computer.
As a publicly available company or a public authority, a connection to the Inter-
net is mandatory and crucial. If you cannot be found on the Internet you might
as well not exist and without an Internet connection, how are your employees
supposed to do their jobs? But a way out is also a way in. Traditional antivirus
programs and firewalls are only able to detect and remove files containing code
associated with malware and manage incoming and outgoing network communi-
cations respectively. There is no way for either of them to discover e.g. password
guessing since the activity in itself is neither concerned with malicious code nor
network communications.
What is needed is something auditing the system with a holistic perspective.




For an intrusion detection system (IDS) to properly perform its task, it has to
process a huge amount of information from firewalls, logs and audit records. The
detection rules of the IDS will only single out a small part of the daily events as
suspicious and raise an alarm, but a small part of a huge amount may still be a
lot. As attacks in general are meant to go undetected, attackers try their best
to masquerade their appearance. To accommodate this, the detection rules are
defined in a slightly vague fashion. Unfortunately this vagueness increases the
chance of legitimate actions being labeled as suspicious, a prevailing problem
known as false positives.
In many current IDSs, it is the operator that must manually distinguish between
true and false positives.1 The fact that false positives easily outnumber the true
alarms does not, in general, make the operator any happier. Finding the real
threats can be the equivalence of finding a needle in a haystack.
1.3 Goal
To investigate the problem described in 1.2 and to see what can be done about
it we intend to:
1. study current methods for reducing the number of alarms.
2. improve and implement one of these methods in an available IDS.
1.4 Limitations
This thesis is not an evaluation of IDSs and their effectiveness, nor is it about
how to detect suspicious activities in a host or network. The method survey is
not a complete or exhaustive survey and the chosen reports should be viewed
as representatives of their respective areas.
1.5 Document Organization
Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the workings of an IDS, as well as
a presentation of the IDS Snort and two of its most common interfaces, BASE
and Snorby.
Chapter 3 presents a limited survey of methods used for prioritizing and re-
ducing alarms.
Chapter 4 presents the methodology behind our work.
Chapter 5 presents our findings and conclusions.





This chapter describes Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), how they work in
general and a brief overview of systems available today.
2.1 General Overview
An IDS is similar to an antivirus program scanning files for malicious code.
But where the traditional antivirus program only scans the content of a file the
IDS parses and interprets network traffic and/or host activities. An IDS can
use data collected from network packet analysis, logs from routers, firewalls,
servers, local systems and system calls to mention a few [1]. Just like the
antivirus program an IDS has a set of rules or a database containing known
attack signatures. The IDS compares the signatures against patterns of activity,
traffic or behaviour deduced from the data and issues an alarm when the pattern
or behaviour is a close match. Besides from just issuing an alarm an IDS may
in some cases also take active countermeasures such as shutting down Internet
links, launch back-traces or make other attempts to identify the attacker and
gather evidence. Specifically, an IDS detects unauthorized use of or attacks on
a system or network. An IDS can, just like a firewall, either be software-based
or hardware-based.
Figure 2.1 shows an overview of a generic IDS. Target system refers to where
the sensor is situated, i.e. a router or an ordinary host. Sensor is a piece of
software responsible for collecting data for the IDS. The data can originate from
a multitude of sources each with its own format. The pre-processor is responsible
for weeding out the data required for analysis and transforming it into a format
that can be understood by the IDS. The analysis engine vets the data against
the rules and policies to determine whether it is benign or malicious. Post-
processing involves correlation of alarms, or construction of attack scenarios,
or collection of alarms from other analysis engines. The response unit decides
for each alarm if the reaction to it should be active or passive [25]. A passive
15
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of a generic IDS [25].
response includes generation of alarms or log entries but other than that it does
not interfere with the traffic in any way. An active response on the other hand,
may reset the TCP connections in order to disrupt communications, simply drop
traffic if the IDS is inline, add the malicious host to blocking lists, or in any
other way disturb the attacker [1].
The typical IDS will not prevent an attack, its function is to detect and alert.
However, some IDSs do have this attack-preventing feature and are called IPSs,
intrusion prevention systems. But they are a minority, the typical IDS should
be viewed as a complement to a firewall, antivirus software, and such and not
as a replacement.
2.1.1 Placement
There are generally three different kinds of IDS,
• Network-based IDSs (NIDSs), monitors network links and backbones look-
ing for attack signatures.
• Host-based IDSs (HIDSs), monitors the operating system and file system
for signs of intrusion.
• Distributed IDSs (DIDSs), a number of IDSs used as remote sensors re-
porting to some kind of central management system.
There are also IDSs specifically dedicated to gateways monitoring the traffic
passing in and out of the home network and IDSs dedicated to application-
specific traffic understanding the flow of the application logic and the underlying
protocols.
NIDS (Network-based IDS) A NIDS is an IDS that can monitor an entire
segment of the network (see figure on page 17). It is placed on (an) appropriate
16
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Figure 2.2: Architecture of a NIDS.
segment(s) of the network. All traffic seen by the network interface card (NIC)
is passed on to the IDS. The advantages of a NIDS is the fact that it does
not affect either the systems of the network or the network itself since it just
passively records any traffic seen by the NIC. One disadvantage is that it only
sees the traffic by its NIC. Packets taking a different route through the network
will be missed. Therefore, a NIDS does not always see the whole picture.
HIDS (Host-based IDS) A HIDS protects only the host on which it is situated
(see figure on page 18). Due to its location it has access to other types of data
than just network information, including local information such as system calls,
file system modifications, and system logs. A plus with the HIDS is the fact
that it is possible to adapt the ruleset in great detail for each host. The ruleset
only has to deal with the services specific for that host. A NIDS must have
rulesets to deal with everything since it will see everything in traffic on the
network. The fine tailored ruleset for HIDS reduces processor overhead and
enhances performance for each host. The drawback of a HIDS is the fact that
it steals computing power from its host, unlike a NIDS.
DIDS (Distributed IDS) The standard DIDS is part of a manager/probe ar-
chitecture (see figure on page 18). NIDS and/or HIDS sensors placed throughout
the network report to a centralized management station which compiles the re-
ports. Attack logs can be uploaded and new attack signatures downloaded from
the central management to the sensors as needed. The benefit of a DIDS is the
holistic view it presents supplementing the NIDS, unaware of the state of hosts,
and the HIDS, unaware of the state of the network. Since all systems have their
drawbacks, so has also this one. The DIDS uses the internal network to com-
municate with the centralized management, and if the network is incapacitated,
so is the holistic view.
17
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Figure 2.3: Architecture of a HIDS.
Figure 2.4: Architecture of a DIDS.
18
CHAPTER 2. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
2.1.2 Detection Schemes
There are two different approaches an IDS can take when deciding if an event
should be reported as an alarm or not, anomaly detection and misuse de-
tection.
Anomaly detection, also known as statistical detection, strives to define nor-
mal, expected behaviour [35]. It is based on the idea that attacks and intruders
displays different behaviour than the normal legitimate user. E.g. a trojan set-
ting up a high number of connections where the normal user would yield only
a handful of connections will result in an alarm [24]. To be able to decide
what actions are anomalous a baseline of normality for user behaviour and sys-
tem activity has to be established. The baseline is either predefined by the
system developers or constructed using statistical sampling, specification-based
approaches or neural networks [1]. Recording and deciding normal behaviour is
a complicated process. It is hard to exhaustively define normal behaviour since
it is dynamic and changes over time. Homogeneous systems with a moderate
number of users where the same actions are performed repeatedly are much
more readily described than a heterogeneous system with maybe thousands of
users, say a university network. It is also hard deciding what is an anomaly and
what is a minor deviation in the behaviour of the user. To partly compensate
for this uncertainty, the decision function works with intervals and boundary
values. The behaviour is allowed to slide a bit from the expected value without
triggering alarms. When an alarm is triggered, the alarm is accompanied by
a certainty value depending on how far off the behaviour is. This helps when
quickly deciding if an event should be considered as to be a true or false positive,
although caution should be exerted. Inappropriately set threshold values are a
potential disaster. Set too high and attacks are be missed, set too low and the
level of false positives skyrockets.
Policing all activities is a costly endeavour since the extensive logging needed
by the system to perform has a significant impact on the performance of the
host. This makes anomaly detection less suitable for real-time systems [1].
Anomaly detection has its benefits and drawbacks. Anomalous behaviour does
not have to be an indication of an attack, the explanation for the altered be-
haviour could be as simple as new assignments for the user or a new service on
the network. This results in costly false positives which have to be examined
[24]. But this weakness is also the strength of anomaly detection. Although
unaware of the ways of novel attacks an anomaly detecting IDS is still able to
produce alarms for the novel attacks - as long as the attacks results in a system
behaviour different from the normal. Unfortunately this is not the only obstacle
to be conquered. When choosing the parameters to build the baseline, one has
to make a correct selection of parameters and not choose too few or too many.
Too few will result in an incomplete model missing attacks and too many will
unnecessarily burden the host system.
Misuse detection, also known as signature-based detection or rule-based de-
tection, strives to define improper behaviour [35]. It follows the same principles
as an antivirus program. Patterns of misuse called attack signatures are stored
in a database and the audited area, may it be log files or network traffic, is
19
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vetted against these and any match will result in an alarm. A signature can
be i.e. a string to search for in packets or a sequence of actions. Intrusion
schemes are, just like malware, ever changing; the signatures must therefore be
constantly updated as not to miss any attack. Most IDSs adhere to the misuse
principle [24].
This method has both advantages and disadvantages if compared with anomaly
detection. Where misuse detection cannot catch novel attacks, anomaly detec-
tion can. Where anomaly detection can never be quite certain of an intrusion,
misuse detection can. Misuse detection suffers from similar definition problems
as anomaly detection. The problem with attack signatures is how to define them
and still be able to catch all misdeeds without causing false positives to trigger
off on normal traffic.
To summarize; an IDS can adhere to a known-good (anomaly detection) or a
known-bad (misuse detection) policy [1]. Known-good has configuration files
with the acceptable behaviour explicitly stated. All else yields alarms. Known-
bad is much simpler since it does not require a comprehensive model of al-
lowed input. Known-bad trigger alarms only on traffic that is known to be bad.
Known-bad and known-good both have drawbacks and benefits. Known-bad is
easier on the processors, alerting only when something matches a rule. Unfor-
tunately it can only alert on what is stated in the rules. Anything else sails
through. Known-good has the benefit of being able to alert on novel attacks
as long as they yield a behaviour deviating from the configured acceptable be-
haviour. The drawback of known-good is the impossible task of modelling all
behaviour that is acceptable which results in many false positives. On top of
that, it is completely normal for a user’s behaviour to change over time. Also
if the system is able to cope with a slowly changing behaviour, who is to say
an intruder would not slowly accustom the system to a behaviour which would
mask the planned intrusion? Most IDSs use a combination of the two.
2.1.3 Key Concepts
A true positive is an alarm correctly indicating an attack.
A true negative is an event correctly classified as benign.
A false positive is an alarm issued for a benign event mistaken for an attack.
This is not uncommon in an anomaly detection system where all events not
explicitly marked as approved issues an alarm [24]. Misuse detection is also
plagued by erroneous alarms, the cause being badly written detection rules or
benign traffic sporting a high similarity to malicious traffic [16]. Buggy software
and badly configured hardware adds to the load for both systems, effectively
drowning the true positives. This is a big problem today [3], and a lot of research
and effort goes into finding a way to minimize the effects false positives have on
an operator’s work situation and the system dealing with alarms.
A high level of false positives is normal for “young” IDSs and drops off with the
tweaking of the system over time [1].
A false negative is an attack the system fails to detect and is much more seri-
ous than a false positive [24]. Whereas false positives may obscure the view, the
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true positives are still there, are still logged and retrievable from the database.
An undetected attack is not logged anywhere and thus when and if the intru-
sion is detected there is no way of knowing for how long the system has been
compromised, what data to trust, which backup is clean or how much havoc has
been wreaked.
2.1.4 Motivation
So why bother having an IDS as it seems like a lot of headache? E.g. say a
company one day discovers that someone has gained unauthorized access to
their database. If they have no IDS, how can they know if they can trust their
data? Find out when the breach happened? And if any of the backups can be
trusted?
An IDS, hopefully, grants the ability to discover reconnaissance attempts, at-
tempted system compromise or other malicious activity and this can mean the
difference between being compromised or not. If no one is aware of the attacker
trying to break into the system, how can she be stopped? With an IDS able
to warn the administrator of a successful attack, the administrator can take
measures to limit the damage or take the system oﬄine to examine the extent
of the breach.
Another reason to have an IDS is its data mining properties helping the adminis-
trator finding subtle trends in large amount of data, which would be impossible
for a human to find unaided. Correlation between alarms and hosts helps the
administrator to see patterns otherwise hidden.
No matter how big a help the IDS is, skilled analysts will always be needed to
sift through the alarms the system produces. They have to be able to separate
the real alarms from false positives. No matter how much the system learns, it
will never be able to assess the level of a threat like a skilled and experienced
analyst knowing her network.
2.2 Available systems
There are a great many IDS, IPS, and GUI available today from many different
software companies. Many are commercial systems targeted at consumers and
their home computers such as antivirus and firewall applications offered by
Symantec, ESET and others. The systems that we are interested in in this
thesis are however not targeted at home computers. They are designed to
handle loads much greater than what a home computer ever will encounter, and
require knowledge that most people do not have. During the course of our work
we have studied a few of them, and most of them are open-source systems as




Snort [34] is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention system
now developed by Sourcefire and was originally released in 1998 [31]. It has three
modes of operation. Packet sniffer mode reads packet headers and displays
them on the console. Packet logger mode will log received packets to a file.
Network intrusion detection mode will analyse incoming packets and detect
intrusion attempts. Snort analyses network traffic with the help of predefined
rules containing detailed descriptions of what kind of traffic should be considered
harmful to the network. In other words it uses the misuse-based paradigm.
These rules may also contain actions to be taken when a specific attack is
detected. Appropriate actions can be to log the alarm to a database, send
an email to an administrator or terminate the offending connection. With the
help of these rules Snort looks at all parts of incoming network packets (header
and payload) to determine whether each individual packet should be considered
malicious or not. If a packet is considered malicious the appropriate action for
that type of alarm will be taken.
The alarms that are captured by Snort are by no means guaranteed to be actual
attacks or intrusion attempts made by an adversary. Snort is only designed to
recognise possible attempted attacks on the network. This means it is essentially
just a dumb sensor filtering out traffic matching a set of predefined rules. In turn
this means that there is a relatively high chance that a majority of the alarms
are going to be false positives (depending on how large a target for attacks the
network is). The hard work then of analyzing the alarms and see the correlation
between different alarms is left entirely to the operator to handle.
Snort sensors are most commonly placed in front of the firewall protecting the
local network so they can capture the unfiltered traffic coming from the Internet.
Figure 2.2 on page 17 is a good example of such a sensor placement. If the local
network is very big and divided into subnets it might be a good idea to also place
Snort sensors at the border of those subnets. Placing more than one Snort sensor
in the network can help tracking the attack as it progresses in the network. An
attack most commonly start with someone attempting to penetrate the outer
defences (firewalls), if this succeeds they might attempt to infect a computer on
the inside. If the computer is successfully infected it will become their bridge
into the network. Therefore it would be good to have more sensors inside the
network to monitor traffic between computers. The Snort sensor at the border
to the internet will only be able to see incoming and outgoing traffic and not
traffic moving between the hosts of the internal network.
Preprocessors
Preprocessors are plug-ins which can be used with Snort to rearrange or modify
incoming packets before they reach the filtering engine. The Snort preprocessors
generally fall into two categories. They can be used to either examine packets
for suspicious activity or modify packets so the detection engine can properly
interpret them. An “examining” preprocessor has the ability to detect non-
signature-based attacks that the detection engine cannot track down. Such
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attacks include port-scans where a state has to be saved between many different
connections to determine whether there is a port-scan occurring.
The second kind of preprocessor normalizes incoming traffic so the detection
engine will be able to properly detect attacks. Incoming packets can for example
be fragmented because the original packet was too large. This creates a problem
for the detection engine since the harmful part of the package might be split
into two different packets, which results in the detection engine failing to trigger
an alarm. Preprocessors are here to mend this situation by stitching the two
fragmented packets together again. Packet fragmentation usually happens when
packets travel between different types of networks. I.e. if a packet travels into an
Ethernet network and is larger than the MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) for
that network the packet will be split into two or more packets to be reassembled
when it reaches its destination.
Rules
Snort rules are divided into two logical sections, the rule header and the rule
options. The header contains the rule’s action, protocol, source and destination
IP addresses and netmasks, and the source and destination ports information.
The rule option section contains alarm messages and information on which parts
of the packet should be inspected to determine if the rule action should be taken.
Actions that can be taken include logging the activity, dropping the packet all
together, reject it (with TCP, RST or ICMP port unreachable), and pass (ignore
the packet).
1 alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111 \
2 (content :"|00 01 86 a5|"; msg:" mountd access ";)
 
Listing 2.1: Example Snort rule
Listing 2.1 defines a rule to generate an alarm if there is traffic coming from any
ip or port to a local address 192.168.1.0/24 on port 111 with a payload containing
the binary data “00 01 86 a5”. The binary sequence “00 01 86 a5” can be
located anywhere within the payload for a match to occur. When that happens
an alarm will be logged with the message “mountd access”. Backslash is used
to divide the rule onto multiple rows, the default interpretation is otherwise one
row one rule.
2.2.2 BASE
BASE [15] stands for Basic Analysis and Security Engine and is designed to
read and display the logged alarms Snort has generated. Alarms are displayed
to the user via a web interface written in PHP.
Figure 2.5 gives a statistical overview of what has been logged by the differ-
ent sensors such as the distribution of different protocols of the logged alarms.
There are also links to the most common views that an administrator will be
interested in keeping an eye on, e.g. most recent alarms and most common
alarms. The views can be further specialised by using the search function where
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Figure 2.5: BASE home screen.
the administrator can be more precise about what he/she is looking for in the
database.
BASE also gives the user the capability to add alarms to groups making it easier
for the user to spot trends in the incoming alarms. Adding alarms to groups is
an entirely manual process. Alarms that have been placed in a group can then
be viewed in a special tab of their own.
To give the user a better overview of the most recent attacks, BASE generates
graphs using statistics Snort has gathered. The user controls what is displayed in
the graph via comprehensive controls. Simple graphs, such as number of attacks
over time can be generated as well as more in-depth graphs only displaying
statistics for a single host or port.
2.2.3 Snorby
Snorby [27] (Figure 2.6) is, like BASE, a web-interface for Snort and has many
of the same features. It is developed using Ruby on Rails [38] and uses many
of the modern web development techniques available today, such as Ajax and
Flash. The main difference to BASE is that Snorby is built with collaboration
between users in mind. All users have two main collaboration tools at their
disposal, marking events with a star and leaving comments.
Marking events with a star is similar to placing a bookmark. The user simply
clicks on the star icon associated with that particular event to mark it. Starred
events are gathered in a separate list common to all users, meaning if one user
stars an event everyone else will be able to see it as well. This promotes col-
laboration in that all users can work together to find interesting or important
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events and investigate these further. This also works well with the other collab-
oration tool in Snorby, the commentary system. When starring an event, the
user can leave a comment explaining why that particular event is of interest or
need further investigation. At a later time, when an administrator logs on to
the system she can view those starred alarms, read the comments, review them,
and take an appropriate action.
Snorby also has the ability to generate automated reports that are mailed to
the system administrator. These reports contain summary statistics about what
kind of alarms the Snort sensor has generated the previous week as well as more
in-depth information about important alarms.
2.2.4 Cisco MARS
MARS [4] stands for Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System, and is a
network security suite developed by Cisco. In contrast to Snort, BASE, and
Snorby this system costs money to buy and install in a network. But it also
has much more to offer than the previous systems. MARS is more than just a
network sensor that looks for malicious traffic on the network. It is more like a
command central for all systems that have a security role in the network, such
as firewalls, network sensors, antivirus programs, and much more. It combines
information from many different sources into one interface that is easier to
overview, and more than that it also correlates the collected information.
By correlating the information, MARS can detect chains of events that are re-
lated to each other across all the different sensors. If an attacker starts attacking
a computer and tries to gain root access this can potentially be detected in a
number of different places. The attacker might try to exploit a vulnerability
on a mail server, which is visible from outside the network. Before the attack
reaches the mail server it has to pass the firewall and probably a network sensor
similar to Snort. If it gets past the first firewall, the mail server itself might
have a firewall of its own. Lastly the mail server will have a system log that
stores messages about local events, i.e. if someone tries to login on the computer
a log message will be created. MARS is fed all this information from all these
different sources and correlates them into a form more easily overviewed. The
operator can then see exactly what has happened from start to finish in the
attack, and even if it succeeded or not. MARS will also try to give suggestions
about where the attack can be mitigated most effectively so it does not happen
again.
Cisco MARS also has the ability to collaborate with other similar MARS systems
that are deployed around the world. Useful information about attacks are shared
between these to help detect new and unknown attacks. For example, blacklists
used to block spam mail are also used to detect suspicious incoming traffic.
Traffic sent from a computer known to be a spammer gets logged and reported
to an operator automatically. This can be useful to know as much of the spam
mail sent today are sent from bot nets operated by criminals. Knowing if such
traffic suddenly increases might give an early warning that something bad is




This chapter presents different methods helping the operator of an IDS handle
the amount of alarms produced, with a focus on false positives.
The algorithms behind the methods presented below are nothing new and have
been used within research since the 80s. One can follow how the area matures in
the literature through the decades. The same methods used to find anomalies
[36, 10, 22, 14, 11, 32, 21, 20] and detect misuse [36, 13, 23, 19, 37, 18] are
used today to form more abstract higher level alarms out of specific lower level
alarms.
Reducing the amount of data is not a novel idea either [12]. Focus has shifted
though with the growing hardware capacities, from reducing the amount of
data for the benefit of the system to the benefit of the operator. Frank [12]
also breathes the hope that with good enough rules, systems and/or training
examples, false positives and false negatives can be brought down to a minimum.
This hope is rebutted by Axelsson [3] where he makes calculations on the base-
rate fallacy and points out the consequence, that false alarms are something we
will probably never get rid of as the false alarm rate will have to be impossibly
low for that to happen. This seems to be a generally accepted truth and the
way to reduce false positives today is to apply the methods presented below
thus hopefully minimizing the effect from false positives.
3.1 Aggregation
The meaning of aggregation varies greatly between reports and we therefore feel
the need to define the word ourselves.
Definition 1. Aggregation is the process of grouping alarms together based
on certain user-defined criteria found in alarms.
Alarms can be aggregated based on any attributes found in alarms such as:
destination IP, alarm type, content of data portion.
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Of the methods presented in this chapter, aggregation is the most low level and
straight forward of them all. Hence, it is not common in the literature to focus
solely on aggregation. Aggregation is now more of a ubiquitous step in any
scheme processing alarms.
Debar and Wespi are among the few still explicitly mentioning aggregation even
though very little attention is given to it, mainly focusing on correlation [9].
They describe how to aggregate and correlate alarms with the ACC – aggrega-
tion and correlation component. The task of which is to present a condensed
view of the input received from multiple sensors and ACCs. Incoming events
are processed by extracting common information and finding a match in pre-
vious observations. Correlation relationships are then formed by looking for
duplicates and consequences.
A duplicate is an alarm whose cause have already been taken into account by
the ACC algorithm. How alarms are judged to be duplicates is specified in a
configuration file. A consequence is an alarm that under some conditions gives
reason to expect others to follow. For a following alarm to be considered a part
of the consequence chain it must occur within a given interval of its predecessor.
As with duplicates, consequence chains are declared in a configuration file.
Lastly, the correlated alarms are aggregated into situations, where alarms have
certain characteristics in common. This step is performed since isolated events
are often considered insignificant. A situation is defined by four terms: alarms
class, source, target and severity level. The user is presented the situations
which are fewer in number than the original unprocessed alarms.
3.2 Correlation
Aggregation of alarms still leaves a lot of alarms to be inspected and further
methods have been explored to crop the number of alarms presented to the user.
The term correlation is used for a variety of methods to compress the number
of alarms displayed for the user. To eliminate ambiguity we again feel the need
to make a definition.
Definition 2. Correlation is the process of building data models from alarms
using external knowledge not found within the information carried by the alarms
themselves.
External knowledge might be such as how alarms appear together, or the im-
pact attacks have on the network. The idea is that correlation will suppress
the impact of false positives by lifting the alarms to a higher level of reason
and putting them into context. False positives are marginalized and the true
positives are put into focus.
In this chapter, two methods of correlation are presented, correlation using
conditions and correlation using probabilities.
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3.2.1 Using conditions
Correlation using conditions continues the chain of thought presented by Debar
and Wespi [9] for aggregation, some alarms are consequences of others. The
idea is that most intrusions are not isolated and are part of a chain of actions
where earlier actions are preparing for later. Each alarm is associated with
a set of pre-conditions to be fulfilled for the attack to succeed, and a set of
post-conditions describing the aftermath of the attack, if succeeded. Attack
chains are formed by connecting the pre-conditions of one alarm with the post-
conditions of one or several other alarms. The attack chains are meant to 1)
result in fewer items for the operator to inspect and 2) remove false positives
since they do not belong to any attack chain.
As with the definitions of aggregation and correlation, there is no consensus
regarding denomination. Ning et al. [28] have developed a framework using
prerequisites and consequences as opposed to pre- and post- conditions. The
alarms and their connections are modelled onto graphs where nodes corresponds
to alarms and edges represents the relationships between them. If an alarm has
been decided to prepare for another, they are connected by an edge.
The resulting chains are intended to be analyzed by human users to understand
the correlated alarms as well as the strategies behind them. But the graphs can
get fairly big due to the amount of alarms. For a user to be able to manage
the graphs they have to be cropped. Ning et al. propose filtering out irrelevant
alarms and aggregating alarms of the same type as means. Here, aggregation
shows up as a vital part of the process without being given the same focus as
in Debar and Wespi [9].
Cuppens et al. [6] have developed something similar to Ning et al. [28] but
do not use graphs as a means to model alarms and relationships. As part
of the project MIRADOR, CRIM was developed as a cooperative module for
IDSs. It manages, clusters (groups alarms into sets corresponding to the same
occurrence of an attack), merges (creates a new alarm that is representative of
the information contained in the various alarms belonging to this cluster) and
correlates alarms.
Since an intruder, most likely, has to carry out several attacks in a certain order
to reach his goals, Cuppens et al. defines the task of the correlation function
as anticipating the intrusion plan. A set of candidate plans of the current
intrusion is returned by the function. The plans are denominated candidate
since the intruder might not have reached his goal yet. The result is used by the
reaction function to help the operator take the best course of actions against
the intruder.
When an alarm is received, the database is checked to see if the pre- conditions
of the new alarm can be linked to any post-conditions of stored alarms. If it
can, the correlation conditions are checked. An algorithm is then applied to the
pair to see if it might be merged into an existing attack scenario, if not a new
is started.
Another variation of this theme is the requires/provides model by Zhou et
al. [39]. Whereas CRIM by Cuppens et al. [6] and the model suggested by
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Ning et al. [28] use predicates to describe the state of the network, Zhou’s
model is based on capabilities which describe what the attacker can access
on the network. Inference rules are drawn between the capabilities, and if all
capabilities of requires (cf. pre-conditions of Cuppens et al. and prerequisites
of Ning et al.) can be inferred from the capabilities of provides (cf. post-
conditions of Cuppens et al. and consequences of Ning et al.) the two alarms
are correlated.
3.2.2 Using probabilities
The use of conditions for correlation, see previous section of Ning et al. [28],
Cuppens et al. [6] and Zhou et al. [39], is a black and white procedure. Either
all of the conditions for correlation are fulfilled and the alarms are correlated, or
it fails. Correlation using probabilities adopts a grayer view of the correlation
process. Instead of all or nothing, the probability of an alarm being correlated
to another is calculated. That probability is then used when deciding if the
alarms belong together.
Dain and Cunningham [8] have developed an algorithm for fusing and combining
alarms into scenarios. A scenario is described as a sequence of alarms grouped
together as they share a common cause. Whole scenarios are labeled as false
instead of individual alarms thus simplifying for the operator. Each new alarm
is compared to the existing scenarios using data mining techniques and the
probability of the alarm belonging to that scenario is calculated. The alarm
is then added to the most likely candidate, the scenario yielding the highest
probability. If none exists a new one is created.
The most flexible way to fuse an alarm into a scenario would be to consider all
possible ways of combining each new alarm with all previously collected, recal-
culating for each alarm how the biggest scenarios can be formed. This would
quickly become computationally infeasible. Obviously, this is not possible. In-
stead an atom model is proposed. The new alarm is compared to all so far
constructed scenarios and merged with the one returning the highest probability
of correlation. If all scenarios return a probability lower than a preconfigured
threshold, the alarm joins a new scenario. Once assigned a scenario the alarm
is not reconsidered or reassigned, hence the term, atom model. This procedure
might generate errors but greatly simplifies deciding how to assign alarms.
3.3 Finding the normal
Up to 90% of all alarms have benign causes such as misconfigured hardware
and buggy software [16]. By “finding the normal” we refer to the process of
finding the alarms caused by benign events. To be able to identify and remove
these before applying the correlation methods mentioned in previous section
holds a lot of promise. The amount of data that is processed by the models is
significantly decreased, as well as the data presented to the user.
A very straight forward method is applied by Gengo and Clifton [5]. By us-
ing a data mining technique called frequent episodes, common and recurring
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sequences of alarms for a given site are identified. These are then manually an-
alyzed to see whether they result from normal operations. With the help from
these alarms, site-specific filters can be constructed which may help reducing
the amount of alarms presented to the administrator.
Julisch [16] is of the same idea as Gengo and Clifton but attacks the problem
from a higher level of abstraction. Alarms are grouped in clusters and for each
cluster a meta-alarm, a generalized alarm, is derived. A generalized alarm is a
pattern which the alarm created by the IDS must match in order to belong to
that cluster.
Julisch focuses on bringing alarms into clusters where each cluster represents
the root cause behind the alarms. A root cause is defined as a “problem that
affects components and cause them to trigger alarms”.
To be able to generalize alarms a single rooted and connected directed acyclic
graph (DAG) called a generalization hierarchy is constructed over each attribute,
of the alarm. Each parent node in the graph is a more generalized attribute
than any of its children nodes. To generalize an alarm, its attributes are located
in the DAG. The attributes of the alarm are then replaced by the parents. The
problem with DAGs is that there might be more than one parent to a node.
When generalizing alarms one can face problems when there is more than one
choice. Julisch proposes two strategies to resolve this:
• choose-one - user-defined rules decides which parent to choose.
• explore-all - pursues all possible generalizations in parallel and retains
the one that first leads to a generalized alarm of a user defined size.
A somewhat different approach is used by Manganaris et al. [26] Instead of
filtering out or removing the benign alarms as Julisch [16] and Clifton and
Gengo [5] do above, they are viewed as something normal. The idea is presented
as applying anomaly detection on the output from a misuse detection system. A
base template of what the normal alarms are and how they behave is established,
when the “normal” alarms suddenly change in frequency or in sequence, an
alarm is raised. The basic idea Manganaris et al. have is that repetitive behavior
over long periods of time is in all likelihood normal. Combinations of certain
alarms occurring in close temporal proximity of each other and always in the
same order, for an extended period of time are deemed less suspicious than a
sudden burst of novel alarms. To discover the sets of benign alarms occurring
frequently, association analysis is used on the bursts of alarms.
3.4 Ranking
Correlation in Section 3.2 and filtration in Section 3.3 helps the operator a great
deal, reducing the number of items to go through. They do not however help
the operator to rank and process the result in regard of importance. This is
addressed by Almgren and Jonsson [2] and Porras et al. [30]. The two reports
have diametrically opposed methods to rank alarms.
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Almgren and Jonsson [2] pose the question: “is it possible to capture the pref-
erences of the site security officer (SSO) by monitoring her normal interaction
with the IDS?” or put a little differently: “is it possible to prioritize alarms
based on the feedback from the user?” Their aim is to develop a system that
learns how to rank alarms based on the input from the user and local operational
conditions. This model assumes the use of a graphical user interface to display
the alarms and interaction from the user in the form of clicking on alarms. Four
interaction modes are presented:
• Clicking - the system stores information on what alarms the user clicks
on. Assumes that alarms clicked on is of greater interest than those not
touched. Ranks those with a larger amount of clicks higher than those
with a lesser amount.
• Directed learning - this is an extended form of clicking. On top of the
normal procedures the user has the choice of specifying to the system why
she finds this particular alarm interesting.
• Feedback - the system ranks the alarms and specifies for each a reason
why it is raked the way it is. The user then has the option of either
agreeing or disagreeing with the ranking. This is in a way directed learning
in reverse. Instead of the user telling the system, the system is telling the
user.
• Explicit questions - this is another extension of clicking where the sys-
tem occasionally asks the user how to rank an alarm.
Almgren and Jonsson estimate the first interaction mode, clicking, to be the
base case of all proposed interaction modes and concentrate on this first. The
work flow of the base case is intended to follow
1. alarms are presented based on the current ranking function.
2. the SSO reviews the ranked list to assess the most important alarms.
3. the SSO investigates the most important alarms by clicking on them.
4. the system evaluates the current ranking function by checking what alarms
were clicked and if these indeed were ranked highest. If not, the system
reevaluates the ranking function using the feedback from the clicks for
improvement.
5. a new view is presented to the user based on the new sample ranking
function.
The system presented by Almgren and Jonsson operates on an on-the-fly con-
figuration. The ranking M-correlator devloped by Porras et al. [30] operates on
utterly opposite premises. It is dependent on configuration files describing the
topology of the system, the most critical assets and alarms of interest for the
operator.
As can be seen above, the final ranking score is dependent upon a multitude of
variables. The correlator starts though with filtering out alarms the operator
has expressed low interest in. On the alarms passed by the filters a relevance
score is calculated for each, this corresponds to the relevance node in the graph.
Each alarm is compared against a map of the topology of the network containing
32
CHAPTER 3. PREVIOUS WORK
Figure 3.1: The Bayesian network used when calculating the final rank score
for alarms in the M-correlator by Porras et al. [30].
information about such things as running applications, OS, services, open ports,
to see how relevant the alarm is to the network. The M-Correlator includes an
Incident Handling Fact Base which provides information about vulnerability
dependencies. E.g. an alarm pertaining to a Microsoft Server would yield a low
relevance score in an environment running Apache. The map of the network
is automatically generated by the tool Nmap. The M-Correlator moves on to
calculate the priority of the alarm. This relies on two variables (priority node in
the graph). One is to what degree the alarm is targeting data assets and services
most critical for the client users. These are enumerated in a configuration file
by the operator. The other concers which alarms are of greatest interest to the
operator. This is also specified by the operator in a configuration file. Lastly,
an incident rank is assigned to each alarm based on the previously calculated
relvance and priority scores, reflecting the possible impact the attack would have
on the system and the likelihood of its success (outcome in the graph). Once an
alarm has been given an incident rank the M-Correlator tries to merge related
alarms together into higher-level security incidents which in turn are ranked.
This is done by aid from the Incident Handling Fact Base which also carries
information about what types of alarms can be merged.
The relevance score, priority calculation and incident rank are all computed by
using a variation of the Bayes framework for belief propagation in trees.
3.5 User input
Only a few reports mention user input and only Almgren and Jonsson [2] focus
exclusively on the interaction between system and operator. The interaction
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can be passive with the system simply observing the user and trying to draw
conclusions from these observations and any possible user input, or it can be
active posing specific questions to the user, initiating the interaction. This
makes the system dynamic in the sense that the algorithm behind the ranking
possibly changes by every interaction.
The time the correlation system of Cunningham et al. [7] is exposed to the user
is limited only to the user tagged sets it is trained upon before launch. This is
the only interaction with the system, making it a static one, since beyond the
initial training set, there are no modifications to how the algorithm processes
the alarms.
Attempting to reduce the number of false positives Pietraszek [29] first lets
the user classify a set of alarms, then machine learning techniques are used
on training examples the system derives from the original set of user classified
alarms to generate rules of how to classify. The alarms classified by the rules are
then sent to the user for optional scrutiny. Alarms are re-classified as needed.
Although the user is very involved in the process of classifying alarms, this is
very little highlighted by Pietraszek. Nothing is mentioned about the process
of classifying the starting set of alarms, or the process of reclassifying, or about
how the interaction functions, or what kind of input the system expects and
what kind of feedback it gives.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the mission based system of Porras et al. [30]
involves the user, although quite extensively, only during start-up, similar to
Cunningham et al. [7]. The user has to enumerate critical data assets and
services and specify an interest profile describing which classes of alarms are of
greater concern. However, there is no interaction with the user once the system
is on line and there is no discussion about giving feedback to the system or
what to do if the user is dissatisfied with the ranking. However, Porras et al.
describe an adaptive mode concerning the conditional probability tables (CPTs)
under the section describing the Bayes calculation. Here the analyst presents
simulated alarms to the system which are then ranked. For each alarm, the
ranking is either accepted or changed to a more accurate one by the analyst.
The effect will be that the CPTs change to some extent to better mirror the
preferences of the analyst. This adaptive mode is never evaluated or mentioned
again in the remainder of the report.
All schemes have user input somewhere in the chain. Somewhere and some-
place there has to be a human involved in the process to either analyze an
alarm, describe the critical aspects of a network, evaluate performance, sepa-
rate unimportant alarms form the important or deciding if it is a true or false
positive. Clifton and Gengo [5] described in Section 3.3 need the user to deter-
mine whether a frequent episode is benign. The same goes for Julisch [16] in
the same section. The generalization hierarchies must all be defined by the user
and contains the knowledge of the user about the system and about alarms in
general.
In the next chapter we discuss how the methods presented here relate to our




In order to investigate current methods of prioritizing and managing alarms,
we have studied current research in form of published reports and books, as
described in Chapter 3. We have also interviewed four professionals.1 Based
on this material, we had a number of options to choose from when deciding on
a possible improvement to an existing IDS. The choice finally settled on the
implementation of a ranking functionality in the architecture Snort/Snorby.
Choosing method for implementation
Aggregation was the first to be rejected due to its simple and confined nature.
Correlation (see Section 3.2) is a labour intensive and time consuming method
in regard to identifying and defining pre-conditions and post-conditions. This
makes correlation an activity incompatible with the continuous task of inspect-
ing incoming alarms. As our interest lies with the everyday interaction a user
has with the IDS, correlation is rejected. Set up of filters is done prior to the de-
ployment of the IDS. The setup process is in no way part of everyday operations
making this less interesting.
Ranking is a necessary step whether the system employs aggregation, correla-
tion, ranking or a collaboration of them all. As long as there are more than
one alarm to inspect, the operator has to make a choice in which alarm to in-
spect first. That choice is the essence of ranking - which is the most important
alarm to look at? For these reasons we have chosen to implement a variation of
ranking.
Choosing architecture to make implementation on
To be able to make improvements to an existing IDS we needed access to the
source code, which is easier with open source projects. Snort is an obvious
choice because of its longevity and dominance within its field. Of the interfaces
available for Snort only two seem to be in use today, BASE and Snorby, where
1See appendix D.
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we chose the latter for this project. BASE is written in PHP and Snorby in
the framework Ruby on Rails. The latter facilitates implementation and leaves
more time to concentrate on the logic of the implementation. Finally, Snorby
is actively developed, meaning that our contributions may be used in future
releases.
4.1 How to implement ranking
There are two distinct methods for ranking, either heavily configured [30] or on-
the-fly configuration [2]. Out of these, the approach by Almgren and Jonsson [2]
seemed the most interesting, focusing on the ongoing interaction between user
and system. The system in Porras et al. [30] has a life-cycle similar to filtering,
only deployed once in the beginning. Any changes made to the configuration
files results in a restart of the system. We believe a dynamic system that can
learn is more useful to the operator.
The first two problems immediately encountered after settling on Almgren’s
and Jonsson’s [2] mode of interaction, were how to communicate to the system
why certain alarms are important and what information of the alarm to use
when deciding on a rank. There is of a lot of information such as destination
IP, source IP, destination port, source port, alarm signature, and/or patterns
in payload that might be of interest to a ranking system. A number of ways,
more or less time consuming were discussed during the course of finding a good
interaction model with the IDS. These are described in the following. For the
final method, see method 3 on page 37.
Interaction method 1: check boxes
One of the discussed and rejected suggestions was the use of check boxes (Fig-
ure 4.1). I.e. each alarm is presented with some check boxes, one each for the
attributes chosen for analysis. As we have chosen to follow the attributes des-
tination IP, source IP, destination port and alarm signature, our case results in
four boxes. The check boxes corresponding to the reason of interest are checked
and the result submitted to the IDS. The same suggestion was also presented
by Emilie Lundin Barse during her interview.2 Hopefully, this will let the IDS
make rather precise predictions about new alarms, whether the operator will
find them important or not. Over time the IDS will gather more information
and improve its performance, saving time for the operator as the critical alarms
will already be flagged. This holds a great benefit over the original clicking
method proposed by Almgren and Jonsson [2] where the system did not know
why an alarm was clicked and in a sense had to guess how to rank the alarms.
The problem and the ultimate reason for its rejection, is that we wanted the
necessary interaction to be as minimal as possible. If this model is extended to
track additional attributes, more check boxes will have to be added and the users
interaction with the system will become more complicated and time consuming.
2Emilie Lundin Barse (information security consultant, Combitech, interviewed in person
by the authors April 12, 2010), see appendix D.3.
36
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY
Figure 4.1: Conceptual design of check boxes for interaction with the ranking
system.
Interaction method 2: only clicking
A better approach would be to gather information in the background in a more
non-intrusive way but still get adequate information to make meaningful pre-
dictions. The first method suggested by Almgren and Jonsson [2], clicking, fits
our objective. It silently records on what alarms the user clicks and tries to
make predictions about rank.
Clicking in its original description has a shortcoming. It is only described as
an incrementing value, meaning a value either grows with clicking or remains
as is. But what if one would like to lower the priority of something? I.e. there
is a server with a serious security flaw. All alarms of a certain type targeting
the server is now of immense interest. In all, a few weeks pass by where all
such alarms are dutifully clicked and examined, until the vendor of the server
software releases a patch. All of a sudden, the previously important alarms are
now a hindrance. Here, it would be very beneficial to be able to rank these
alarms down and stop them from cluttering the view.
Interaction method 3: positive and negative feedback
The solution decided on, is used in a number of community news sites such as
Digg and Reddit and also by the video-sharing website YouTube. It gives the
user the ability to give positive and negative feedback to the system through
two buttons associated with each item. The system will change the rank of that
item according to the vote. News stories and videos appreciated by a lot of
votes will be ranked higher than other news stories and videos.
Figure 4.2: The thumbs up button and the thumbs down button to press for
liking respectively disliking a video on YouTube.
Our ranking model works in a similar manner, but instead of ranking news
stories it ranks alarms generated by Snort. There are two buttons associated
with each alarm, a “+” button and a “-” button. If the user clicks on one of
the buttons she gives that alarm a higher or lower priority respectively.
In reality, alarms are not clicked because of a single attribute.3 Instead, it is
3 Explained by Ola So¨derstro¨m (security analyst, Omegapoint, interviewed in person by
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Figure 4.3: Final design of buttons for negative and positive feedback. “+” is
for positive and “-” is for negative.
often a combination of attributes and external knowledge not found in alarms
that make alarms interesting.4 The ranking system tracks four basic attributes;
source IP, destination IP, destination port, and the signature of the alarms.
These are chosen since they are assumed to often be of interest to an operator.
There is a counter keeping track of the number of up and down votes a spe-
cific attribute receives. When voting for an alarm, each of the four attributes
receives a vote. Prioritizing (giving positive feedback to) an alarm increments
the counters for each of the four attributes associated with that alarm by one.
I.e. an alarm receives an up vote because of its destination port 79, the counter
for port 79 is incremented together with the counters associated with the values
of destination IP, source IP and alarm signature. The reason why the counters
for all attributes are incremented when clicking on an alarm is that the system
has no idea why a user clicks on an alarm. Since there is no way for it to guess
the reason, all it can do is to reward each attribute with one point.
This method of positive and negative feedback is less exact than the method
using check boxes described above, keeping the element of guess from regular
clicking. But, it is possible to add any number of attributes to the chosen
method without any difference to the user, something not possible with check
boxes as described above. Our hope is that the ranking system will recognize
what attributes are of importance when the user is able to give negative feedback
on alarms.
4.2 Time based weighing of votes
One problem with this set-up is that old votes influence the current rank as
much as new votes. I.e. consider two alarms A and B. If A received 50 votes
six months ago B would have to receive 51 votes before it is ranked higher by
the system. Most likely, this makes the ranking system slower and slower in
response to changes in the current level of threat. As new vulnerabilities crop
up and get patched continuously, this is not good. The ranking system should
be able to respond to new threats and give them a higher rank when relevant,
and as the threat disappears, let its rank dissipate over time.
Another problem is that votes for an attribute might fluctuate a lot over time as
Figure 4.4 shows. This poses a problem for the ranking system if it were to use
authors April 23, 2010).
4 By external knowledge we refer to information such as: is the source responsible for many
attacks recently, has the destination host been present in many alarms recently.
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Figure 4.4: Figure illustrating how voting measurements can fluctuate over time.
the number of votes directly as a score for the attribute. The ranking they get
would be very inconsistent from day to day and very hard to predict. Instead
it would be much better to use some sort of average that has a slower rate of
change.
To overcome the problem of equal influence of votes cast far apart in time and
fluctuations in the number of votes, we use an Exponential Moving Average
(EMA). EMA applies weights to data points (or votes in this case), where the
weights will become smaller as the data points get older. The formula of EMA
is defined as follows:
St = α× Yt + (1− α)× St−1
• Yt is the observation at a time period t.
• St is the value of the EMA at any time period t.
• The coefficient α decides the degree of influence the observed value has
on the new EMA value. α is a constant smoothing factor between 0
and 1. A higher α discounts older observations faster. Alternatively,
α may be expressed in terms of N time periods, where α = 2/(N +
1). For example, N = 19 is equivalent to α = 0.1. The half-life of the
weights (the interval over which the weights decrease by a factor of two)
is approximately N/2.8854 (within 1% if N > 5).
For a given set of observations {Y0, Y1, ..., Yn} this formula returns the EMA
value St for any time period t ≥ 1. S1 can be initialized in a number of different
ways of which the most common is to set S1 = Y0, but a more accurate way
would be to set S1 to be the average of the first 4 or 5 observations. However,
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Figure 4.5: Plotted curves showing the effect of using different smoothing fac-
tors.
the error created by setting S1 = Y0 dissipates over time; a smaller α makes the
choice of S1 relatively more important than a larger α value.
The EMA formula consists of two parts; the first part that calculates the influ-
ence of current observations (α× Yt), and the second part which calculates the
influence of old observations ((1 − α) × St−1). The value α and 1 − α decides
the influence that each part has on the new EMA value. These two parts are
then added together to form the new EMA value.
The old observations are represented with only one value (St−1) in this formula,
which is the previous EMA value that was calculated. However if we expand
St−1 in the second part of the formula we get the following:
St = α× Yt + (1− α)× (α× Yt−1 + (1− α)× (α× Yt−2 + (1− α)× (...)))
We see that it is a series of calculations where St−1 (when expanded) holds the
value of all previous observations. So to be able to calculate St we first have to
calculate Y0, Y1, ..., Yt−1 until we finally get to St. This is the way it is going
to work in our ranking system. For each new observation of how the users vote
we recalculate the EMA value using the current amount of votes, the previous
EMA value, and an appropriate α value.
Figure 4.5 shows the behaviour of the EMA formula with three different values of
N . The line called original data5 is the data set {Y0, ..., Yn} that is used as input
to the formula. In our ranking system this would be a set of cumulative numbers
representing how the users voted for different attributes each day. EMA-5,
EMA-10, and EMA-20 in the figure each represents values produced with the
5This data set is a series of fictional votes an attribute received over a period of time.
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EMA algorithm using 5, 10, and 20 respectively as values for N in the algorithm.
The largerN , the smaller the smoothing factor α is, and as a result, irregularities
are smoothed out more than with a smaller N .
As we follow the black line we can see that the number of votes for the fictional
attribute fluctuates a lot between different time periods. This variation could
happen for a number of different reasons, i.e. the attack might have some time
constraint that makes it happen more on some days than others. This fluctua-
tion is not good for our ranking system as it makes the rank very unpredictable.
But when the EMA formula is applied the result is much smoother. The big
jumps and drops in the numbers disappears. As big jumps or drops happens in
the line named original data, EMA-5, EMA-10, and EMA-20 will move in the
same direction but not as much. This is because of the α value in the EMA
formula, as it weighs the previous EMA value with the current value of the
original data line.
As an example we can look at the first point for each of the four lines. They all
start at 59 on the y-axis. The next point on the black line is at 72. To calculate










S1 = α× Y1 + (1− α)× S0
















This gives us the second point of the EMA-5 line. The same calculations can
be made for EMA-10 and EMA-20.
Figure 4.6 shows another way to illustrate how much influence a given data
point has after n time periods. At t = 0 the data point has as much influence
as it can have, it is worth 100% of its original value. As time passes it will
lose more and more of its original value in an exponential manner. The line
representing EMA-10 will have lost about 50% of its original value after about
3.5 days. This corresponds pretty well with the formula for calculating the half
life of an EMA value. With the formula this works out to: 10/2.8854 = 3.4657.
4.3 Implementation of whole system
The implementation of the ranking model is done on top of Snorby. Snorby
adds a few tables on top of the Snort database to support some of the additional
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Figure 4.6: Figure showing how fast previous observations lose their influence
in the EMA formula with three different weights. X-axis is the number of time
periods since the observation occurred, and the Y-axis is the influence in percent
that the observation has over the EMA value.
features that it offers, i.e. the commentary system. To add the ranking model on
top of Snorby, the number of times a user gives positive and negative feedback
to an alarm has to be counted. We decided that the simplest way to store user
feedback was to add columns and tables to the existing database where Snort
stores the alarms. This is accomplished by making two changes to Snorby; two
buttons (“+” and “-”) where added to each event (for positive and negative
feedback), and vote counters where created for each of the four attributes.
Each attribute (i.e. an IP address 10.0.0.5 or a port 80) will have several counters
associated with itself. Each counter will have a variable storing how many votes
one attribute received during a day. These values will then be used in the EMA
formula so the ranking system will be able to see trends in how the users of
the system votes. Three different EMA values will be used to highlight voting
changes over short, medium, and long time periods. But before we can do this
we have to take closer look at the database structure that Snort and Snorby
uses.
4.3.1 Snort database structure
The Snort database stores information about each malicious packet in a struc-
ture where the different parts of each packet are saved in different tables. It
basically stores the whole packet but divided up in its different parts. Our rank-
ing system will however only be interested in a small part of this information.
When a Snort sensor stores an event (alarms are called events) in the database
a unique identifier is generated for that event. This unique identifier, cid, is an





































































Figure 4.7: The Snorby database structure. This figure does not show the whole
database structure, but only the parts that are affected by our implementation
of the ranking model. Items marked in red indicate tables and values added to
the already existing database structure.
in the database. To allow for more than one sensor to store events without
risking collisions between cid values, a sensor id, sid is stored with every event
as well. These two values (sid and cid) forms the primary key for all the tables
storing information about captured packets. Figure 4.7 presents an overview of
the Snort database structure. It also presents the tables that we have added to
store the relevant information for each attribute to accommodate the needs of
the ranking system.
At the centre of this database structure is the event table. It stores the sid and
cid of each packet as well as a signature id and date and time about when it
was captured. The rest of the information about a packet can be retrieved from
other tables in the database as can be seen in Figure 4.7. This figure does not
show all the tables that are available in the Snort database, but only the ones
important for the ranking model.
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Signature For each entry in the event table, there is a corresponding entry
in the signature table as well, with the same cid and sid. The signature of an
alarm specifies which filtering rule in Snort matched the current packet, and
consequently caused it to be logged in the database. The signature table stores
information such as the name of the attack, the id of the signature matching it,
priority of the signature, and what version of the filtering rule in Snort capturing
it. This can be useful if a faulty filtering rule is detected and rectified, as all
events that where captured with the bad filtering rule can be identified and
removed. However, the only information important in this table to the ranking
model is sig id, the id of the signature that captured the packet.
Iphdr Snort more or less follows the OSI standard in how it saves the informa-
tion about packets caught by one of its signatures. The iphdr table is responsible
for saving the source and destination IP of each packet. It will always have an
entry for every event that is logged in the database as all packets traversing the
network are IP packets.
Tcphdr Has only information from captured packets using TCP. This table
has fields for all the information in a TCP header as defined by the OSI standard.
The only information needed for ranking decisions in this table is the destination
port.
Udphdr Similarly to the tcphdr table, this table only saves information about
packets using UDP and has a column for every field in the UDP header. The
necessary information here for ranking decisions is destination port.
4.3.2 How votes are counted
The database tables described above all save information on a per event basis,
meaning there is no table that saves information for one specific IP address for
example. This is however exactly what the ranking model needs to do. It has to
save information for each of the four attributes: signature, source and destina-
tion IP, and destination port. To count the votes we have added a table named
click counters, which can be seen at the bottom of Figure 4.7. Each row in this
table represents a counter that keeps track of votes for one specific attribute,
such as an IP address or a destination port. To connect these counters to signa-
ture, iphdr, tcphdr, and udphdr we need three additional tables: src ip relevance,
dst ip relevance, and dst port relevance. These three tables only store a primary
key (i.e. IP address in the case of src ip relevance) and the total vote count
(tot clicks6) A new table to connect signature to click counters is not needed
as signature already stores information about unique signatures. Every counter
has four values:
6tot clicks is never used in any of the ranking calculations, it is only there because it might
be interesting to an operator to see what the total voting tally is for an attribute.
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• num clicks: A cumulative value that saves the amount of “+” or “-” votes
one attribute receives. If one attributes receives five pluses and four mi-
nuses, the value of num clicks will be 1 since 5 + (−4) = 1.
• ema 5: EMA value with a period of 5 days. Adapts the fastest.
• ema 10: EMA value with a period of 10. Adapts twice as slow as ema 5.
• ema 20: EMA value with a period of 20. Adapts twice as slow as ema 10.
These click counters correspond to the variables Y and S in the EMA formula
(section 4.2, page 39) because it stores information about both the raw vote
counter (num clicks), and the EMA values (ema 5, ema 10, ema 20). Each
counter is equivalent to one data point in Figure 4.5. A counter only collects
data during 24 hours, after 24 hours a new counter is created for the same
attribute. This creates a set of counters that each represents votes cast for
one attribute during one day. If a user votes for an event that does not have a
counter that is less than 24 hours old a new counter is created. The EMA values
in the old counter is used together with the current amount of votes stored in
the new counter (in this case 1, since it is new) as input to the EMA formula
to create the new EMA values in the counter for that attribute. In the EMA
formula these two input variables are called St−1 for the previous EMA value,
and Yt for the current vote count. This process of recalculating the EMA values
also happens every time a vote is cast by the user, but a new counter is only
created if the current one is older than 24 hours.
These counters are only created as needed. When an alarm with attributes that
have never received votes before is clicked a new click counter is created for that
attribute automatically. It is done this way to save space in the database as
creating them all from the start would require a lot of space. Creating click
counters for all possible IP addresses would require 232 = 4294 967 296 entries
in the database, which we do not have room for.
4.3.3 Ruby on Rails
Ruby on Rails (often referred to as Rails) facilitates retrieving information from
the database by creating a so called model of each table in the database. Models
are classes in Rails with automatically generated methods meant for retrieving
and updating data in the table. Each column of the table gets its own set of
methods. I.e. a table called persons will have a class called Persons in the Rails
code, and each column of the table will have a method (i.e. name). Relations
between different tables in the database will also be represented in a similar
manner, but here the developer has to define them in the class definition. I.e.
the event table is represented by an object Event in Rails that has methods for
every database relation of the table. Calling Event.signature returns a Signature
object corresponding to the row in the signature table the particular event had
a relation with.
The relations between different tables in the database are described in the cor-
responding Rails objects by using a function call. There are four basic function
calls that can be used:
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These four methods can be used to describe one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-
to-many relationships in the database. To describe a relationship between a
table containing books and a table containing the libraries that the books belong
to would look like this:
1 class Library < ActiveRecord : : Base
2 has many : books
3 end
4
5 class Book < ActiveRecord : : Base
6 be l ong s t o : l i b r a r y
7 end
 
The object Library is defined with a call to has_many with argument :books to
describe its relationship with another object Book. The fact that the argument
is :books with a plural ‘s’ is interpreted as a reference to the object Book and
not Books, the ‘s’ just makes the code more readable. On the other end of the
relationship the class Book has a call to the method belongs_to with an argu-
ment :library to signify that each Book object belongs to one specific Library
object. These methods also involve some magic that make it convenient when
designing a web-application with Ruby on Rails from the start. For example
all methods defining relationships make a few assumptions about what columns
are present in the tables. The has many method assumes the foreign key in the
table containing books is named library id. If the foreign key has some other
name it can be specified as an argument in the method call.
In the case of the tables that have been added to the Snort database, the
relationship that src ip relevance has to iphdr would look like:
1 class SrcIpRelevance < ActiveRecord : : Base
2 has one : iphdr , : f o r e i gn k ey => : s r c i p
3 . . .
4 end
5
6 class Iphdr < ActiveRecord : : Base
7 be l ong s t o : s r c i p r e l e v a n c e
8 . . .
9 end
 
This ties the primary key column (named ip) of the src ip relevance table to
the column named src ip in the iphdr table. Rails then knows that all rows
in the iphdr table belongs to one specific row in the src ip relevance table.
dst ip relevance and dst port relevance have equivalent relationships defined in
46
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY
their object definitions. Attached to all of these tables is a click counter table
as can be seen in Figure 4.7. This table has what is called a polymorphic
relationship with four tables above it. That means that all of these four tables
can have a relationship with the click counter, and use their respective primary
key as a foreign key in the click counters table. A polymorphic relationship is
defined as follows:
1 class ClickCounter < ActiveRecord : : Base
2 be l ong s t o : countable , : polymorphic => true
3 . . .
4 end
5
6 class SrcIpRelevance < ActiveRecord : : Base
7 has many : c l i c k c oun t e r s , as => : countable
8 . . .
9 end
10
11 class DstIpRelevance < ActiveRecord : : Base
12 has many : c l i c k c oun t e r s , as => : countable
13 . . .
14 end
 
On the second row in the definition of ClickCounter, every object of the class
ClickCounter is defined to belong to something called :countable. Countable
is not a class, but a name for a group of different classes that want to use
this class to store information in its table. On the other side of the relation-
ship SrcIpRelevance has a has_many relationship with the class ClickCounter,
and with a second argument as => :countable. This tells Ruby on Rails that
SrcIpRelevance wants to belong to the polymorphic relationship named “count-
able”. Ergo, the four classes Signature, SrcIpRelevance, DstIpRelevance, and
DstPortRelevance can all have a relationship with the same ClickCounter class
instead of having a unique click counter class for each of the four attribute
classes. Rails makes this possible in the database by having an extra column in
the table click counters, in addition to the foreign, key that saves the name of
the class owning the object/row. This allows other classes to use their primary
key as a foreign key in the click counters table without causing any collisions
between foreign keys from different classes.
4.3.4 Counting Votes
Snorby displays a page listing events from the Snort database in the order cap-
tured by Snort (shown in Figure 4.8). To allow the user to cast votes on events
she thinks are important two buttons have been added, “+” for when the alarm
is interesting and “-” for when it is not. Because the vote is cast on an event
and not on each specific attribute, the ranking system cannot know if one, all,
or a subset of the attributes are interesting. We decided on the most simple
solution which is to share the vote evenly among the attributes of the alarm.
For each vote an alarm receives, each attribute’s score will be incremented or
decremented by one point. Not deciding on individual ratios for each attribute
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Figure 4.8: The event view in Snorby showing events fetched from the Snort
database sorted in the order they where captured.
at this point, i.e. giving source ip two points and destination port only 1, gives
us the opportunity to multiply the score later and produce the same results.





“Port scan”, “230.42.25.6”, “105.200.156.2”, and “80” would each get one point
added to their counters if the user pressed the “+”-button. The vote affects
four different values in the attributes counter: num clicks, ema 5, ema 10, and
ema 20. num clicks stores an integer value that is incremented or decremented
depending on which button was pressed. It starts out with a zero meaning
negative values in a counter are possible. The pseudo code for updating the
three EMA values looks like:
1 def next ( per iod , current , prev ema )
2 mu l t i p l i e r = (2 . 0 / (period+1))
3 return multiplier * current + (1 - multiplier) * prev_ema
4 end
 
The next function above follows the EMA algorithm presented on page 39,
and produces the next EMA value in the sequence. This function takes three
arguments, period is the value controlling the rate at which the EMA value
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decreases. Second one is current which is the vote count for the attribute at
present, and prev ema is the previous EMA value for the attribute. These
three variables correspond to N , Yt, and St−1 respectively in the EMA formula.
Period is used to calculate α in the EMA formula. If a previous EMA value
does not exist the EMA value will have the same value as the vote count for
the current counter. This function is called for all three of the EMA values for
each attribute in the alarm that received a click on their “+” or “-” button.
To be able to see how the operator’s interest in different attributes changes over
time, counters are only active for one day, as described in Section 4.3, after that
new ones are created and the old ones will remain as inactive counters in the
database. When a vote is cast on an event and there are no recent counters for
the attributes of that event, new ones will be created. When that happens, the
values in the old counters are used for calculating the next EMA values for the
new counters.
4.3.5 Displaying the alarms
The EMA values calculated above are used to sort the events in three differ-
ent ways, one for each EMA value that each attribute stores. This gives the
user three different lists displaying alarms according to the perceived impor-
tance the operator herself has contributed to with her votes. The three sorting
alternatives are called “Short”, “Medium”, and “Long”. Short means that it
is easily influenced by changes in the short time span. Medium sees changes
over a medium time span and long over a long time span. Short uses the value
EMA-5, Medium that of EMA-10, and Long EMA-20.
The actual sorting works as follows. The sorting function is presented with a
list with the most recent alarms, in our implementation it is limited to the 100
most recent alarms. Each of the alarms has voting information stored for each
of the four attributes that we are interested in. This voting information includes
EMA-5, EMA-10, and EMA-20 values. In the case of the short sorting order
the sorting function looks at the EMA-5 value for each of the four attributes
in each alarm. These four EMA-5 values are then added together to form the
score for that alarm. This score is then used by the sorting function to sort
the alarms in the list. The sorted list will then contain all the alarms sorted
according to their EMA-5 or short sorting order score.
If the operator chooses the Short sorting alternative, alarms high up in the list
will recently have received votes and therefore have a very short term relevance
to the operator. The Medium sorting alternative is a little more long term and
the sorting order will not be affected that much by a lot of votes in the short
term. Long is even more robust and should reflect what the operator thinks is
important over a very long time span.
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To evaluate our ranking methodology a series of experiments were performed.
A Ruby program was developed for this purpose. As they would be a proof
of concept it was decided to start out with a simple base case, which could
easily be extended by demand. It consists of two parts, 1) an alarm generator,
presented in Section 5.1 and 2) a click simulator, presented in Section 5.2. With
configuration we can direct the simulation and let it emulate different types of
networks and scenarios.
5.1 Alarm generation
The alarm generator generates a list of random alarms with different sets of
attributes. To make it more realistic it uses a configuration which specifies
ratios for how likely an attribute is among the generated alarms. Based on our
expertise, a low security risk signature might for example be more common than
a high security risk signature.
The configuration variables pertaining to alarm generation:
• number of alarms,
the number of alarms to be generated during a test run.
• alarm ratio high,
alarm ratio medium,
alarm ratio low,
decides the ratios between severities in the number of alarms generated.
If high = 15%, then 15% of the number of generated alarms should have
an alarm type classed as a high severity type. The total ratio has to add
up to 100%.
• number of destination IPs,
the number of destinations the generator can choose from when choosing
a value for the destination IP attribute of the alarm.
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• number of source IPs,
the number of sources the generator can choose from when choosing a
value for the source IP attribute of the alarm.
• number of alarm types,
the number of alarm types the generator can choose from when choosing
a value for the alarm type attribute of the alarm.
• severity ratio high,
severity ratio medium,
severity ratio low,
the ratios of the alarm type severities. Snort labels its alarm types to
have either a high, medium or a low severity. The ratios here decide how
many of our total number of alarm types should be classed as severity
high, medium and low. The total ratio has to add up to 100%.
As it is difficult to understand the difference between alarm ratio and severity ratio
at first, we will now give an example to further explain their functions. Assume
that the following variables have values:
• number of alarms = 10
• alarm ratio high = 20%
alarm ratio medium = 30%
alarm ratio low = 50%
• number of alarm types = 8
• severity ratio high = 25%
severity ratio medium = 50%
severity ratio low = 25%
severity ratio x decides how the different alarm types is labeled in terms of
severity. In our example above, this would mean that out of the eight different
alarm types, 1-8, types 1 and 2 are classed as types of high severity, types 3-6 as
types of medium severity and the remaining two types, 7 and 8, as types of low
severity. alarm ratio x decides how many of the generated alarms should be
of what severity. In the example this results in that two out of the ten generated
alarms should have an alarm type classed as being of high severity. Those two
alarms can then be of either type 1 or 2. Three out of the ten generated alarms
should have a type classed as being of medium severity. Those three alarms can
have either of the types 3-6. Lastly, the remaining five generated alarms can
have either of the types 7 or 8.
5.2 Simulating clicks
The configuration also allows us to specify how many of the attributes should
be considered important in the simulation. This is used later in the simulation,
after the random list of alarms has been generated, to simulate which alarms the
operator of the system clicks on. All alarms in the list of generated alarms that
has one or more important attributes will receive a “click”. Each click gives a
point to all the attributes of that particular alarm. The points accumulated for
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each individual attribute will later determine the score that each alarm receives.
The score of an alarm is determined by simply adding up the points for each







Figure 5.1: An example showing how the score for an alarm is calculated.
This score is used to sort the alarms in order of importance. However this way
of sorting does create some anomalies, which we will return to in the Results
chapter (6.1). The anomalies happen when an alarm with less than four im-
portant attributes receives a click, because it will also reward any unimportant
attributes of the alarm with a point. Unimportant attributes will by this pro-
cess receive points simply by the fact that they are associated with an alarm
containing important attributes.
• source IP click worth,
destination IP click worth,
alarm severity high click worth,
alarm severity medium click worth,
alarm severity low click worth,
decides how many points each attribute gets added to its ranking score
when an alarm is clicked.
• important destinations,
how many of the destination IPs should be labeled as interesting to the
user and be clicked when present in an alarm.
• important sources,
how many of the source IPs should be labeled as interesting to the user
and be clicked when present in an alarm.
• important type high,
important type medium,
important type low,
how many of the alarm types with a certain severity should be labeled as
interesting to the user and clicked when present in an alarm.
5.3 Details of configuration
The configuration behind the tests were set up in collaboration with Ola So¨der-
stro¨m to as much as possible mimic a real life scenario.1 The numbers repre-
1 Ola So¨derstro¨m(security analyst, Omegapoint, e-mail correspondence on October 28,
2010), see appendix D.2.
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senting IPs and alarm types are chosen by us as a means to simulate how clicks
would work and have nothing to do with real IP addresses or alarm types.
Basic configuration:
• number of alarms = 100,
since 100 is a nice number to have when calculating percentages.
• number of destination IPs = 50,
we have decided to emulate a smaller network.
• number of source IPs = 100,
logically, the number of external IPs has to be larger than the number of
internal. We decided on 100 which is more than 50 but still small enough
to produce alarms with the same source.
• number of alarm types = 50,
not at all reflecting the actual number real IDSs uses, but a number small
enough to result in alarms having the same type but large enough to give
something to choose from when generating alarms.
• severity ratio high = 15%,
severity ratio medium = 40%,
severity ratio low = 45%,
15% of the alarms types should be classed as high severity alarms, 45% as
medium severity and 40% as low severity. These numbers are coupled to
the distribution of severity among the alarms.
• alarm ratio high = 15%,
alarm ratio medium = 40%,
alarm ratio low = 45%,
15% of all generated alarms should have an alarm type of high sever-
ity, 40% should have an alarm type of medium severity and 45% should
have one of low severity. These numbers are chosen based on the direct
experience of So¨derstro¨m.
• source ip click worth = 1,
destination ip click worth = 1,
alarm severity high click worth = 3,
alarm severity medium click worth = 1,
alarm severity low click worth = 1,
when an alarm is clicked, 1 is added to the weight of the destination,
source and alarm, with the exception of an alarm of high severity. In
that case 3 is added to the weight. This is to counter the effect of the
smaller ratio of high severity alarms. In a real system, one has to analyze
the ratios between the different severities before configuring the weights.
It is also possible to let the system continuously monitor the ratios and
automatically update the weights.
The initial goal was to reach a clicking frequency of 10-15%, a number So¨der-
stro¨m usually averaged. However, this was not possible without leaving an




• important destinations = 4%,
4% of the possible destination IPs are selected as important. If a generated
alarm has a destination IP selected as important a click will be simulated
on that alarm and the weights associated with the destination IP, source
IP and alarm type will all be incremented. This is the smallest percentage
resulting in more than one IP being chosen important.
• important sources = 2%,
2% of the possible source IPs are selected as important. If the source IP of
an alarm is important the attributes are incremented. This is the smallest
percentage resulting in the system choosing more than one source IP to
be important.
• important type high = 75%,
important type medium = 10%,
important type low = 5%,
75% of the alarm types chosen to be of high severity by severity ratio
are selected as important and of interest. These will be clicked if they
show up in a generated alarm. The same goes for 10% of the alarms of
medium severity and 5% of the ones of low. 5% is the smallest percentage
important type low can have and still result in one alarm of severity low
being chosen as important. Feeling that alarms of medium severity should
be more interesting than alarms of low severity we chose to mark 10% of
the medium severity alarm as important. This results in more important
alarms than those of low severity but still keeping the number low enough
not to produce too many important alarms. An alarm of high severity
is surmised to most often be clicked. Too low a percentage would seem
silly and too high would generate too many clicked alarms. A compromise
between the two settled the percentage on 75.
We are aware that the tests do not truly mirror real life. In reality one does
not judge an alarm important based solely on source IP, destination IP or type
of alarm but at the very least a combination of the three. The attribute source
IP might as well be interchanged with the triple (source IP, destination
IP, alarm type). The reasons for clicking on an alarm can be complex, de-
pending on a range of possibilities, a range we have no possibility to emulate.
These tests are here as a proof of concept - that ranking is a viable means to
help the user manage alarms. We have therefore chosen three simple attributes.
By the same reasoning, we have not simulated the effects of down prioritizing
an alarm. As a proof of concept we wanted to keep the experiment simple and
concentrate on only one factor. More importantly, we do not feel there is any
need for the feature since the user would only utilize this if her interest changes
over time or she does something wrong. As the tests are clicked by the program
and no time elapse between the alarms, the conditions under which an alarm is
down prioritized are not replicated.
55




Here we present the results from Chapters 4 and 5. Section 6.1 presents the
performance of our simulation runs viewed from two angles; how well alarms
carrying important attributes are separated from those who do not and how well
the ranking order reflects the true severity of the alarms. Section 6.2 presents
the changes done to Snorby.
6.1 Simulations
Using the configuration desribed in Chapter 5 a series of test runs were per-
formed. To smooth the effects of diverging test runs an average of 10 test runs
was used. The number of alarms with simulated clicks spans from 22 up to 28
averaging 26, making this fairly homogeneous.
Run 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 average
# clicked alarms 27 28 28 27 25 25 22 28 24 26 26
Table 6.1: Number of important alarms generated each test run.
The alarm generation ratios given to the click test simulation (destination IP,
source IP, and alarm type), resulted in 6 IPs and 8 alarm types being chosen as
attributes to be clicked. Table 6.2 summarizes the result.
Dest IPs : 1 - 3
Src IPs : 51 - 53
alarm high : 1 - 5
alarm medium : 8 - 9
alarm low : 30
Table 6.2: The IPs and alarm types chosen as important. Whenever an alarm
shows up carrying any of these attributes, it gets a simulated click.
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Two words frequently recurring within this chapter is important alarms/
clicked alarms and unimportant alarms/unclicked alarms.
Definition 3. An important alarm, also referred to as a clicked alarm,
is an alarm with attributes of interest to the user. When the user spots this
alarm, she is surmised to click on it, showing her interest.
Definition 4. An unimportant alarm, sometimes referred to as an unclicked
alarm, is an alarm lacking attributes of interest to the user. When the user
spots this alarm, she is surmised to leave it unclicked, showing her disinterest.
To explain the result, two aspects are highlighted: the density with which the
important alarms are presented and the ordering.
6.1.1 Density
To be able to understand what is meant by density it has to be defined first.
Definition 5. The density D(i), of ranked alarm position i, is the ratio of
important alarms found at positions 1 up to i compared to the total number of
alarms found at positions 1 up to i, where i ≤ position of last listed important alarm.
D(i) =
# important alarms at positions 1 to i
# alarms at positions 1 to i
The density after all important alarms have been listed remains the same, no
matter how many unimportant alarms are listed beyond that. This is because
density is a measure for how quickly the important alarms are listed. Once they
are all listed, how the rest of the list looks like is unimportant.
Out of the 10 test runs only test run 1, 2, 5 and 10 yielded a density less than
100%, meaning that these four runs were the only runs not able to list the im-
portant alarms without interspersing them with unimportant alarms. Table 6.3
shows the density of a test run averaged from all ten test runs. Positions, i are
shown in italics and density, D(i), in verbatim.
On average, the alarm listed on the first position is an important alarm. In the




Since this is the average of 10 test runs it is obvious that in all cases, in the first
18 positions, all alarms are important. The first change shows up at position
19 where the density on average is 99.5% instead of 100%. This means that
in one run out of the ten, an unimportant alarm is listed at index 19. More
unimportant alarms are interspersed with importants alarms in the following
positions. This can be deduced from from the decreasing density.
Figure 6.1 shows how well the ranking is able to sort alarms and separate im-
portant ones from unimportant. The x-axis represents the positions of the listed
alarms. The y-axis represents the density of the important alarms in the first x
positions. Test runs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 all managed to achieve a density of 100%
and are stacked on top of each other following y = 100. The curves achieving
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i D(i) i D(i)
1 : 100% 18 : 100%
2 : 100% 19 : 99.5%
3 : 100% 20 : 99%
4 : 100% 21 : 99%
5 : 100% 22 : 99.1%
6 : 100% 23 : 99.1%
7 : 100% 24 : 98.8%
8 : 100% 25 : 98.8%
9 : 100% 26 : 98%
10 : 100% 27 : 97.4%
11 : 100% 28 : 97.5%
12 : 100% 29 : 97.2%
13 : 100% 30 : 95.6%
14 : 100% 31 : 96.3
15 : 100% 32 : 96.4%
16 : 100% ... : ...
17 : 100% 100 : 96.4%
Table 6.3: Density of important alarms listed after i positions.
less than 100% are from bottom up: test run 1, 2, 10, 5 and the average. All of
them starts to drop off somewhere in the interval between position 20 and 25.
The bump in the curves, most clearly visible in run 2, means that important
alarms was listed once again. This means that the density rises. Once the graph
levels out, all important alarms of that test run (see Table 6.1) have been listed.
Figure 6.1: Density of all ten test runs and the average after ranking.
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Figure 6.2: Density of all ten test runs and the average before ranking.
Figure 6.2 shows the densities of the alarms before ordering them after rank.
The graph is quite messy but a definitive trend is discernible. As it is pure
chance when an important alarm shows up, the curves covers a larger interval
in the beginning, 0% ≤ y ≤ 100%. But they level out as the position gets closer
to x = 100 and y stabilizes in the interval 20% - 30%. This is expected since
the average number of important alarms is 26 in a set of 100.
6.1.2 Ordering
The density, how well the important alarms are listed together without being
interspersed with unimportant alarms, does not tell anything about the order
of the alarms. The clicked alarms can be ordered in a way not reflecting the
true importance of the alarms, putting the least important clicked alarm at the
top and the most important clicked alarm right above the first unimportant
alarm and still achieve 100% density. Since there is no way of averaging the
placement of an alarm, figures of a few illustrative runs were chosen to indicate
the ordering.
Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show how well the ordering of test run 2, 4 and 7
matches the optimal ordering.1 The x-axis, represents the positions in the list.
The y-axis represents the order the alarms should have. The optimal dots show
1The optimal order is simulated by only awarding points to important attributes when an
alarm receives a click. This results in a ranking score only regarding the attributes of interest
to the user. As no unimportant attributes are awarded points, they cannot contribute to the
rank as in our ranking system. The optimal order is, in other words, the way the user would
have ordered them. Note that the optimal order only refers to the order of important alarms,
it does not pertain the unimportant alarms.
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Figure 6.3: Ordering of alarms of test run two.
Figure 6.4: Ordering of alarms of test run four.
how the alarms really should be ordered. The first position of the list, x = 0, is
where the most important alarm should be found, y = 0. In the second position
the second most important alarm should be found, in other words, the optimal
case matches y = x. The “unsorted” dots represent the unsorted alarms and in
Figure 6.3 the first alarm to be listed (x = 0) is really the 64th most important
(y = 63). This is quickly followed by an alarm that should have been at the end
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Figure 6.5: Ordering of alarms of test run seven.
of the list and then by one which should have been first. From this it is easy to
see the closer the curve follows the optimal case the better, and the farther off
the curve is the more the alarms are out of correct order.
The “ranked” dots representing the ranked case follow the optimal more closely
than the unsorted case, which is not surprising as the ranking here has on
average 26 alarms to rank and does so in at most 32 listings (see Figure 6.6).
Although not fluctuating as wildly as the the dots representing the unsorted
case, it still fluctuates meaning that the ranked alarms are not in the correct
order. The alarms ranked in test run 4 and 7 have orderings closer to the correct
one, than that of test run 2. After around 30 positions, the “ranked” dots lose
their somewhat symmetry to the optimal ordering and start to look like the
“unsorted” dots. This happens when all the important alarm have been listed
and those left to list is of no importance, hence the ordering is of no interest. The
graphs are cropped at x = 50 to display the behaviour after all the important
alarms have been listed. The data points between x = 51 and x = 100 are left
out since the same behaviour as in 35 ≤ x ≤ 50.
Another way to illustrate the order is to focus on the rank given to an alarm for
each of the ten test runs. In Figure 6.6, the intervals of the 12 most important
alarms are tracked (read more about box plots in appendix A). The x-axis
represents the position resulting from the ranking function, the y-axis represents
the position the alarm really should have according to the reason behind the
click. In Figure 6.6 the alarm which should have been first in the list, y = 1,
is ranked anywhere between first and 12th with a concentration around the
first four positions. The alarm which should have been ranked second most
important, is most often placed as fifth.
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Figure 6.6: Intervals of the twelve most important alarms.
6.2 Snorby
The visual changes that have been made to Snorby are quite small and not
obvious if the user is unfamiliar with the interface. The reason behind this
is that our goal was to design an interface helping our ranking system but
that at the same time does not interfere too much with the user’s normal way
of interacting with the interface. Figure 6.7 shows the event view in Snorby
before the modifications, a list of events retrieved from the database where
Snort stores captured packets. Each grey box represents an event with some
basic information about the event, such as name of signature and source and
destination IP. The order in which the events are displayed is the order in which
they where captured. If the user clicks on one of these events, a page showing
more detailed information about that alarm is displayed.
In the lower left corner of each grey box there is a small yellow box with three
icons; a speech bubble, a star, and a red circle with a white cross. These three
icons are buttons letting the user perform three different tasks; view comments,
mark event as favourite, and delete event from database. In Figure 6.8 two new
buttons are present, a “+” and a “-”. These two buttons are what gives the
63
6.2. SNORBY
Figure 6.7: Unmodified version of Snorby displaying the event view.
user the capability to vote for which events she thinks are important. Clicking
on “+” tells the ranking system that this alarm and its attributes are important
to the user, a click on “-” has the opposite meaning.
Figure 6.9: Three links that allow the user to choose how alarms should be
sorted.
Figure 6.8: The buttons that where
added to the Snorby interface.
Figure 6.9 shows the menu that is
added to the top right corner of
the event view page. This menu
was added to allow the user to
choose which of the three EMA val-
ues that should be used when sort-
ing the alarms. “Short”, “Medium”,
and “Long” refer to how much in-
fluence votes cast a long time ago
should have when sorting the alarms.
“Short” uses a shorter time window,
“Medium” uses a little larger window, and “Long” will take into account votes
that where cast even longer ago. There is also a link called “Default” resetting
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the sorting order to the standard order that Snorby uses, in this case sorted by







The ranking function seems to be performing quite well. Its performance
matches optimal density in 6 cases out of 10. In the other four cases the den-
sity drops due to unimportant alarms being listed before important ones. Why
unimportant alarms get listed among the important ones goes back to how clicks
are handled. As the system has no way of knowing why the user clicks on a
specific alarm it can only add to or subtract from the current score of the at-
tributes concerned by the alarm. A phenomena we call collateral ranking
is thus created. Unimportant but common attributes get a high ranking score
only due to association, as they are often present in alarms with other attributes
viewed as important.
Definition 6. Collateral ranking is the act of awarding unimportant at-
tributes a higher rank due to their association with important attributes. That
is, unimportant attributes get points by simply being present in the same alarms
as important attributes.
The phenomena of collateral ranking is even more clear when the ordering is
studied. In Figure 6.6 it is obvious that collateral ranking affects ordering even
more than the density. The bulk of the box plots hover in the main vicinity of
the expected placement but the extremities go much farther off. In our small
scale experiment of 100 alarms the effect is not overly drastic but if this were to
be scaled up to 1000 alarms perserving the trends evident in our experiments,
the interval of the most important alarm would grow proportionally from [1, 12]
to [1, 120]. Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show the variation one can be expected
to deal with. Depending on the alarms, their distribution and the clicks of the
operator(s) can end up with a ranking following the expected ordering fairly well,
or one can get a ranking having little in common with the expected ordering.
How well the phenomena of collateral ranking translates into a real scenario
we do not know and see the need to make studies in a real environment before
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definitive conclusions can be drawn. The alarms in our tests are randomly
generated without internal connections which is not the situation in the real
world. The whole practice of the methods mentioned in Chapter 3.2 is based
on the assumption that alarms are not random. We do not know if the results
obtained are in any way skewed by the data and tests on real data have to be
performed to see if they support our findings.
7.1.1 Issues outside of the system
The model tracks three attributes in the simulations and four in the implemen-
tation in Snorby which is a minuscule subset of all the attributes possible to
track. The question is whether the trends found here manifest themselves in a
more complex model, tracking more attributes. Will the ranking become more
accurate in presenting the expected order or will the collateral ranking be am-
plified and wreak even more havoc? As Ola So¨derstro¨m described, alarms are
not clicked because of a single attribute, instead it is often a combination of
attributes which make an alarm interesting.1 These kinds of conditional clicks
is not something our model respects. To explicitly tell the system under what
conditions attributes are important, it might be a good idea to apply a data
mining technique to the clicked alarms to find relationships between them. The
discovered relationships can then be displayed for the user and she can either
agree or disagree with the estimated relationship.
In our ranking system, it is absolutely vital that the operator knows what she
is doing. Voting for unimportant alarms that at first seem important or voting
against important alarms that at first seem unimportant might lead to the wrong
alarms to be highlighted and the alarms needing the most attention being hidden
somewhere at the bottom of the list. Therefore, overconfidence in the ranking
is dangerous no matter how good an analyst one views oneself to be, since there
is no way to check if the system ranks alarms correctly.
A precise level of exactness will probably never be attained with a ranking
system producing estimates based solely on user input. A remedy could be to
have configuration files containing information otherwise difficult to convey to
the system. Difficult information might be conditional clicks, e.g. alarms of the
following type: C is only interesting if destination IP = 3, port = 79 and
protocol = UDP. The problem with configuration files is maintenance. They
have to be kept up to date to be of any use to the system. Configuration can be
anything from minimal, only keeping a few choice decisions on how to rank, or
it can be huge (see Porras et al. [30]) containing every detail. Less configuration
and more on-the-fly results in a system easy to start using but less exact. More
configuration and less on-the-fly results in a system more exact in its ranking
but much more difficult and time consuming to launch and maintain. There
will always be a trade-off.







The most obvious and given task in future work is to test our model using more
realistic data and see how it performs.
Our ranking system has a number of weaknesses that are in part inherent to
how it fundamentally works, but it also has a few weaknesses which probably
could be mended with some additional features. Even if an alarm signature is
completely uninteresting and is categorically down voted, it still might get a lot
of points just by association - collateral ranking. This could be mended with
an administrative console which allows the operator to manually lock a certain
attribute at a lower rank. The opposite is also attractive, allowing the user to
raise the rank of an alarm drastically if the need presents itself.
Collateral ranking is also the perpetrator of how the expected order of alarms
is reflected in the ranking. Can this be coped with by adding more attributes
to follow?
Point adjustments could also be made depending on which version of a signa-
ture generated the alarm. Snort has a column called sig ver in the signature
table, which saves the version number of the signature that generated the alarm.
Adjusting the points awarded depending on the version might be of interest in
certain scenarios. A signature is maybe discovered to be causing a lot of false
alarms and patched as a result. The updated signature will receive a new ver-
sion number. A penalty can then be attached to the old version of the signature
to lower the rank of all the alarms which where captured with the old version.
How useful this would be also depends on how new signatures are deployed. If
they are first tested on one Snort sensor while the others continue using the old
one, then it might be of use. But if all Snort sensors start using the updated
version immediately alarms generated by the old defunct signature will become
obsolete quickly and giving them a lower score might not have any effect at all
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on the priority of the alarms.
A more advanced addition to the ranking system would be to look at votes in
a wider context, as chain of votes. The user of the system might place votes
on alarms similar to each other in some regard. These similarities would be of
interest to the ranking system as they can give more information about why
the user is prioritising one alarm with signature A but not another with the
exact same signature. The most recent alarms receiving votes could then be
analysed to find what common traits they have. The user might only prioritize
alarms with signature A if the destination IP is 10.0.0.1 and port is 80. This is
something our ranking system at present cannot handle.
8.2 Conclusions
We have studied different techniques to help the user of an IDS manage alarms.
Among the techniques for processing alarms, we find aggregation, correlation,
filtering and ranking. Out of these, ranking was chosen for an in-depth analysis
due to its many possibilities of being tweaked through normal interaction with
the user. Based on our analysis, we have implemented a ranking system in the
architecture Snort/Snorby that the user is able to interact with. Our system
tracks four attributes of each alarm: source and destination IP, destination port
and alarm signature, and keeps a ranking score for each. The alarms are ranked
based on the total score of these four attributes.
The ranking system seems to be performing quite well based on our generated
test data. The alarms carrying important attributes are all ranked at the top of
the list presented to the user. This gives the user a much smaller interval to scan
for important alarms and lets her detect alarms of importance faster. There are
no guarantees that the alarms will be sorted according to actual importance,
though. The ordering is dependent on how often different attributes occur in
alarms and the alarms of highest importance might not occur as often as others
and therefore end up lower down among the important alarms. This behaviour
is credited to the phenomena we call collateral ranking (defined on page 67).
This is not a system for operators in training. No guidance is given to the user
about alarms and the user needs to be knowledgeable in this area to be able
to properly use the ranking system. Prioritizing alarms not having any real
importance and down prioritizing crucial alarms will severely skew the final list
and might lead to important alarms being missed as they are located at the
bottom of the list.
The data used in the simulations is randomly generated and does not originate
from any real world context. The results therefore have a certain amount of
uncertainty about them. Before any work is done expanding this model, it
would be beneficial to test it in a live network.
Still, our model is based on user input in simple terms and might not catch the
more complex reasons why the user decides an alarm is important or unimpor-
tant. The phenomena of collateral ranking also disturbs the result. We propose
the use of configuration files but we have not formally tested this. The prob-
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lem with configuration files, though, is the generally time consuming work of
maintaining them and keeping them up to date. This will always be a trade-off,
with less configuration and more on-the-fly operation the system will be read-
ily maintained but with a certain amount of uncertainty about it. With more
configuration and less on-the-fly operation the system will be more exact in its
ranking but harder to maintain.
Overall, our ranking system ranks alarms with minimal configuration and input
from the user and shows promising results. We believe it will be a great asset
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A box plot is dependent on five values:
1. xmin, the minimum value among the data points.
2. xlower, the lower quartile.
3. x0.5, the median.
4. xupper, the upper quartile.
5. xmax, the maximum value among the data points.
x0.5 = the most central value of the data points ordered in ascending order. If
n is even x0.5 is the average of the two most central data points.
Let the median split the data points in two halves. If n is odd, the median is
accounted to both halves and if n is even, none of the halves.
xlower is the median of the lower half and xupper is the median of the upper
half.






Give positive feedback to an alarm
Actor: System administrator
Goal: The vote should be evenly divided between all or a subset of the attributes
of the alarm and saved to a database.
Interaction: The user clicks on a button that gives this alarm and alarms similar
to this one a higher ranking.
Difficulty: Easy
Give negative feedback to an alarm
Actor: System administrator
Goal: The vote should be evenly divided between all or a subset of the attributes
of the alarm and saved to a database.
Interaction: The user clicks on a button that gives this alarm and alarms similar




Goal: Sorting order should change.
Interaction: It should be possible for the user to change the sort order of alarms
between three different orders; short, medium, and long. Short will sort the
alarms in a way that reflects their short term changes in the ranking. Medium








click test is a small program we developed to test how effective it would be
to sort alarms using votes from the user. It does not directly mimic how our
implementation in Snorby works in that it does not simulate any kind of negative
feedback.
1 #!/ usr / b in / ruby
2
3 ### CONFIGURATION ###
4
5 # Number o f alarms to genera te
6 $num alarms = 100
7
8 # Des t ina t ion IPs , how many in t o t a l and what percent o f them
tha t w i l l r e c e i v e
9 # c l i c k s
10 $num dest ip = 50
11 $ impor tan t de s t i p = 4 # in percent
12
13 # Source IPs , same dea l as wi th d e s t i n a t i o n IPs
14 $num src ip = 100
15 $ impo r t an t s r c i p = 2 # in percent
16
17 # Alarm type s .
18 # How many alarm type s shou ld t he r e be?
19 $num alarm types = 50
20 # How shou ld they be d i v i d ed between the th r e e s e v e r i t i e s high
, medium and low?
21 $ s e v e r i t y r a t i o s = { : high => 15 , # in percent
22 : medium => 45 ,
23 : low => 40 }
24
25 # What percen tages o f the d i f f e r e n t alarm s e v e r i t i e s shou ld
r e c e i v e c l i c k s ?
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26 $ important a larm types = { : high => 75 ,
27 : medium => 10 ,
28 : low => 5 }
29
30 # Alarm genera t ion r a t i o s in percent
31 $a l a rm ra t i o s = { : high => 15 ,
32 : medium => 40 ,
33 : low => 45 }
34
35 # How much i s a c l i c k worth?
36 $ s r c i p c l i c k = 1
37 $ d e s t i p c l i c k = 1
38 $a l a rm type c l i c k = { : high => 3 ,
39 : medium => 1 ,
40 : low => 1 }
41
42 ### END OF CONFIGURATION ###
43
44 # IP ranges
45 $d e s t i p s = ( 1 . . $num dest ip ) . to a
46 $ imp de s t i p s = $d e s t i p s [ 0 . . ( $num dest ip ∗( $ impor tan t de s t i p
/100.0)).round]
47 $src_ips = ($dest_ips.last+1..$dest_ips.last+1+
$num_src_ip).to_a
48 $imp_src_ips = $src_ips [0..( $num_src_ip*($important_src_ip/
100 .0 ) ) . round ]
49
50 # Alarm type ranges
51 $a larm types = {}
52 prev v = 0
53 $ s e v e r i t y r a t i o s . e a ch pa i r do | k , v |
54 new v = prev v + ( $num alarm types ∗( v/100.0)).floor
55 $alarm_types[k] = (prev_v+1..new_v).to_a
56 prev_v = new_v
57 end
58
59 # Important alarm types
60 $imp_alarm_types = {}
61 $important_alarm_types.each_pair do |k,v|
62 types = $alarm_types[k]




66 # Print what was genera ted
67 puts "Dest IPs: #{$dest_ips.first}-#{$dest_ips.last}"
68 puts "Important dest. IPs: #{$imp_dest_ips.first}-#{
$imp_dest_ips.last}"
69 puts "\nSource IPs: #{$src_ips.first}-#{$src_ips.last}"
70 puts "Important src. IPs: #{$imp_src_ips.first}-#{$imp_src_ips
.last}"
71 puts "\nAlarm types:"
72 $a larm types . e a ch pa i r do | s , v |
73 puts "\t#{s.to_s}: #{v.first}-#{v.last}"
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74 end
75 puts "\nImportant alarm types"
76 $imp alarm types . e a ch pa i r do | s , v |
77 puts "\t#{s.to_s}: #{v.first}-#{v.last}"
78 end
79
80 # two hashes t ha t w i l l ho ld the we i gh t s f o r d i f f e r e n t i p s and
type s o f alarms
81 $s ip w = {}
82 $dip w = {}
83 $alarm type w = {}
84
85 #hashes t ha t w i l l ho ld the r e a l we i gh t s
86 $ r e a l s i p w = {}
87 $ r ea l d ip w = {}
88 $rea l a l a rm type w = {}
89
90 # w i l l ho ld a l l the alarms t ha t are generated
91 $alarms = [ ]
92 # keeps t rack o f how many alarms in t o t a l




97 a t t r a c c e s s o r : s ev e r i t y , : s r c i p , : d e s t i p , : type , :
unordered , : ranked , : opt imal
98
99 def i n i t i a l i z e ( i )
100 @id = i
101 # random number t ha t w i l l dec ide which alarm to genera te
102 random = rand (100)
103
104 a l a rm ra t i o s = $a l a rm ra t i o s . s o r t { | a , b | a [ 1 ] <=> b [ 1 ] }
105
106 cum r = 0
107 a l a rm ra t i o s . each do | i |
108 s = i [ 0 ] # s e v e r i t y
109 r = i [ 1 ] # ra t i o
110
111 i f random < cum r+r then
112 $to t a l a rms [ s ] += 1
113 # genera te alarm of s e v e r i t y s
114 @sever i ty = s
115 @src ip = $ s r c i p s [ rand ( $ s r c i p s . s i z e −1) ]
116 @dest ip = $d e s t i p s [ rand ( $d e s t i p s . s i z e −1) ]
117 types = $alarm types [ s ]
118 @type = types [ rand ( types . s i z e −1) ]
119 @unordered = 0
120 @ranked = 0
121 @optimal = 0
122
123 # i n i t i a l i z e va l u e s in sip w , dip w and alarm type w
124 $s ip w [ @src ip ] = 0
125 $dip w [ @dest ip ] = 0
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126 $alarm type w [ @type ] = 0
127 $ r e a l s i p w [ @src ip ] = 0
128 $ r ea l d ip w [ @dest ip ] = 0
129 $rea l a l a rm type w [ @type ] = 0
130 break
131 end




136 def add c l i c k
137 $s ip w [ @src ip ] += $ s r c i p c l i c k
138 $dip w [ @dest ip ] += $ d e s t i p c l i c k
139 $alarm type w [ @type ] += $a l a rm type c l i c k [ @sever i ty ]
140
141 i f $ imp s r c i p s . i n c l ude ?( @src ip )
142 $ r e a l s i p w [ @src ip ] += $ s r c i p c l i c k
143 end
144 i f $ imp de s t i p s . i n c lude ?( @dest ip )
145 $ r ea l d ip w [ @dest ip ] += $ d e s t i p c l i c k
146 end
147 i f $imp alarm types . va lue s . f l a t t e n . i n c lude ?(@type )






153 $s ip w [ @src ip ] + $dip w [ @dest ip ] + $alarm type w [ @type ]
154 end
155
156 def r ea l impor tance
157 $ r e a l s i p w [ @src ip ] + $r ea l d ip w [ @dest ip ] +
$rea l a l a rm type w [ @type ]
158 end
159
160 def important ?
161 $ imp s r c i p s . i n c l ude ?( @src ip ) | |
162 $ imp de s t i p s . i n c lude ?( @dest ip ) | |
163 $imp alarm types . va lue s . f l a t t e n . i n c lude ?(@type )
164 end
165
166 def s e t op t ima l ( index )




171 # genera te some random even t s
172 1 . upto ( $num alarms ) { | i | $alarms << Alarm . new( i ) }
173
174 #keep a counter f o r how many important alarms , used f o r
s t a t i s t i c s l a t e r .
175 no imp alarms = 0
176
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177 # simu la t e c l i c k s f o r important even t s
178 $alarms . each index do | i |
179 $alarms [ i ] . unordered = i
180 i f $alarms [ i ] . important ?
181 $alarms [ i ] . a dd c l i c k




186 # make a copy to pre se rve o r i g i n a l order
187 $alarms un = Array . new( $alarms )
188
189 $alarms . s o r t ! { | x , y | y . r ea l impor tance <=> x . r ea l impor tance
}
190 # record the order o f the op t ima l l y ranked alarms
191 $alarms . each index do | i |
192 $alarms [ i ] . s e t op t ima l ( i )
193 end
194
195 # sor t even t s by importance
196 $alarms . s o r t ! { | x , y | y . importance <=> x . importance }
197
198 # record the order o f ranked alarms
199 $alarms . each index do | i |
200 $alarms [ i ] . ranked = i
201 end
202
203 count imp alarms = 0
204
205 puts "\nNumber of generated alarms"
206 puts "\tHigh : #{$tot_alarms[:high]}"
207 puts "\tMedium : #{$tot_alarms[:medium]}"
208 puts "\tLow : #{$tot_alarms[:low]}"
209 puts "\tTotal : #{$alarms.size}"
210
211 puts "\nNumber of clicked alarms : #{no_imp_alarms}"
212
213 puts "\nAlarms sorted by importance"
214 puts "\t Legend: <Alarm type >, src ip-->dest ip"
215 $alarms . each do | a |
216 pr in t "\n"
217 pr in t "#{a.importance} | " . r j u s t (7 )
218 pr in t "#{a.real_importance} | " . r j u s t (7 )
219 pr in t "<#{a.type}>" . r j u s t (6 )
220 pr in t " (#{a.severity})" . l j u s t (11)
221 pr in t "| #{a.src_ip}-->#{a.dest_ip}" . l j u s t (13)
222 pr in t " | "
223 i f a . important ?
224 pr in t "important |"
225 pr in t " #{(count_imp_alarms += 1)} |" . r j u s t (6 )
226 else
227 pr in t "|" . r j u s t (11)




230 pr in t "#{a.unordered} |" . r j u s t (6 )
231 pr in t "#{a.ranked} |" . r j u s t (6 )




236 puts "\t Legend: <Alarm type >, src ip-->dest ip"
237 $alarms un . each do | a |
238 pr in t "\n"
239 pr in t "#{a.importance} | " . r j u s t (7 )
240 pr in t "#{a.real_importance} | " . r j u s t (7 )
241 pr in t "<#{a.type}>" . r j u s t (6 )
242 pr in t " (#{a.severity})" . l j u s t (11)
243 pr in t "| #{a.src_ip}-->#{a.dest_ip}" . l j u s t (13)
244 pr in t " | "
245 i f a . important ?
246 pr in t "important |"
247 pr in t " #{(count_imp_alarms += 1)}"
248 else
249 pr in t "|" . r j u s t (11)









Interview with H˚akan Nohre from Cisco via e-mail in Swedish.
Bold = us
Normal = H˚akan Nohre
I hur stor utstra¨ckning kan man aggregera alarmen i er IDS?
(AGGREGERA = t.ex. visa alla alarm som inbegriper samma ka¨lla
som ett alarm s˚a att man la¨tt kan se om n˚agon verkligen attackerar
na¨tverket, allts˚a sorterar alarmen p˚a n˚agot gemensamt attribut som
ka¨lla, destination, port, protokoll, etc.)
Kan ske p˚a olika niv˚aer:
• I sja¨lva IPS s˚a kan alarm aggregeras innan de skickas, s˚a att t.ex. flera
event av samma typ mellan samma sort/dest skickas som ett alarm ista¨llet
fo¨r flera (minskar bruset).
• I managementverktyget IME kan man la¨tt sortera attacker efter t.ex. per
destination, per source, per attacktyp, per sensor etc. Dvs man kan f˚a
en omedelbar vy av alla attacker fr˚an ip adress X, fo¨rdelat p˚a target
T1,T2,T3...TN, och under dessa attacktyper (A1, A2, A3) per X och Ti.
• I management verktyget Cisco MARS aggregeras inte bara IPS alarm,
utan a¨ven alarm fr˚an brandva¨ggar, operativsystem fo¨r att aggregeras till
incidenter. En incident kan best˚a av hundratals events, da¨r kanske ett par
kommer fr˚an IPS, o¨vriga fr˚an brandva¨ggsloggar eller serversystem.
I hur stor utstra¨ckning kan man p˚averka hur alarmen aggregeras?
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Helt konfigurerbart i alla niv˚aer.
I hur stor utstra¨ckning kan ert system korrelera alarm/fo¨ra upp dem
p˚a en ho¨gre niv˚a?
(KORRELERA = t.ex. kan man bygga scenarion da¨r en hel attack-
kedja beho¨vs fo¨r att uppn˚a hackarens m˚al. Att kunna se att ett alarm
eller flera kan kopplas till ett scenario och varna fo¨r scenariot ista¨llet
fo¨r att bara visa alarmen var fo¨r sig a¨r ett exempel p˚a korrelation.)
I management verktyget Cisco MARS aggregeras inte bara IPS alarm, utan a¨ven
alarm fr˚an brandva¨ggar, operativsystem fo¨r att aggregeras till incidenter.
En incident kan best˚a av hundratals events, da¨r kanske ett par kommer fr˚an
IPS, o¨vriga fr˚an brandva¨ggsloggar eller serversystem.
Vilka fo¨rdelar har Ciscos system o¨ver konkurrenterna na¨r det ga¨ller
att korrelera/aggregera alarm?
En fo¨rdel med Cisco MARS a¨r att den kan aggregera alarm fr˚an flera olika
ka¨llor, inte bara IPS, utan brandva¨ggar, serversystem. En IPS kan sa¨gas ge bra
focus med mycket detaljer om en attack, men ofta kan man tappa den stora
bilden eftersom IPS bara lyssnar/ser trafiken p˚a ett par sta¨llen i na¨tverket.
Med MARS kan man allts˚a utnyttja information inte bara fr˚an IPS fo¨r att f˚a se
en fullsta¨ndigare bild. T.ex om IPS visar att A fo¨rso¨ker hacka B : Vilka o¨vriga
maskiner har A talat med sista 24 timmarna? Denna trafik kanske inte ens har
g˚att genom IPS, s˚a man vill allts˚a utnyttja brandva¨ggsloggar eller netflow ha¨r.
Kan er IDS la¨ra sig hur viktiga vissa typer av alarm a¨r fo¨r en admi-
nistrato¨r genom dennes interaktion med systemet? T.ex. genom att
registrera vilka alarm som klickas p˚a.
• A¨r det n˚agot ni tilla¨mpar i ert system?
• Om ja, hur samlar ert system in denna information?
• Ser du n˚agra fo¨rdelar/nackdelar med detta interaktionssa¨tt?
I v˚art system besta¨ms viktigheten i ett alarm av ett metava¨rde, “Risk Rating”.
Risk Rating a¨r en funktion av:
• event severity (hur allvarlig attack)
• event fidelity (hur sa¨ker a¨r man att det ej a¨r false positive)
• attack relevancy (om attack a¨r relevant fo¨r OS som attackeras, da¨r detta
faststa¨lls med passive OS fingerprinting
• target value (administrato¨rsspecifierad va¨dering av target maskin)
• reputation (ka¨llans rykte p˚a internet, tas fr˚an Cisco Sensorbase)
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Ju ho¨gre RiskRating desto allvarligare a¨r attacken. Vilka actions en IPS skall
ta besta¨ms av Risk Rating, t.ex. droppa paket om Risk Rating > 80.
Ser ej s˚a stora fo¨rdelar med att IPS anpassar sig efter anva¨ndarens klickande,
detta kan ju variera med tiden.
Hur ser ni p˚a framtiden? Kommer IDS-system bli ba¨ttre p˚a att
uppta¨cka nya attacker sja¨lva eller kommer det fo¨rbli en “katt och
r˚atta”-lek da¨r tillverkaren av IDS-systemet alltid ligger steget efter
dom som hittar p˚a nya attacker?
Ett IPS system med signaturer som a¨r sant vulnerability baserade (motsats till
exploit baserat) bo¨r hitta a¨ven nya attacker om det a¨r en ka¨nd s˚arbarhet.
Cisco IPS har a¨ven funktion fo¨r ryktesbaserad filtrering, en stor andel av a¨ven
nya attacker sker idag fr˚an komprometterade hostar, s.k botnets. Dessa attacker
kan blockeras a¨ven om de a¨r helt nya eftersom blockering sker med hja¨lp av
rykteshanteringen.
Vilka problem har era kunder som de vill att ni skall lo¨sa na¨r det
ga¨ller intrusion detection och intrusion prevention?
Ofta n˚agon form av Compliance, t.ex. PCI compliance.
Vilken ny funktionalitet i ert IDS-system a¨r det era kunder efterfr˚agar
mest?
Just nu p˚ag˚ar mycket uppgraderingar av datacenter till 10 gig ut mot servrarna,
vilket ger mycket ho¨g total throughput i datacenter. S˚a prestandakraven va¨xer
hela tiden.
D.2 Ola So¨derstro¨m
Transcript of interview we did with Ola So¨derstro¨m from Secode on 23 April
2010. The interview was done in person and recorded on an mp3-player.
Vad har du gjort sen du slutade p˚a Chalmers?
–Na¨r jag slutade p˚a Chalmers s˚a hade jag inget jobb direkt. S˚a jag hja¨lpte lite
mindre fo¨retag med deras IT-miljo¨er i sto¨rsta allma¨nhet. Oftast windows miljo¨
och vardagliga problem som dom hade. Och det var va¨l ganska la¨rorikt. Detta
var ho¨sten 2003.
–Sen gick det drygt ett a˚r och s˚a fick jag jobb p˚a Secode som jag har jobbat hos
sen 2005. Da¨r har jag haft ungefa¨r samma arbetsuppgifter, har va¨l utvecklats
lite kanske men det har blivit mycket sitta och klicka p˚a alarm. Da¨r a¨r jag nu
men sen ny˚ar a¨r jag pappaledig.
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–Vissa saker har man i fa¨rskt minne na¨r man sitter och h˚aller p˚a med det. Men
som jag nu ka¨nner att vad fort man kommer i fr˚an det ta¨nket och arbetsg˚angen.
F˚ar man ta¨nka efter lite gran s˚a kommer det fram s˚a sm˚att.
Vilka interface har du anva¨nt?
–Cisco Works, Juniper, Tipping Point, ISS (iss.net) och Snort
Ifall du ta¨nker p˚a dom olika IDS:er som du anva¨nt, i vilken ut-
stra¨ckning ka¨nner du att du kunnat aggregera alarm.
–Tipping Point har en aggregerings-funktion inbyggt i GUI:t, men den var va¨ll
kanske inte s˚a anva¨ndbar.
–Det man a¨r intresserad av oftast a¨r att se la¨ngre tillbaks a¨n bara det som man
f˚ar in i GUI:t. Det kommer s˚a stor ma¨ngd larm s˚a att bara aggregera dom som
finns da¨r fyller inte s˚a stor funktion.
–Om man da¨remot hade kunnat haft n˚agot som h˚aller koll historiken fo¨r en
source ip adress s˚a man vet om den har triggat en viss signatur flera g˚angen
innan (ett par veckor tillbaka).
I hur stor utstra¨ckning ka¨nner du att du har kunnat p˚averka hur
systemen aggregerar alarmen?
–Ja, det har jag kunnat go¨ra. Har framfo¨r allt kunnat sta¨nga av aggregeringen.
Jag har kunnat aggregera p˚a godtyckliga fa¨lt i det GUI:t om jag vill. Na¨stan
alla GUI:n till˚ater att man sorterar p˚a en godtycklig kolumn. Som v˚art system
ser ut da¨r vi samlar allting i ett eget GUI da¨r man ser alla ha¨ndelser kommer
in. Det har en sorterings funktion som jag anva¨nder ganska ofta. D˚a kan jag
direkt se om det ma˚nga som klumpas ihop under ett attribut. Jag kan sortera p˚a
signaturen och se om det a¨r ma˚nga m˚anga olika ip-adresser som triggar den d˚a
kanske den f˚ar lite la¨gre tillfo¨rlitlighetsgrad. S˚a just sorterings funktionaliteten
tycker jag a¨r va¨rd na¨stan mer a¨n aggregering.
Ett typiskt alarm har information om tid, alarmtyp, ka¨lla/destination,
etc. Ra¨cker denna information fo¨r dig eller beho¨ver du mer?
–Det ra¨cker fo¨r att utesluta en hel ma¨ngd larm. Men om det a¨r n˚agot som a¨r lite
intressant d˚a kastar jag alltid med mer information fo¨r att kunna komma till
n˚agon slutsats om hur vida det a¨r intressant i verkligheten eller inte. D˚a a¨r det
typiskt att man tittar na¨rmare p˚a i vilken omgivning som den ha¨r signaturen
triggar. Om det a¨r p˚a ett va¨ldigt begra¨nsat na¨tverk eller om det kommer fr˚an
internet osv. Omgivningen a¨r va¨ldigt viktig. Kollar a¨ven p˚a vilken riktning om
attacken sker, p˚a sja¨lva signaturen om den a¨r va¨ldigt gammal osv.
Anva¨nder du n˚agra kompletterande verktyg till IDS:en? (tcpdump)
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–Ja det go¨r man. Tcpdump inte minst. A¨r det s˚a att det a¨r n˚agot som a¨r
tillra¨ckligt intressant d˚a loggar man direkt in p˚a sensorn och ko¨r ig˚ang en tcp-
dump.
Har du n˚agra script som automatiskt g˚ar ig˚ang vid ett visst alarm?
–Om man inte kan kolla till en slutsats genom att titta p˚a larmet. Men om
vi talar Juniper, da¨r finns det tillg˚ang till n˚agra packet fo¨re och efter alarmet
i.o.m. att man kan sta¨lla in att den ska f˚anga det. D˚a kan jag ju titta da¨r och
komma ganska l˚angt p˚a det. Skulle inte det vara tillra¨ckligt, d˚a loggar jag in
p˚a sensorn och ko¨r ig˚ang en tcpdump fo¨r att bilda mig en uppfattning. Na¨r
man va¨l har f˚att tcpdump:en, antingen s˚a kollar jag p˚a den direkt i skalet eller
wireshark om man vill f˚ar lite ba¨ttre koll p˚a vad som har ha¨nt. Annars har vi
lite hemmabyggda system som dekodar om det a¨r obfuskerade javascript t.ex.
eller om det a¨r payloads har mycket hexkod o.s.v.
Sebastian: –Har ni det som en plugin/preprocessor till Snort?
–Nej det har vi inte. Utan det a¨r frist˚aende sm˚a Python/Pearl script da¨r vi kan
klistra in packeten i fo¨r att f˚a ut n˚agonting vettigt. Fo¨r att se vad som da¨ljer
sig bakom s˚a att sa¨ga.
–Det vi har byggt till Snort det a¨r verktyg fo¨r att ha¨mta pcap:en fr˚an Snort
till skillnad fr˚an Juniper da¨r man kan klicka p˚a ett larm och se pcap:en. S˚a i
Snort har vi konfat det s˚a att den alltid sparar packet data fo¨r varje signatur.
Men den sparar det i ett inte s˚a la¨ttillga¨ngligt format. Det a¨r sv˚art pcap till
ra¨tt signatur/ha¨ndelse. S˚a det har vi byggt verktyg s˚a att vi kan logga in och
sen komma a˚t det d˚a.
Hur ofta brukar du granska alarmen na¨rmre? A¨r det dom flesta eller
bara n˚agra f˚a?
–Det a¨r nog ganska f˚a som jag g˚ar in och granskar na¨rmare i den bema¨rkelsen.
Jag tror att det ro¨r sig om max 10-15%.
Vad a¨r det som go¨r att du inte klickar p˚a dom andra 90% av alarmen?
–Dels a¨r det s˚a att man alltid jobbar med att redusera antalet falsklarm, och
det arbetet ligger man alltid lite efter med. S˚a man f˚ar in en del alarm da¨r man
vet att det ha¨r borde inte finnas ha¨r, men jag har inte tid just nu att filtrera
bort det. Och dom som har jobbat fo¨re mig de senaste veckorna har inte heller
haft tid att filtrera bort det. S˚a det finns da¨r och man vet att det triggar och
a¨r ofarligt fo¨r det har man kollat p˚a.
–Sen a¨r det d˚a den andra typen av alarm som inte a¨r falsklarm men som inte a¨r
intressanta av andr anledningar. Dom kanske inte fo¨rekommer i en omgivning
som a¨r intressant, t.ex. om man ser maskaktivitet fr˚an externa adresser. Det a¨r
ju inte falkslarm fo¨r dom fo¨rso¨ker faktiskt attackera men man ser dom precis
hela tiden och dom a¨r inte intressanta att kolla p˚a.
–Sen a¨r det lite gr˚askala da¨r i mellan av olika anledningar.
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Hur skulle du beskriva ett typiskt tillva¨gag˚angssa¨tt fo¨r dig na¨r du ser
ett alarm?
–D˚a brukar jag fo¨rst och fra¨mst go¨ra n˚agon typ av historikuppslagning/korre-
lering p˚a source-ip-adressen fo¨r att se om vi har n˚agon information om den ha¨r
va¨rden. Det kanske a¨r s˚a att kunden har meddelat att just den ha¨r va¨rden f˚ar
go¨ra nmap-avso¨kningar men att vi inte har missat att ge v˚art backend system
den informationen s˚a att larmet triggar a¨nd˚a. Eller ocks˚a kanske det a¨r s˚a att
kommer det fr˚an dom ha¨r va¨rdarna d˚a a¨r det ja¨ttekritiskt, d˚a ska man skicka
insidentrapport direkt. S˚a fo¨rst fo¨rso¨ker jag kolla upp source-ip-adressen i v˚ara
egna system och go¨ra n˚agon typ av historik och korrelering.
–Sen g˚ar jag vidare. A¨r det en extern va¨rd d˚a kanske man kollar om den a¨r i
fr˚an Korea/Kina osv. Na¨sta steg a¨r nog att titta p˚a packetdata om s˚ant finns
tillga¨ngligt. Vidare kollar jag p˚a hur signaturen a¨r definierad. (A˚terigen a¨r Juni-
per bra da¨r till skillnad fr˚an Cisco och TippingPoint da¨r man inte har tillg˚ang
till hur signaturen a¨r definierad. S˚a kan jag se det regulja¨ra uttryck som dom
har anva¨nt fo¨r att f˚anga just den ha¨r attacken.) D˚a kan jag go¨ra en bedo¨mning
om just den ha¨r signaturen har en ho¨g tendens att falsklarma eller om den a¨r
av god kvalite´, och matcha det mot den packetdata som jag har fo¨r att se om
den borde trigga eller inte.
–Sen la¨ser jag p˚a om sja¨lva attacken/exploiten som dom fo¨rso¨ker utnyttja. Det
finns oftast i GUI:t da¨r jag kan komma a˚t CVE-nummer. Beho¨ver jag bilda mig
en ba¨ttre uppfattning a¨nd˚a kollar jag p˚a internet och la¨ser p˚a om attacken och
s˚arbarheten.
Bygger du sja¨lv n˚agra kopplingar mellan alarm eller go¨r systemet det
a˚t dig?
–Nej inte s˚a mycket faktiskt. Det a¨r inte s˚a ofta som vi har den bilden framfo¨r
oss. Vi har kanske bara en ganska begra¨nsad del av na¨tverket som vi ser. Vi ser
inte vad som ha¨nder sen riktigt. Vi vet kanske inte om att det m˚alet som dom
fo¨rso¨ker attackera att det a¨r en mail/web-server fo¨r den a¨r inte a˚tkomlig utifr˚an.
Nej jag tror inte det, inte just den typen av kopplingar. Klar man bygger ju ihop
vissa signaturer som i kombination a¨r extra intressanta om dom fo¨rekommer.
Men just attackkedjor p˚a na¨tverket, kan ha¨nda att jag glo¨mt det fo¨r att jag inte
jobbat p˚a ett tag, men inte s˚a mycket tror jag.
Eva Lina: –Fo¨r Emilie hade det i SSIM. Da¨r kunde hon sta¨lla in s˚adana korre-
leringssaker som att om du har f˚att in s˚aha¨r m˚anga alarm av den ha¨r typen d˚a
kanske det bo¨rjar bli intressant. D˚a kanske du bo¨r titta om du har f˚att in alarm
av dom ha¨r typerna innan dess. Eller om du f˚ar det ha¨r alarmet efter˚at d˚a a¨r
det ja¨ttefarligt.
–Lite grann kanske man go¨r det undermedvetet. Man kollar ju a¨nd˚a den histo-
riken som finns na¨r man f˚ar ett alarm. Man kollar source-ip-adresserna och man
sl˚ar ju a¨ven p˚a sja¨lva signaturen fo¨r att se vad man f˚ar upp. Men det a¨r va¨ldigt
mycket p˚a manuell basis isf som man go¨r det.
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–Fast det a¨r klart har man proxy-, brandva¨ggs- och ids-loggar hos en kund,
d˚a har vi mycket sto¨rre mo¨jlighet att go¨ra den typen av korrelering. Man kan
koppla en anva¨ndare till en source-ip-adress t.ex.
Enter Magnus:: meddelar att Ola a¨r sen...
Sebastian: –Jag ta¨nkte p˚a OSSIM; det hade ju a¨ven tillg˚ang till syslog loggar...
Den kunde i syslog:en se om det a¨r n˚agon som fo¨rso¨ker go¨ra en root-attack. D˚a
kunde den se i loggen om det a¨r n˚agon som f˚ar misslyckade login-fo¨rso¨k eller
kanske t.o.m. lyckade login-fo¨rso¨k.
–Precis, men det a¨r inte s˚a ofta vi har den mo¨jligheten. Men om vi har det
a˚tagandet fr˚an kunden att vi kanske har syslog:ar fr˚an deras servrar som vi kan
koppla till ha¨ndelser i IDS:en osv. S˚anna system har kommit ganska starkt p˚a
sistone. Hos n˚agon kund s˚a har dom ett s˚adant system som vi loggar in p˚a och
tar fram information fo¨r att go¨ra den korreleringen. Annars s˚a a¨r det v˚ara egna
system da¨r det a¨r lite mer eller mindre p˚a manuell basis som vi go¨r den ha¨r
typen av korrelering och kopplar ha¨ndelser till varandra.
Eva Lina: –Fo¨r la¨ser man rapporterna som producerats, d˚a a¨r det ju dom ha¨r
stora rosaskimrande landskapen som m˚alas upp hur allt detta skall automatiseras
med machine learning algorigthms. Men det finns ingenting av det ute i den
riktiga va¨rlden a¨n d˚a?
–Nja. Det finns men dom sa¨ljer skitbra nu och dom kostar enorma summor
pengar. En kund dom ko¨r n˚att som heter Arcsight. Det a¨r ett system som skall
sva¨lja allting och som skall go¨ra den ha¨r typen inbyggda intelligensen i sig d˚a.
Men det ka¨nns som att dom missar lite. Dels s˚a tror jag inte att den har s˚a
mycket intelligens i sig utan den samlar nog bara ihop allting p˚a ett sta¨lle och
s˚a spottar den ur sig det till anva¨ndaren s˚a f˚ar den sitta da¨r ba¨st den vill. Och
i sluta¨ndan a¨r det operato¨rens erfarenhet som avgo¨r om man kan faststa¨lla om
det a¨r ett larm eller inte. Fo¨r man kan omo¨jligen g˚a tillverkarens skala p˚a om
det a¨r allvarligt eller inte. Det a¨r s˚a m˚anga fler parametrar som avgo¨r om det a¨r
intressant eller inte. S˚a jag tror att det l˚ater skitbra fo¨r n˚agon som inte jobbar
med det. Hos oss skulle det inte sa¨lja s˚a bra.
Eva Lina: –Det na¨mnde Emilie ocks˚a att hon var inte riktigt sa¨ker p˚a den ha¨r
universala lo¨sningen. Ett na¨tverk a¨r som en individ, den a¨r unik, den finns ingen
annanstans i va¨rlden i princip. S˚a det finns inget som passar fo¨r alla na¨tverk.
–Det ka¨nner man ocks˚a na¨r man sitter och jobbar, man la¨r sig kundernas na¨tverk
och vad som brukar trigga da¨r och vad som a¨r legitimt och vad som a¨r avvikelser i
det legitima s˚a att sa¨ga. S˚a som jag ser det; visst det a¨r signaturbaserade system
som vi jobbar med men p˚a v˚ar niv˚a s˚a a¨r det avvikelsedetektering som vi arbetar
med. Hur uppta¨cker vi n˚agonting som inte brukar fo¨rekomma i den ha¨r enorma
stro¨mmen med ha¨ndelser som vi f˚ar emot oss hela tiden. Och d˚a ga¨ller det att
bygga system som uppta¨cker dom avvikelserna i det normala mo¨nstret s˚a att
sa¨ga.
Sebastian: –S˚a dom bra systemen a¨r helt enkelt dom som bara hja¨lper en att hitta
avvikelserna. Det a¨r inte s˚a att systemet skall uppta¨cka dom riktiga alarmen
sja¨lv utan det skall fungera som ett verktyg a˚t operato¨ren bara?
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–Ja. Jag har inte sja¨lv arbetat med Arcsight och dom ha¨r sto¨rre systemen s˚a jag
har sja¨lv inte s˚a stor erfarenhet av hur dom fungerar. Det var ju bara n˚agra a˚r
sedan som Unified Threat Management var ett begrepp da¨r man skulle bygga
ihop IDS med brandva¨gg med antivirus, all funktionalitet i ett. Men det slog
aldrig igenom riktigt fo¨r att ingenting var riktigt bra fr˚an bo¨rjan. Bygger man
ihop ma˚nga lite halv-pissiga system tillsammans blir det inte ba¨ttre.
–S˚a nej, jag tror inte s˚a himla mycket p˚a det ha¨r att man skall aggregera ihop
system i varandra och f˚a ett flashigt GUI och sitta och arbeta med. Man m˚aste
nog ta¨nka lite modula¨rt. Det skall vara skalbart systemet men a¨nd˚a s˚a att man
kan skra¨ddarsy det s˚a som man sja¨lv vill.
Sebastian: –S˚a o¨ppna standarder d˚a helt enkelt?
–O¨ppna standarder ja. Helt klart. Hade vi kunnat arbeta med Snort bara s˚a
hade det varit bra men det kan vi inte.
–Men Sourcefire hade varit intressant att titta p˚a. Det har vi snackat om att vi
skall ta in i v˚art testlabb och utverdera. S˚a vi f˚ar va¨ll se. Det vore intressant
att se skillnaden mellan Snort och Sourcefire och se om det blir va¨ldigt mycket
ho¨gre kvallite p˚a larmen a¨n vad Snort har.
Hur kategoriserar du alarm?
–A¨r det s˚a att ett alarm kommer o¨ver den da¨r tro¨skeln da¨r man inte bara klickar
bort det, utan det a¨r lite intressant. D˚a fo¨rso¨ker man faststa¨lla vilken kvallite
p˚a det a¨r p˚a signaturen helt enkelt.
Sebastian: –Hur ser signaturen ut d˚a. A¨r det ett regular expression eller n˚att
annat?
–Om man nu har tillg˚ang till det. I t.ex. TippingPoint har vi inte n˚agon access
alls till hur signaturen ser ut. Men i Snort och Juniper har man ju det. Det
a¨r regulja¨ra uttryck. Dom anva¨nder ett Perl-bibliotek fo¨r att parsa dom ha¨r
regulja¨ra uttrycken. Kan man regulja¨ra uttryck s˚a kan man bilda sig en upp-
fattning om signaturen. Sen finns det lite fler parametrar man kan skruva p˚a na¨r
man skapar en signatur. I Juniper kan man skapa custom signaturer sja¨lv, om
man tycker att den a¨r usel s˚a kan man go¨ra en kopia av signaturen och anva¨nda
den som bas fo¨r en egen signatur. D˚a kan man modifiera det regulja¨ra uttrycket
om man t.ex. tycker att sql injection bara skapar en massa falsklarm hela tiden
s˚a kan man peta in n˚agonting som minskar falsklarmen.
–Ne, s˚a det a¨r inget magiskt alls. Det a¨r bara att komma a˚t den informationen
helt enkelt och kolla p˚a det regulja¨ra uttrycket.
Hur kategoriserar du alarm?
• “l˚ag-niv˚a alarm”
• “ointressanta”
• “dubblett”, (orsak redan ka¨nd)
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• “grad av tillfo¨rlitlighet”, t.ex. en regel som triggar alarm kan
vara va¨ldigt allma¨n och orsaka m˚anga alarm varav de flesta inte
beror p˚a intr˚ang och d˚a ha en l˚ag grad av tillfo¨rlitlighet eller en
regel kan vara va¨ldigt specifik och da¨rfo¨r a¨r alarm som genereras
utifr˚an den regeln av ho¨g tillfo¨rlitlighetsgrad.
• “bekra¨ftelse”, kan man hitta ett nytt event som bekra¨ftar att
alarmet a¨r korrekt?
–Jag tycker att man arbetar lite gran efter alla dom da¨r. Vissa alarm a¨r ju
inte intressanta av olika anledningar och na¨r man g˚ar lite djupare in p˚a dom
d˚a har dom ingen sto¨rre tillfo¨rlitlighet na¨r man va¨l kollar p˚a hur signaturen a¨r
definierad t.ex.
Eva Lina: –Du har inga egna kategorier fo¨rutom dom som vi na¨mnt?
–Nej, faktiskt inte. Jag har inga egna. Jag har nog inte s˚a mycket mer att sa¨ga
om det ha¨r uto¨ver det som jag redan sagt. Magnus f˚ar trakasera mig efter˚at om
han tycker att han vill ha fler svar.
Hur skulle du betygsa¨tta dom grafiska interface som du anva¨nt? Finns
alla dom saker du vill ha da¨r eller a¨r det n˚agot du saknar?
–Det varierar s˚aklart. Men om man ska sammanfatta det jag har sagt innan
lite. Det a¨r enormt va¨rdefullt att dels kunna se definitionen p˚a signaturen fo¨r
att kunna bedo¨ma om det a¨r falsklarm eller inte. Och dels att kunna f˚anga paket,
s˚a att den f˚angar paket na¨r signaturen triggar eller helst d˚a innan s˚a man ser
vad som har skickats. Annars blir man alltid tv˚aa om man f˚ar sa¨tta ig˚ang den
efter att det har ha¨nt. Det a¨r otroligt va¨rdefullt att se paket runtomkring sja¨lva
ha¨ndelsen.
Eva Lina: –Emilie ville ha ett enkelt sa¨tt att g˚a direkt fr˚an GUI:t till command
line s˚a att man kunde ko¨ra sql-fr˚agor direkt till databasen. Fo¨r att ibland ka¨nde
hon sig hemmad av GUI:t.
–Jo men absolut. Det a¨r det som vi jobbar med ocks˚a. Da¨r finns det sa¨tt da¨r
man kan g˚a hur l˚angt som helst fo¨r att underla¨tta fo¨r anva¨ndaren. Men i dom
ha¨r kommersiella systemen da¨r finns det ju oftast, i alla fall som vi jobbat med,
den typen av funktionalitet. Utan det a¨r ju i v˚ara egna system. Dels s˚a kra¨vs det
att man har en ganska stor databas med ha¨ndelser som man kan so¨ka i GUI:t.
Men man kan ju inte spara hur mycket som helst fo¨r d˚a blir det fo¨r l˚angsamt,
s˚a kanske tv˚a m˚anader tillbaka max.
–Men visst i det egenutvecklade gra¨nssnittet som vi har da¨r a¨r det ju typiskt
s˚adana da¨r saker man vill go¨ra. Man vill ho¨gerklicka p˚a larmet, sa¨tta ig˚ang en
tcpdump p˚a sensorn fo¨r att f˚anga in mer traffik. Go¨ra uppslag/korreleringar
direkt. Just den ha¨r typen av korreleringar och historiken da¨r det a¨r ju s˚adan
funktionalitet som jag tycker skall finnas med na¨r man klickar upp ett larm.
S˚a att det har tagits om han om av backend-systemet s˚a att sa¨ga. S˚a att man
sja¨lv inte skall beho¨vs sitta och go¨ra massa slagningar i n˚agon databas, utan
den informationen finns da¨r oavsett om man a¨r ute efter den eller inte.
Sebastian: –Menar du typ vilka 5 ka¨llor som triggade samma alarm och s˚ada¨r?
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–Ja, den typen av statistik hade ju varit intressant. Om man ta¨nker p˚a en
source-ip-adress som har triggat och man vill veta historiskt sett hur det har
sett ut p˚a den ha¨r sensorn, har den triggat ma˚nga g˚anger, kanske hur andra
operato¨rer har bedo¨mt den ha¨r ha¨ndelsen, osv.
–Men visst sen finns det ju mer ho¨gniv˚afr˚agor som man kanske skulle vilja sta¨lla.
Hur ser det ut lite mer generellt med signaturer och source och destinations
portar fo¨r att blida sig n˚agon typ utav uppfattning just i den ha¨r omgivningen
d˚a. Och allting och allting kan man ju inte bygga in i bakomliggande system.
–Att man bygger in i alla fall dom viktigaste grejerna s˚a att man f˚ar upp den
informationen na¨r man klickar p˚a alarmen. Typ om man har ett obfuskerat
javascript eller payloads osv, att man f˚ar upp det i larmet och kan dekoda det
direkt. S˚a att man inte beho¨ver url decoda n˚agonting genom att g˚a ut p˚a na¨tet
och klistra in en url, bara fo¨r att se vad fan det a¨r som han har skickar fo¨r ja¨vla
GET request ha¨r eller inte.
–Allting har ju som syfte att reducera den tiden det tar att komma till en slut-
sats. Och desto fortare man kan skicka iva¨g en rapport eller informera kunden
om att det ha¨nt n˚att ha¨r desto ba¨ttre. All dom ha¨r funktionerna som man kan
bygga in i GUI:t som underla¨ttar, det a¨r liksom det man stra¨var efter hela tiden.
Du sa att ungefa¨r 10% av alarmen brukar du klicka p˚a. Hur ofta bru-
kar du g˚a utanfo¨r interfacet och ut p˚a na¨tet fo¨r att hitta information
innan du kan besta¨mma dig fo¨r hur du ska klassificera ett alarm?
–Dom 10 procenten, d˚a go¨r jag nog i princip alltid en korrelering i alla fall.
Kollar i v˚ara egna system. Historiken p˚a ha¨ndelsen och s˚a da¨r. Och i 5% av
fallen s˚a g˚ar jag in och tittar p˚a signaturen och kollar p˚a pcap datan om den
finns tillga¨nglig. I 2-3% s˚a g˚ar jag ut p˚a sensorn och sniffar fo¨r att f˚a a¨nnu mer
information.
Vilka fo¨rba¨ttringar vill du se fo¨r att go¨ra det enklare att uppta¨cka
attacker?
–Rent GUI-ma¨ssigt, ju mer information som kan fo¨rmedlas direkt till operato¨ren
desto ba¨ttre. Jag skrev ner tre punkter da¨r.
–Ba¨ttre korrelering. Det a¨r en s˚adan da¨r grej som a¨r s˚a oerho¨rt tungt och kra¨ver
s˚a va¨ldigt mycket h˚ardvara fo¨r att uppn˚a det man vill fo¨r att det a¨r s˚a tunga
fr˚agor man m˚aste sta¨lla fo¨r att f˚a den da¨r korreleringen. Men mer korrelering
och kanske ba¨ttre fo¨rst˚aelse fo¨r vilka typer av enskilda signaturer som a¨r in-
tressanta tillsammans med andra signaturer. I sig s˚a a¨r dom aldrig intressanta
men tillsammans med andra blir dom intressanta. Om tillverkarna kunde sja¨lva
komma fram med egna metasignaturer mer s˚a hade det hja¨lpt till.
–Sen generellt sa¨tt s˚a a¨r ju kvalliten ganska l˚ag p˚a signaturer, det a¨r va¨ldigt
va¨ldigt mycket falsklarm. Om man kunde ansta¨lla n˚agra nissar som go¨r lite mer
tester innan dom sla¨pper signaturerna, s˚a att det blir lite ba¨ttre kvalite och true
positives.
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–Sen skrev jag avvikelsedetektering. Det var lite grann det som jag na¨mnde
tidigare att man p˚a n˚att sa¨tt kan bygga system som uppta¨cker avvikelserna i
dom ha¨r enorma stro¨mmen av ha¨ndelser som man f˚ar. Da¨r kan man ju g˚a in
hur djupt som helst p˚a den source-ip-adressen p˚a just det ha¨r na¨tverket. Varfo¨r
kommer avvikelsen, a¨r det p˚a signatur-niv˚a? osv.
–Men molnet kanske ra¨ddar oss och allt kommer bli bra...
Eva Lina: –Ja, hoppas kan vi ju alltid go¨ra.
Skulle du fo¨redra ett system som la¨rsig automagiskt hur du vill ha
det, ett da¨r man m˚aste konfigurera allt (har full kontroll) eller kanske
n˚agot da¨r i mellan?
–Jag har nog inga problem att sla¨ppa kontrollen. Men samtidigt tycker jag att
sen s˚ant system som la¨r sig av hur en opreato¨r klickar p˚a alarm osv. Det tror
jag skulle vara va¨ldigt va¨rdefullt. Men det ka¨nns no¨dva¨ndigt att det a¨r n˚agon
typ av IDS-administrato¨r som kan g˚a in och se vilka beslut som har fattats och
kan overrida dom beslut som har fattats och go¨ra justeringar och ha insyn i den
processen. Men jag tror att man skulle kunna komma ganska l˚angt bara p˚a att
titta p˚a klick om det a¨r hyfsat erfarna operato¨rer som sitter da¨r. Om man ser
att de ha¨r larmen dom klickar man alltid bort, man hackar alltid bort dom utan
att ens klicka upp dom.
–Na¨r jag bo¨rja da¨r och man sitter med nytt GUI, sen blir man helt fo¨rsto¨rd. Allt
det kreativa ta¨nkandet bara fo¨rsvinner. Men d˚a hade man massor med ide´er om
vilka fo¨rba¨ttringar man skulle kunna go¨ra med just GUI:t. Och d˚a kommer jag
ih˚ag att en ide var att system skulle la¨ra sig att om fyra operato¨rer hackar bort
ett alarm i en veckas tid eller tv˚a dagars tid, det kanske man kan klassa som
gro¨nt (inte s˚a intressant). Sen kanske n˚agon IDS-administrato¨r kan samla alla
gro¨na alarm och go¨ra en o¨versikt och sen sa¨ga att; okej dom ha¨r alarmen dom
tar vi inte in i v˚art system la¨ngre. Och s˚a kanske man har ro¨da alarm som man
alltid dubbelklickar p˚a och man a¨r alltid p˚a sensorn och go¨r en tcpdump. Dyker
n˚agonting s˚adant upp igen d˚a taggas det automatiskt ro¨tt.
–N˚agon s˚adan typ av visuella hja¨lpmedel s˚a att man direkt kan bilda sig en
fo¨rsta uppfattning skulle vara bra.
Eva Lina: –Mmm, fo¨r det snacka vi om att vi skulle go¨ra. Att vi har toppen med
dom ho¨gst rankade, dom ro¨da, sen ta¨nkte vi ha en lista med bubblare med dom
som o¨kar mest, da¨r deltat a¨r som sto¨rst. Och sen sen lista med helt nya alarm
som aldrig setts p˚a na¨tverket innan och det a¨r ingen som har klickat p˚a dom
n˚agonsin. Och s˚a naturligtvis s˚a att man kan f˚a tillg˚ang till alla alarm. Men att
ha dom da¨r tre tyckte vi ka¨ndes ra¨tt vettigt.
–Absolut, det ka¨nns ja¨tte vettigt.
Eva Lina: –Men vad bra d˚a var vi inte helt fel ute d˚a iaf.
A¨r det viktigt att kunna ge negativfeedback? Att kunna ranka ett
alarm la¨gre och ange anledning(ar) fo¨r detta till systemet? Om man
t.ex. har en dator i na¨tverket med en ka¨nd bugg/svaghet da¨r det
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a¨r viktigt att veta om en attack sker. Men om den senare patchas
och man inte la¨ngre vill se den och isf ta bort den m.h.a. negativ
feedback.
–Absolut det a¨r ocks˚a en funktionalitet som a¨r va¨ldigt viktig i ett s˚adant system.
S˚a att jag ser dom inte som o¨msesidigt uteslutande dom ha¨r olika systemen ni
har. Sen kanske man kan ta¨nka sig att i dom fallen det a¨r en viss typ av s˚arbarhet
och man vet att na¨sta tisdag s˚a skall Microsoft sla¨ppa sitt service pack fo¨r det
ha¨r. Och vi kommer skicka incidentrapporter till kund fram tills dess men efter
det a¨r det inte intressant. D˚a skulle man vilja sa¨tta n˚agon life-time p˚a den ha¨r
signaturen: den a¨r ro¨d tills tisdag, och sen g˚ar den ner p˚a gro¨n. S˚a man kan
sa¨tta n˚agon tidstag p˚a dom.
–Men absolut, manuell negativ feedback. Vem som ska go¨ra det, om operato¨ren
skall kunna go¨ra det sja¨lv eller om det skall vara en IDS-administrato¨r som skall
go¨ra det, det a¨r va¨ll fr˚agan man kan ta sta¨llning till. Men mo¨jligheten den ka¨nns
viktig.
Eva Lina: –Magnus hade ju fyra olika interaktionssa¨tt med IDS:en. Dels bara
att man tittar p˚a var klickar anva¨ndaren. Dels att anva¨ndaren sja¨lv kunde ange
anledningen till varfo¨r han klicka p˚a alarmet. Och s˚a att systemet sja¨lv gissade
p˚a hur anva¨ndaren ville ha det, s˚a f˚ar man sitta och h˚alla med eller inte h˚alla
med. Och s˚a tillslut att den fr˚agar explicit om hur den ska ranka alarm.
–Vad sa¨ger du om dom ha¨r olika graderna av interaktion? Eller vill du bara att
den skall h˚alla ka¨ften?
–Det a¨r ra¨tt stressigt att sitta da¨r. Man hinner inte ge feedback till systemet s˚a
att det la¨r sig. Och att sitta och fundera p˚a var det hamnar p˚a en skala mellan
ett och tio, det tror jag inte skulle funka fo¨r oss i alla fall.
Eva Lina: –S˚a det ha¨r med att ange varfo¨r du a¨r intresserad, det a¨r inget fo¨r
dig?
–Nej. Bara ren klickning och sen i efterhand att n˚agon med stor erfarenhet kan
g˚a in och go¨ra dom fo¨ra¨ndringar som beho¨vs. Det tror jag a¨r mycket ba¨ttre.
Eva Lina: –Men det ha¨r med att man kan h˚alla med eller inte h˚alla med att
man har t.ex. en ja- eller nej-knapp. S˚a att man kan tala om fo¨r systemet att
ja det ha¨r var bra rankat eller nej det ha¨r var d˚aligt. Vad sa¨ger du om det?
–Den kra¨ver ju inte s˚a mycket interaktion. Den a¨r nog inte s˚a dum. A¨r det ett
larm som klassas ro¨tt och sen tycker man att det ha¨r har blivit fel. Fo¨r det a¨r
bara en massa urusla operato¨rer som har suttit och rankat fo¨r jag vet att jag
vet att det ha¨r a¨r inte intressant. I dom fallen hade nog varit bra att ha den
mo¨jligheten i GUI:t.
Eva Lina: –Fo¨r d˚a har man ju dels det ha¨r att det blir ointressant o¨ver tid, att
man kanske slutar klicka p˚a det och det l˚angsamt do¨r bort. Och dels s˚a kan man
aktivt do¨da det va¨ldigt fort.
–Just det, s˚a man f˚ar b˚ada va¨rldarna da¨r.
Eva Lina: –Jag antar att den da¨r sista va¨ldigt verbala och pratglada IDS:et som
hela tiden fr˚agar om hur alarm skall rankas inte heller a¨r n˚agot fo¨r dig?
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–Nej, det a¨r absolut ingenting fo¨r mig.
Ser du n˚agra nackdelar eller risker med ranking?
–Ja det a¨r klart att det finns. Det go¨r det ju. Det kan vara s˚a att man la¨gger fo¨r
stor tillfo¨rlitlighet i den ha¨r rankingen. Och sen vaggas man in n˚agon typ av...
Sa¨g att man har en skala p˚a ett till fyra och sen a¨r det n˚att som a¨r p˚a tv˚a och
dom ger man fan i att titta p˚a fo¨r att dom bara a¨r p˚a tv˚a. Men det finns andra
orsaker till att den a¨r da¨r nere och den borde inte egentligen vara da¨r nere, utan
den borde vara lite ho¨gre. Hade man inte haft rankingen fr˚an bo¨rjan d˚a hade
man kanske a¨gnat den sto¨rre uppma¨rksamhet. Det a¨r da¨r det kra¨vs n˚agon med
lite sto¨rre erfarenhet som kanske g˚ar in med ja¨mna intervall och kollar den hur
rankingen sker och av vilken anledning den har fattat besluten s˚a man kan go¨ra
justeringar.
–Och man kanske ocks˚a ska ha ett system da¨r man l˚aser vissa signaturer till
en viss rank fo¨r att dom a¨r alltid intressanta. Det skall inte anva¨ndare och
operato¨rer kunna hacka bort, utan dom a¨r l˚asta och man vet att dom larmen
a¨r kritiska. Men annars kommer jag inte p˚a n˚agra omedelbara nackdelar med
rankingen.
Eva Lina: –Fo¨r det var va¨ll det som H˚akan Nohre p˚a Cisco s˚agade ranking med.
Han tyckte att n˚agon kan ju ranka det fel och d˚a kan det tippa hela systemet.
Och vad kommer ha¨nda om anva¨ndare a¨ndrar sig efter ett tag, vad ska vi go¨ra
med det d˚a? Ne det verkar inget bra, tyckte han.
Sebastian: –Ja det a¨r ju det som a¨r problemet. Grupppsykologi kan ju f˚a en
inverkan med. D˚a kanske man f˚ar ta¨nker n˚att i stil med; det ha¨r a¨r ju gro¨n, d˚a
kanske det a¨r n˚agon som vet ba¨ttre a¨n mig som har rankat. Man bo¨rjar tvivla
p˚a sig sja¨lv.
–Exakt. Den risken finns da¨r. Men jag tror att ett s˚adant system sa¨tter lite krav
p˚a dom som jobbar med det, s˚a att dom har ganska stor erfarenhet. Den ha¨r
problematiken den kan man ju komma run ocks˚a genom att man kanske viktar
anva¨ndares mo¨jligheter. S˚a att en som bara har jobbat da¨r i ett a˚r kanske inte
har mo¨jlighet att ranka s˚a h˚art. Utan hans klick betyder mindre a¨n n˚agon som
har jobbat da¨r i tio a˚r. D˚a reducerar man riskerna att en nykomling sabbar hela
systemet.
–Men jag tror att den mesta av den problematiken som Cisco snubben tar upp,
den kan man nog komma runt om man lurar lite grann. Om man ser det som
en hja¨lpreda och inte en absolut sanning. Utan att man tar det fo¨r vad det a¨r.
Har du n˚agra o¨vriga kommentarer eller synpunkter?
–Nej jag tror inte det...
Sebatian: –Jag ta¨nkte p˚a det du sa att na¨r man klickar p˚a alarm s˚a kan man
f˚a upp relaterad information, statistik och annan intressant information. Tror
du man skulle kunna anva¨nda den informationen fo¨r att p˚a n˚att sa¨tt ge en
slags rank- eller relevans-poa¨ng till alarmet? Om man hittar mycket relaterad
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information och ser att ett source ip har orsakat en ja¨vla massa alarm de senaste
tio minuterna...
–Absolut. All den typen av korrelering som go¨rs den borde ju anva¨ndas. Den
har ju som syfte att man ska bilda sig en ba¨ttre uppfatting om ha¨ndelsen och
den hja¨lper ju. Den skulle ju ocks˚a kunna vara inbyggt i rankningssystemet.
T.ex. om en signatur triggar men source-ip-adressen triggade ocks˚a en annan
signatur ig˚ar p˚a det ha¨r na¨tverket, och det go¨r att den ha¨r ha¨ndelsen klassas
som allvarligare a¨n om den bara var isolerad.
–Da¨r kan man gra¨va ja¨tte mycket ka¨nns det som. Vad ska man titta p˚a da¨r. Sig-
naturen? Source-ip-adressen? Vilken miljo¨ den fo¨rekommer i? Vilka tro¨skelva¨rden
skall man sa¨tta? Tillsammans med vilka andra signaturer kan det vara intres-
sant? Hur l˚angt tidsspan skall man ha, n˚agon ma˚nad bara eller ett a˚r?
–Men absolut. Jag tror att det skulle kunna hja¨lpa om man fo¨rde in den infor-
mationen i rankningsprocessen.
D.3 Emilie Lundin Barse
Transcript from interview of Emilie Lundin Barse from Combitech. The inter-
view was done in person and recorded.
Intervjun bo¨rjar med en demonstration av verktyget OSSIM.:
–Snort a¨r ju egentligen huvudkomponent i OSSIM och det som du f˚ar intr˚angs-
detekteringslarmen ifr˚an. Ide´n med dessa verktyg a¨r att du ska kunna f˚a in
information fr˚an andra ka¨llor och loggar, etc. I den gamla installationen plockar
vi in loggarna fr˚an brandva¨ggen och d˚a kan man korrelera droppade anslutning-
ar, till exempel folk som fo¨rso¨ker komma in genom brandva¨ggen p˚a portar som
a¨r sta¨ngda, med larm om de IP-adresserna dyker upp i n˚agot sammanhang. Det
a¨r intr˚angsdetektering med add-on-information.
–S˚a ha¨r i den gamla versionen har du BASE-gra¨nssnittet men de h˚aller p˚a att
la¨gga upp sin egen eventviewer som de har valt att kalla den. Da¨r kan du dela upp
saker i olika flikar. Du kan ocks˚a installera snare fo¨r att plocka in windowsloggar
och OSsec som a¨r en hostbasered linux-IDS och d˚a poppar de upp ha¨r.
–Den kollar lite p˚a vad som ha¨nder p˚a sja¨lva sensormaskinen ocks˚a. Alla larmen
hamnar i den ha¨r fliken, men detta a¨r ju det som kallas forensic, det mer att
gra¨va i na¨r man redan vet att n˚agot har ha¨nt. De har en larmflik da¨r korrele-
ringsregler eller direktiv go¨r att ho¨gprioriterade larm eller events poppar o¨ver i
larmfliken. Tanken a¨r va¨l att man bara ska kolla p˚a de som a¨r ho¨gprioriterade.
Eva Lina: –Sta¨ller man in i n˚agon konfigureringflik vilka som prioriteras?
–Ja, man f˚ar la¨gga in s˚adana regler. Men den har ett ga¨ng inbyggda ocks˚a. Om
man f˚ar ett snortlarm p˚a en attack mot en port har den na¨tverksverktyg som
kollar om porten svarar p˚a trafiken. Om den go¨r det f˚ar det ho¨gre prioritet och
blir till exempel ett larm. Man kan la¨gga in en massa s˚adana som de kallar
policys.
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–Om man tittar p˚a direktien, har den s˚adana ha¨r recurrent snort event. F˚ar
man va¨ldigt ma˚nga snort events av samma typ larmar den p˚a det.
Sebastian: –Kan man go¨ra motsatsen ocks˚a? Om man f˚ar va¨ldigt m˚anga, kan
man ignorera dem d˚a kanske?
–Jo man kan skriva en policy. Man anva¨nder den till direktiven men man lagrar
dem inte, s˚a de ligger inte kvar i den ha¨r eventfliken. Den go¨r bara korreleringen
i minnet men lagrar inte dem i databasen.
Eva Lina: –Spar ju minne.
–Ja, jo. Den anva¨nder ju p0f som a¨r en passive OS fingerprinting och da¨r kan
den sa¨ga host same och det a¨r inget man sparar p˚a. Den har detekterat att det
forfarande a¨r en windowshost, samma maskin, det a¨r kanske inte n˚agot man vill
utreda direkt.
–Om man go¨r utredningar s˚a a¨r det faktiskt ofta de positiva ha¨ndelserna som
man vill ha och de felaktiga. Ta brandva¨ggsloggar som exempel, om du hittar
n˚agonting som go¨r att du tror att en server a¨r hackad s˚a a¨r det ju mer intressant
med vilka sessioner som har kommit igenom brandva¨ggen. Faktum a¨r va¨l att det
ofta a¨r m˚anga utredningar da¨r det a¨r viktigare med vad som har lyckats n vad
som har misslyckats. Lyckade inloggningar kan vara viktigare a¨n misslyckade.
–Na¨r du f˚ar upp ett alarm kan du klicka p˚a det och d˚a f˚a upp listan o¨ver events,
det kan ju vara flera events som orsakar samma larm. Vi kan ta och titta p˚a
n˚agra olika regler, vi har gjort en del egna, just d˚a med brandva¨ggsloggarna
och lite andra saker. Rare but open destination port har lite s˚adana regler. Om
det a¨r mer a¨n 30 sekunder som sessionen p˚ag˚ar prioriterar man upp den. Det
a¨r ganska bra, att inte bara ha intr˚angsregler utan ocks˚a andra saker.
Sebastian: –Kan jag anva¨nda de ha¨r reglerna rekursivt? Om jag d˚a vill ha ett
attackscenario, kan jag d˚a sa¨ga att det ha¨r beteendet liknar den ha¨r trojanen,
och sedan ha¨nder det ha¨r. Jag refererar till ett id och sa¨ger att det ha¨r ha¨nder
fo¨rst och sedan det ha¨r?
–Du f˚ar la¨gga ihop det i samma direktiv tror jag, men det g˚ar ju att go¨ra flera
egna grejer i samma direktiv. Men jag vet inte riktigt hur, har inte anva¨nt det.
–OSSIM a¨r det jag anva¨nt mest. Jag tycker man kan ka¨nna sig lite begra¨nsad
ha¨r och skulle vilja ha ba¨ttre mo¨jligheter att sortera sja¨lva p˚a vilken parameter
man vill och ha ett friare gra¨nssnitt, mer ett sql query-gra¨nssnitt med sto¨d fo¨r
regexpar.
Sebastian: –S˚a att man kan go¨ra ungefa¨r som views i sql s˚a att man f˚ar en egen?
–Det finns, jag har provat ett par stycken s˚adana ha¨r security information
management-verktyg som a¨r a¨nnu mer inriktade p˚a att man stoppar in alla
sin loggar i dom snarare a¨n ids-larm. RSA enVision a¨r ett verktyg da¨r de har
ett sqlgra¨nssnitt. Fast man f˚ar lite sto¨d s˚a att man inte beho¨ver skriva queries
utan du har lite hja¨lp.
Sebastian: –Men finns det inte n˚agon so¨kfunktion? Det har en i BASE.
–Du kan ju la¨gga in tidsperioder. Gra¨nssnitter a¨r ganska kr˚angligt men du kan
la¨gga in tisdperioder och du kan la¨gga in IP-adresser, vilken sensor larmet kom-
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mer ifr˚an och s˚a vidare, men du kan inte so¨ka p˚a riktigt vad du vill. Man skulle
vilja ha n˚agot mer liknande googleindexeringsso¨kning.
–Jag har anva¨nt Splunk ocks˚a. Det anva¨nds till att stoppa in textbaserade loggar
i och det go¨r n˚agon slags so¨kmotorindexering av loggarna. Det a¨r ganska fra¨ckt,
fo¨r man skulle vilja ha den hja¨lpen i OSSIM.
Eva Lina: –Men du brukar allts˚a klicka runt p˚a alarmen?
–Ja det go¨r jag. Jag tycker att man na¨stan alltid beho¨ver g˚a in och titta p˚a
inneh˚allet. Den har ju ma˚nga ka¨llkodlarm och sql injection-larm och d˚a f˚ar man
i princip hexkoden da¨r nere. Jag tycker att det na¨stan a¨r alltid man beho¨ver
titta p˚a det fo¨r att se om det a¨r ett falsklarm eller inte, sa¨rskilt na¨r det ga¨ller
ka¨llkod. Om man har det aktiverat falsklarmar det va¨ldigt mycket. Ofta triggar
den p˚a vissa websidor.
Eva Lina: –Tycker du att det ra¨cker med informationen som finns ha¨r?
–Nej, egentligen inte.
Eva Lina: –Vad brukar du vilja ha fo¨rutom detta?
–Sessionsinformation, man ser om det har etablerats en session och hur mycket
trafik som har g˚att och eventuellt vilka andra maskiner attackeraren har pratat
med. Det andra verktyget jag anva¨nt heter Sguil, a¨r na¨stan ett snortgra¨nssnitt.
Det ko¨r jag faktiskt hemma. Det har nog utvecklats av det amerikanska fo¨rsvaret
som sitter i 24/7-o¨vervakning och verkligen tittar p˚a varje larm som kommer.
S˚a i och fo¨r sig, det a¨r gjort mer s˚a att man verkligen tittar p˚a varje alarm.
–Ha¨r har de markerat ett alarm,mysql insertion overflow attempt. Det a¨r typiskt
s˚adana jag ser hemma ocks˚a, bakgrundsbrus p˚a internet kan man va¨l sa¨ga. Det
a¨r speciellt infekterade maskiner i Asien, jag antar att de inte har n˚agon update
p˚a sina maskiner...
Eva Lina: –Det a¨r va¨l ra¨tt mycket piratkopierat da¨r borta ocks˚a?
–Ja, s˚a de betalar va¨l inte fo¨r sina windowslicenser direkt och d˚a har de ingen
uppdatering p˚a dem.
–I det ha¨r gra¨nssnittet delar dom upp det i ho¨gprioriterade alarm, mellanpriori-
terade och l˚agprioriterade i olika panes. Man kan konfigurera om det lite grann
och sedan kan man klicka upp regeln som har triggat och s˚a visar den paketin-
neh˚all och s˚a kan du a¨ven ha¨r go¨ra en lookup p˚a IP-adressen. Om man so¨ker
p˚a na¨tet p˚a det som st˚ar i paketet ser man att det a¨r s˚a ha¨r det ser ut na¨r en
infekterad maskin fo¨rso¨ker sprida sig vidare.
–Det ha¨r go¨r a˚tminstone aggregering, aggregerar p˚a ka¨ll-IP tror jag. Den a¨r ju
lite korkad d˚a, fo¨r vissa saker ill man ju aggregera p˚a distinationsIP och andra
p˚a ka¨ll-IP. Den har count ha¨r, s˚a den ha¨r har 64 stycken likadana larm ha¨r.
Eva Lina: –Hur m˚anga mo¨jligheter har man ha¨r att aggregera annorlunda?
–Ha¨r a¨r det bara att den samlar ihop samma, s˚a ha¨r har man inte s˚a ma˚nga
mo¨jligheter. Tanken a¨r att man ska eskalera, att man tittar p˚a varje alarm och
sedan kan kategorisera dem som ointressanta och d˚a fo¨rsvinner de.
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–Jag har g˚att n˚an kurs SANS Institute-kurs, de har bra sa¨kerhetskurser. Jag
har g˚att deras intrusion detection-kurs och da¨r bera¨ttar de hur de jobbar i de
ha¨r verktygen. De har junior analysts som sitter och kollar p˚a alla alarm som
kommer upp. Sedan har de senior analysts som kollar p˚a det som har eskalerats.
–Man kan ju alltid sa¨tta p˚a coh sta¨nga av snortregler och la¨gga in egna regler. I
vissa sammanhang har man va¨ldigt fokuserad detektering och d˚a har man bara
va¨ldigt specifika regler fo¨r saker som man vill uppta¨cka fo¨r en viss tja¨nst.
–Inom fo¨rsvaret tittar man oftare p˚a vissa IP-adresser, o¨vervakar lite vad dom
sysslar med. Man anva¨nder i princip inte standardreglerna.
Sebastian: –Hur mycket folk har dom som sitter och kollar? A¨r det s˚a de lo¨ser
problemet? Att de har senior och junior? Hur mycket l˚ater de systemet klura ut
sja¨lv vad som a¨r farligt och inte farligt eller go¨r de helt enkelt s˚a att de har en
himla massa folk som tittar p˚a allt och s˚a f˚ar de bedo¨ma vad som a¨r farligt och
inte farligt?
–Det blir ju s˚a, man tittar p˚a vissa saker mer noga, man har ju begra¨nsat med
tid. Ett tips jag fick p˚a hur man kan kolla a¨r att titta p˚a de mest allvarliga
alarmen och sedan titta p˚a s˚adant som dyker upp som enstaka ha¨ndelser fo¨r
att inte missa n˚agot. Just det ha¨r med droppade saker i brandva¨ggen, vad som
a¨r ganska vanligt a¨r att man tittar p˚a top 10 och bottom 10. F˚a ha¨ndelser
a¨r antagliggen n˚agon som manuellt fo¨rso¨ker go¨ra n˚agonting. Top 10 a¨r oftast
scanningar d˚a de bara scannar igenom allt.
–Men Sguil gillar jag. Fo¨r hemmabruk da¨r man har ra¨tt lite trafik a¨r det bra.
Det kommer bara att rulla fo¨bi alarm om man har det mesta p˚aslaget som vi
har gjort i vissa sammanhang. Det ha¨r a¨r mer gjort fo¨r att trimma ner lite p˚a
reglerna skulle jag nog tycka, medans i OSSIM har man filosofin att man sparar
p˚a alla alarm medans man inte tittar p˚a alla om man inte tror att n˚agot specifikt
har ha¨nt. Det a¨r lite olika sa¨tt att jobba p˚a.
Sebastian: –Men d˚a funkar inte OSSIM lika bra i ho¨gtrafiksammanhang?
–Jo det go¨r den ju, fo¨r du beho¨ver inte titta p˚a allting som kommer in. vi har
haft lite samarbete med Saab Microwave s˚a vi har det installerat hos dem. Det
blir ja¨ttemycket men det g˚ar ra¨tt bra, man f˚ar rensa lite s˚a att diskarna inte
blir fulla. Och det finns begra¨nsningar, man kan inte ha hur mycket som helst
i databasen samtidigt. Men det a¨r ju problemet med alla databaser. Det blir
ju ra¨tt segt om man har ett par 100.000 events i databasen. So¨kningarna blir
va¨ldigt l˚angsamma. D˚a kanske man inte kan ha mer a¨n ett par dagars ha¨ndelser
samtidigt. Man f˚ar na¨stan ha en maskin som importerar och exporterar data
fo¨r de tidsperioder man vill so¨ka.
Sebastian: –Det har man ju la¨st om, att d˚a det g˚ar fo¨r l˚angsamt att logga till
databasen dumpar dom till n˚agot bina¨rt format och s˚a f˚ar andra maskiner st˚a
och tugga igenom den da¨r filen och la¨gga den i databasen.
–Man f˚ar na¨stan bygga upp en s˚an struktur, att man har en maskin som samlar
in data, en som go¨r realtidsanalys och sedan en separat maskin da¨r man go¨r
de ha¨r manuella so¨kningarna eftersom de sto¨r realtidsanalysen. S˚a man beho¨ver
tv˚a analysmaskiner.
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–P˚a Microwave har de ko¨rt Snort ganska la¨nge och om du ko¨per Snort har den
ett litet ba¨ttre gra¨nssnitt a¨n BASE p˚a den kommersiella versionen.
–Det tar oftast tv˚a a˚r innan man a¨r no¨jd, konfigurerar lite regler, sta¨ngt av
det som sto¨r. Ofta uppta¨cker man konfigurationsfel i na¨tverket och d˚a a˚tga¨rdar
man kanske de grejerna i bo¨rjan, s˚a det a¨r va¨ldig tmycket som ligger och sto¨r
i bo¨rjan. Jag har ho¨rt det fr˚an flera att det tar cirka tv˚a a˚r innan man ka¨nner
att man kan jobba i det.
–Men jag kan sa¨ga att jag har egentligen inte jobbat med intr˚angsdetektering.
Jag har gjort tv˚a installationer av OSSIM i tv˚a olika na¨t och vi har gjort vis-
sa anpassningar, grejat med regler och policys och lite direktiv, men vi har
inte varit med hela va¨gen tills det blev anva¨ndningsbart. Det blir ju mycket
skra¨pha¨ndelser. Det var ju som n˚agon sade att det fo¨rsta man beho¨ver konfigu-
rera bort a¨r o¨vervakningsmaskiner som sa¨kerhetsavdelningen anva¨nder, fo¨r de
ligger ofta och spyr ut trafik som triggar regler. Att just konfigurera bort att
maskinen sja¨lv generar ha¨ndelser a¨r en sak man beho¨ver go¨ra.
Sebastian: –D˚a a¨r de allts˚a de hetaste maskinerna man kan infektera i ett
fo¨retag? Det a¨r de maskiner som sa¨kerhetssystemet ignorerar.
–Precis. Faktiskt, det a¨r va¨ldigt ka¨nsliga data om man hittar en s˚adan databas
och kan g˚a in och titta. Det har varit vissa s˚adana verktyg som per default
varit o¨ppna mot internet. Att g˚a in och kunna titta p˚a ett fo¨retags snortlarm
a¨r ju inte bra. Man kan se vad det a¨r fo¨r IP-adresser, vad maskinerna har fo¨r
funktion. Jag kommer inte ih˚ag vad verktyget hette, jag tror de tipsade om det
i kursen jag la¨ste och fick prova igenom n˚agra olika verktyg.
Sebastian: –Google a¨r ju bra p˚a det da¨r ocks˚a, hitta s˚adana saker allts˚a. Jag
kan ta¨nka mig att man kan go¨ra en so¨kquery i google fo¨r att hitta alla BASE-
installationer.
–Just det, det var nog s˚a man hittade de ha¨r maskinerna som hade det ha¨r
gra¨nssnittet o¨ppet. Det var n˚agon so¨ksta¨rng man kunde anva¨nda fo¨r att hitta
alla o¨ppna sajter.
Vilka gra¨nssnitt och IDSer har du anva¨nt?
–Gra¨nssnitt: Sguil, BASE, det a¨r snortgra¨nssnitt allihop. Sedan har jag ocks˚a
anva¨nt Cisco MARS. Det kan man va¨l ocks˚a se som ett gra¨nssnitt, men det a¨r
egentligen ett security information managment-verktyg. Det a¨r ju ett ramverk.
Hur tyckte du att man kunde sko¨ta aggregering i det?
–Nu ko¨rde de ju inte Snort s˚a jag s˚ag inte riktigt det egentligen, men det hade
andra roliga features i gra¨nssnittet. Na¨r du fick upp ett larm kunde du klicka
p˚a n˚agon liten ikon och f˚a upp hur trafiken g˚att i na¨tverket. Man samlade
inte loggar fr˚an routrar, switchar och brandva¨ggar. Man anva¨nder ju inte Cisco
MARS om man inte har ra¨tt mcyket ciscoutrustning, men man kunde f˚a upp
att “jaha d˚a har det g˚att genom den switchen och den routern och blev stoppat
i den brandva¨ggen”. Det a¨r ganska snyggt. D˚a vet man ju att trafiken faktiskt
inte gick fram till servern den fo¨rso¨kte attackera. Det a¨r s˚adan o¨vrig information
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som a¨r va¨ldigt bra att ha, just det ha¨r med brandva¨ggens logg da¨r man f˚ar veta
b˚ade vilka sessioner som har g˚att igenom och vilka som blivit stoppade.
Sebastian: –Men det a¨r bara om man anva¨nder Ciscos? Det finns inga o¨ppna
program fo¨r att...?
–I OSSIM kan du go¨ra det. Du kan plocka in loggarna fr˚an brandva¨ggarna och
egentligen go¨ra sp˚arningen sja¨lv. Cisco har ju tagit det ett steg la¨nger a¨n OSSIM.
I OSSIM kan du ocks˚a se om maskinen har svart p˚a trafiken.
–I Sguil har en agent fo¨r sessionsloggning. P˚a det na¨tverkssegementet du lyssnar
p˚a loggar du alla sesioner, vilka IP-adresser som har pratat med varandra p˚a
vilka portar och hur mycket trafik som har g˚att. Du kan ho¨gerklicka p˚a ett event
i Sguil och f˚a upp vilka andra maskiner den attackerade maksinen har pratat
med mer p˚a na¨tverket. Da¨r har du kanske a¨nnu ba¨ttre mo¨jligheter till det.
Men om du ta¨nker p˚a alla interface du anva¨nt, a¨r det bra aggre-
tionsmo¨jligheter eller blir man frustrerad och ka¨nner att man vill
go¨ra mer och annorlunda?
–Ja, man skulle vilja att de var mycket ba¨ttre (skratt).
Eva Lina: –Kan man p˚averka dem p˚a n˚agot sa¨tt och tala om fo¨r dem att “s˚a
ha¨r vill jag aggregera och go¨r det a˚t mig”?
–I princip. OSSIM a¨r open source s˚a du kan ju la¨gga till dina egna plugins. Du
kan ju la¨gga till en egen flik da¨r du go¨r en massa annat. Men det a¨r ju klar, det
a¨r ju en massa jobb.
Eva Lina: –Det finns fo¨rba¨ttringspotential allts˚a?
–Ja, det finns fo¨rba¨ttringspotential i alla verktyg. Kan ju la¨gga till RSAenvision
da¨r ocks˚a. Men det a¨r mer allma¨nt fo¨r loggar och jag har anva¨nt ett antal s˚adana
verktyg. Det finns ett som heter ArcSight ocks˚a som a¨r generellt fo¨r loggar. Men
dessa tv˚a a¨r generellt fo¨r loggar och inte bara fo¨r na¨tverkssa¨kerhetso¨vervakning.
ArcSight har jag inte anva¨nt men jag har sett lite av det. De a¨r ganska mycket
fo¨r korreleringsmo¨jligheter, men det a¨r som med OSSUM, att man f˚ar la¨gga
in det sja¨lv. Alla system a¨r unika s˚a alla nstallationer av s˚adana system a¨r
fler˚arsprojekt. Man kan inte bara installera det och tro att det fungerar.
–Du skulle kunna stoppa in snortlarmen i Splunk. Det a¨r mer googleindexering
p˚a textloggar, men du skulle kunna stoppa in alarm i den ocks˚a. Da¨r har du
ganska bra sto¨d att tala om vad olika fa¨lt a¨r fo¨r n˚agonting. Da¨r har man lite
mer s˚adana so¨kningar som jag skulle vilja go¨ra.
Sebastian: –S˚a det skulle man kunna kombinera med n˚agon av de andra?
–Fo¨rdelen med Snort a¨r ju att du kan logga i olika format och inte bara bina¨rt.
Det finns ett plugin som heter Barnyard, det a¨r en egen process. Snort loggar
bina¨rt och s˚a har du Barnyard som go¨r om det till flera olika format. Jag tror
p˚a att man vill ha flera analysverktyg till samma loggdata. Det a¨r nog inte ett
verktyg som a¨r ra¨tt fo¨r alla system.
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Vad vill du ha ut av ett alarm? Det vanligaste a¨r ju att du f˚ar ut tid,
alarmtyp och ka¨lla, destination osv.
–Paketdata vill jag definitivt ha, annars kan man oftast inte sa¨ga n˚agonting om
det.
Eva Lina: –Du sa att du titta p˚a sessionerna ocks˚a, a¨r det n˚agot mer a¨n det du
vill a˚t?
–Egentligen vill man ju ha allt (skratt). Det fo¨rsta man go¨r a¨r att klicka p˚a
larmet, titta p˚a paketinneh˚all. Na¨sta steg a¨r att kolla vilka andra maskiner den
ha¨r maskinenn har pratat med. Vilka andra alarm har den ha¨r maskinen orsakat.
Na¨sta steg a¨r att g˚a in i serverloggarna och kolla, kan man ha separat, om det
ser ut som om n˚agot har ha¨nt p˚a den ha¨r maskinen. Om det ser ut som om den
larmar fo¨r att det finns n˚agon bakdo¨rr p˚a en maskin a¨r det klart att man g˚ar
in och kollar om bakdo¨rren finns da¨r. Men d˚a har man kommit lite utanfo¨r det
som intr˚angsdetekteringssystemet ska go¨ra.
–Men om det har ha¨nt n˚agonting kan man spela in fullsta¨ndig na¨tverkstrafik
under en viss teidsperiod. Jag vet folk som har gjort det. Man kan la¨gga upp en
egen process som spelar bo¨rjar spelar in. Na¨r du f˚ar ett visst snortlarm spelar
du in all na¨tverkstrafik under kanske 5 minuter fo¨r att f˚a mer information och
d˚a f˚ar du ocks˚a en mer komplett bild utav vad som har ha¨nt. Men har du m˚anga
larm kan det bli hur mycket trafik som helst, fast du kan ju va¨lja att bara ta
fo¨r en viss IP-adress d˚a i och fo¨r sig.
Eva Lina: –A¨r det n˚agra andra verktyg fo¨rutom de du har visat oss som du
anva¨nder fo¨r att komplettera bilden?
–Informationsma¨ssigt sett?
Eva Lin: –Magnus pratade om tcpdump...
Tcpdump a¨r va¨l egentligen standrad 1A, s˚a det anva¨nder jag. Man kan skriva
filter i det ocks˚a. Det a¨r ju ocks˚a till fo¨r konfigurationen, att fo¨rst˚a varfo¨r den
triggar p˚a vissa saker och fo¨r att felso¨ka. Tcpreplay fo¨r att testa, man kan spela
upp en fil md trafik som man vet att det finns attacker i, s˚a kan man ser att
den triggar p˚a det.
–Vad har man mer? Wireshark har man fo¨r att kunna go¨ra ytterligare analys.
Men OSSIM inneh˚aller flera andra verktyg, s˚a den inneh˚aller p0f som a¨r en pas-
sive OS fingerprinting. Den kollar trafiken och ser vad det a¨r fo¨r operativsystem
p˚a maskinerna som pratar. Och s˚a har den NTOP som go¨r viss trafikanalys s˚a
att man ser vilka protkoll som g˚a. Man ser trafikma¨ngd.
–Vad som a¨ven a¨r intressant a¨r att se hur m˚anga events man f˚ar. Det finns ett
verktyg som heter pnGraph som tittar p˚a Snorts statistikfil och ritar grafer p˚a
det. Man ser o¨ver tiden hur m˚anga alarm man har f˚att, och s˚a ser du trafikma¨ngd
o¨ver tiden.
–O¨ver huvudtaget trafikbeteende, NTOP visar det. Det a¨r ett open source-
verktyg, men da¨r f˚ar man go¨ra lite konfigurering. Man beho¨ver en liten server
men det ing˚ar i OSSIM om man installerar det.
–SGUIL har ju fo¨rdelar helt klart fo¨r hemmabruk da¨r man f˚ar ganska lite
ha¨ndelser. Du har ba¨ttre so¨kmo¨jligheter tycker jag. OSSIM har varit lite buggigt
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ocks˚a men det a¨r ju klart, det har utvecklats en del. Det finns en kommersiell
version med appliance, en h˚ardvarul˚ada som du installerar.
Eva Lina: –Na¨r det ha¨nder n˚agot och du till exempel sl˚ar p˚a tcpdump, har du
automatiserat det eller g˚ar du in manuellt och startar det na¨r du ser att n˚agot
ha¨nder?
–Det har ju varit pilotinstallation det jag har gjort. Jag har ju inte drivit det
hela va¨gen tills det a¨r fullt fungerande, s˚a det har bara varit att jag har g˚at tin
manuellt egentligen. I och fo¨r sig, jag har ju gjort ett script som spelar in med
tcpdump hela trafiken under en viss tridsperiod efter ett larm. Det har jag gjort
n˚agon g˚ang.
Sebastian: –La¨ggs det in i snortfilterreglerna?
–Nej, det a¨r helt separat, du go¨r en plugin som a¨r kopplad till snortreglerna.
Sebastian: --Jag har bara la¨st manualen, men da¨r kan man la¨gga in samtidigt
som man skriver reglerna fo¨r vad det a¨r den ska reagera p˚a, sa¨ga till den att
go¨ra vissa saker.
–Jo, men det var via det. Men det var ganska la¨nge sedan s˚a det a¨r knappt att
jag kommer ih˚ag hur jag gjorde. Sedan fick man go¨ra ett annat script som s˚ag
till att rensa bort efter en viss tid s˚a att det inte blev fullt p˚a disken, fo¨r det
har man ju ocks˚a problem med om man spelar in trafik. Man f˚ar ha lite koll p˚a
vad man go¨r.
Eva Lina: –De ha¨r verktygen du har anva¨nt, finns det n˚agon mo¨jlighet fo¨r dem
att samarbeta, att f˚a dem att prata med varandra? F˚ar man hacka sja¨lv eller a¨r
det hopplo¨st?
–Du menar tcpdump...?
Eva Lina: –Jo, och de andra verktygen man kan ta¨nka sig att anva¨nda.
–Man f˚ar hacka lite sja¨lv, men de a¨r ju gjorda fo¨r det. Tcpdump anva¨nder man
ofta lite separat. I och fo¨r sig, just na¨r du kopplar det till Snort har den sto¨d
fo¨r att du ska kunna ko¨ra vilket program du vill na¨r ett larm trippar.
Sebastian: –Omva¨nt d˚a? Jag a¨nkte p˚a Ciscos MARSsystem. Da¨r a¨r det tva¨rtom,
att de helst vill att det bara ska vara inom Ciscos sytem. Eller till˚ater de ocks˚a
att man kopplar in lite vad som helst?
–Snort kan du anva¨nda ihop med Cisco MARS. Cisco har sin egen IDS och
s˚a sto¨djer de Snort. Men Snort a¨r s˚a spritt att man m˚aste na¨stan sto¨dja den.
Men Cisco sto¨djer ju inte sina konkurrenters. Men da¨remot, OSSIM sto¨djer
n˚agra olika IDSer, men de a¨r ju inte heller bundna till n˚agon och a¨ven ArcSight
och RSAenvision sto¨djer flera olika. De a¨r ju inte heller bundna till n˚agot IDS-
fo¨retag. Tittar man p˚a till exempel Symantec har de ocks˚a n˚agon programvara
fo¨r att knyta ihop IDS-larm och andra loggar. Och d˚a sto¨djer de ju framfo¨r allt
sin egen. Men na¨stan alla sto¨djer sin egen IDS och Snort i alla fall.
Brukar du kategorisera dina alarm?
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Eva Lina: –Du visade oss l˚ag-, mellan- och ho¨gprioriterade larm. Brukar du
la¨gga till egna prioriteringar fo¨rutom dessa? Magnus hade p˚a fo¨rslag “ointres-
santa”, “dubletter - orsak redan ka¨nd”. Har du n˚agra egna indelningar fo¨rutom
detta?
–I SGUIL kan man la¨gga in olika kategorier, fast man ka¨nner alltid att de in-
te passar. Man vill ha lite egna. Men sedan har du att du kan la¨gga in din
egen kommentar till larmet na¨r du behandlar det. Det a¨r bra. O¨ver huvudtaget
beho¨ver man ha n˚agot s˚a att man kan fo¨lja upp efter˚at. Sa¨rskilt om man kon-
figurerar alarm m˚aste man ha n˚agon slags changelog p˚a vad man har gjort och
varfo¨r. Annars kommer man inte fo¨rst˚a det. Jag har anva¨nt mest det inbyggda
men man skulle nog vilja go¨ra mer a¨n vad det finns sto¨d fo¨r egentligen. Jag
skulle vilja go¨ra egna kategorier och kunna flytta o¨ver dem och ha flera olika
flika fo¨r olika kategorier.
–Jag tror att man altlid kommer vilja ha s˚a att man kan konfigurera upp sja¨lv.
Sedan har man kanske n˚agra som fo¨ljer med.
Det finns allma¨nna regler som triggar p˚a lite allt mo¨jligt och s˚a finns
det mer specifika. Har du ng˚aon indelning av hur tillfo¨rlitligt ett larm
a¨r? Till exempel att fo¨r detta larm finns det 90% sannolikhet att det
a¨r riktigt och fo¨r ett annat larm a¨r det bara 20% sannolikhet att
det a¨r riktigt. Anva¨nder du dig av en s˚adan indelning p˚a olika alarm
ocks˚a?
–OSSIM har det sja¨lv. Snort har tre prioritetsniv˚aer p˚a larmen men OSSIM
har a¨ven reliabilityniv˚aer. Jag tror a¨ven att den la¨gger in det p˚a snortlarmen,
att vissa a¨r mindre p˚alitliga a¨n andra. Det da¨r skulle man beho¨va sitta och
konfigurera upp, fo¨r det a¨r olika fo¨r olika system. I OSSIM kan du per larm g˚a
in och sa¨tta den ha¨r siffran och det a¨r viktigt.
–Problemet a¨r att vissa op˚alitliga larm handlar om va¨ldigt viktiga saker s˚a man
kan inte bara g˚a in och sta¨nga av dem.
Eva Lina: –Den korrelering jag sett f˚ar man sta¨lla in sja¨lv i config-filer. Du har
inte haft n˚agra automagiska system? De la¨r sig, korrelerar, dumpar ut en vacker
fin, bild och talar om fo¨r dig att ditt na¨tverk a¨r helt sa¨kert?
–Na¨pp!
–De kan ju ge sken av att vem som helst skulle kunna anva¨nda dem d˚a man ser
grafer och s˚a vidare, men i princip s˚a bygger det alltid p˚a att du har n˚agon som
verkligen vet vad go¨r i botten. Sedan kan du go¨ra vissa managementvyer som
man kallar det. Man la¨gger upp vissa grafer, till exempel antal larm o¨ver tid.
S˚adant kan ju management tycka a¨r intressant. O¨kar eller minskar hotbilden p˚a
n˚agot sa¨tt?
Eva Lina: –En allma¨n regel med 20 eller 10% tillfo¨rlitlighet, hur ba¨r du dig a˚t
om du ska verifiera om det a¨r riktigt eller ett falsklarm?
–Ibland kan man se i paketinneh˚allet. A¨r det n˚agot som p˚ag˚ar kan man spela in
na¨tverkstrafiken och kolla p˚a den. Annars a¨r det bara att g˚a in p˚a servern och
kolla om det verkar ha ha¨nt n˚agot, har trafiken ens kommit fram?
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Eva Lina: –Och de grafiska interfacen? Ka¨nner du att du har n˚agot att tilla¨gga
eller ka¨nner du dig terapeutiskt rensad?
–Ibland tycker man att kommandoradsgra¨nssnitt har sina fo¨rdelar, men det a¨r
ju b˚ade och. Man vill kunna f˚a upp grafer o¨ver vissa saker. Men att g˚a in i
databasen och go¨ra sql-fr˚agor eller sql-script anva¨nds ra¨tt mycket. Na¨r man har
snortlarm a¨r det ra¨tt ofta man g˚ar in direkt mot databasen och kollar saker.
Det g˚ar fortare, det a¨r mer kraftfullt och du kan so¨ka p˚a vad du vill. De grafiska
gra¨nssnitten brukar ju tyva¨rr begra¨nsa vad man kan so¨ka. Problemet a¨r att det
alltid a¨r s˚a unikt hur man jobbar, det a¨r sv˚art att f˚a ett gra¨nssnitt som passar
alla.
–Men jag ser inget problem med att man har ett grafiskt gra¨nssnitt som man
go¨r vissa saker i och sedan kan du go¨ra sql-so¨kningar bredvid. Men det a¨r ju
inte s˚a dumt om det finns en liten flik som go¨r att du kan go¨ra so¨kningar p˚a
vilka fa¨lt du vill i gra¨nssnittet ocks˚a.
Sebastian: –Det a¨r va¨l det som a¨r problemet. Det a¨r tv˚a saker som a¨r va¨ldigt
motsatta varandra. Att ha ett intuitivt GUI och sedan ha alla kraffulla verktyg
som finns under. Det g˚ar inte att f˚a ihop.
–Det finns inget intr˚agsdetekteringsystem som en idiot kan sko¨ta egentligen -
idag. Du f˚ar ju en massa konstiga falsklarm. P˚a en kursen som jag gick, om du
ko¨rde en viss p2p-trafik ihop med Junipers IPS tyckte den plo¨tsligt att man
hade trojaner p˚a alla sina system.
–Jag tror inte riktigt p˚a IPS. Man kan ju i sin brandva¨gg stoppa viss trafik som
man a¨r sa¨ker p˚a a¨r d˚alig. Men IDSen har en annan roll, den go¨r o¨vervakning
och den ska man helst ha passiv s˚a att man sja¨lv kan agera p˚a det man tycker
a¨r viktigt.
Om du f˚ar va¨lja, fantisera fritt, vad vill du ha i framtiden fr˚an dina
IDSsystem? Vad a¨r o¨nskeegenskapen du saknar idag?
Sebastian: –Vad a¨r det manuella tr˚akiga arbetet som du helst skulle vilja slippa?
–Jag har ju inte gjort det manuella tr˚akiga arbetet. Det skulle man kunna fr˚aga
de p˚a Ccode som sitter med heltidso¨vervakning till exempel. Det hinner ju bli
tr˚akigt. Jag har bara g˚att in och tittat ibland. Vi har inte haft n˚agot uppdrag
egentligen da¨r vi haft ett kontinuerligt jobb med att g˚a in och titta p˚a det. Men
det a¨r kanske det jag skulle vilja jobba med. Att man kan la¨gga en halvdag i
veckan p˚a analys och fo¨rba¨ttringar a˚tminstone.
–Man kan ju ha samma information p˚a flera gra¨nssnitt, jag skulle kunna ta¨nka
mig att kombinera det som OSSIM go¨r med SGUIL. Man skulle vilja ha ganska
m˚anga funktioner att va¨lja mellan som att man kan go¨ra en googleliknande
so¨kning i loggarna och att man kan go¨ra sql-fr˚agor mot vilken information som
helst i larmen.
Eva Lina: –Vad vill du helst ha, full kontroll eller skulle du kunna ta¨nka dig ett
system som automagiskt la¨r sig hur den ska klassificera trafik? Eller ka¨nns det
lite la¨skigt?
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Sebastian: –Eller som la¨r sig go¨ra gissninar, go¨ra kvalificerade gissningar vad
anva¨ndaren a¨r ute efter?
–I s˚a fall tror jag mer p˚a ide´n att den fr˚agar mig “jag tror det ha¨r” och s˚a f˚ar du
sa¨ga ja eller nej. Interaktiv inla¨rning. Jag har la¨st en artificiell neuronna¨tkurs och
dom la¨r sig va¨ldigt konstiga saker. Jag skulle nog inte lite p˚a det. Sja¨lvla¨rande
a¨r inte redo fo¨r n˚agon anva¨ndning just nu i alla fall. Men om man kan vara med
och besta¨mma och fo¨rst˚ar varfo¨r den klassar saker a˚ ett visst sa¨tt.
Eva Lina: –D˚a kanske du gillar Magnus ide´ med att den tittar p˚a var du klickar
och fr˚agar lite fr˚agor na¨r den a¨r osa¨ker.
–P˚a det temat s˚a har ju Stefan Axelsson gjort en artikel, han var i v˚ar fors-
kargrupp tidigare. Han har gjort just det ha¨rmed interaktiv inla¨rning, att den
fr˚agar anva¨ndaren och klassificerar saker. Det kanske kan vara lite intressant fo¨r
det ha¨r. Som related work tycker jag nog att det kan vara bra.
Sebastian: –S˚a systemet ska helst INTE ta n˚agra egna initiativ utan att fr˚aga
fo¨rst?
–NA¨!(skratt) Framfo¨r allt s˚a vill jag ha kontrollen, jag vill ga¨rna logga mycket
saker s˚a att det finns da¨r. Men sedan ma˚ste man plocka ut vad det a¨r man
ska titta p˚a i o¨vervakningssyfte i realtid. Sedan vill jag kunna g˚a tillbaka in i
databasen, s˚a att man prioriterar upp vissa ha¨ndelser som man faktiskt tittar
p˚a. Man vill ju a¨nd˚a ha den stora ho¨gen med saker, att man g˚ar in da¨r ibland,
kollar vilka kategorier av larm man f˚att.
Sebastian: –OSSIM hade det ha¨r med relevans. Om man skulle ta och l˚ata den
p˚averka relevansen, na¨r den fo¨rso¨ker la¨ra sig vilka saker som ...
–Jo den kan f˚a la¨ra sig vad som ska poppa upp i larmfliken kanske. Men jag vill
a¨nd˚a ha den stora massan med allting s˚a att jag kan g˚a in och so¨ka i det sja¨lv.
Jag vill ha den kontrollen att allt finns kvar i originalformat och jag kan g˚a in
och so¨ka i det. Men sedan ma˚ste man ha n˚agot gra¨nssnitt fo¨r realtidso¨vervakning
fo¨r att p˚a n˚agot sa¨tt konfigurera det s˚a att man hinner titta igenom det.
Sebastian: –Det skulle ju kunna vara en grej, att den i o¨verblicken la¨r sig vad
man tycker a¨r relevant.
–Statistik beho¨ver man ocks˚a. Man beho¨ver kunna f˚a statistik p˚a IP-adresser,
vilka IP-adresser som har genererat mer allvarliga ha¨ndelser, vilka som genererat
mest ha¨ndelser och vilka som genererat f˚a men allvarliga till exempel. S˚adana
saker beho¨ver man kunna f˚a ut. Man vill kunan go¨ra statistikso¨kningar i data
fo¨r att veta vad manska titta p˚a. I OSSIM kan du f˚a upp grafer. Typiska a¨r ju
“top ten attackers”. Men det a¨r bara p˚a antal larm. Sedan kanske du skulle vilja
ha n˚agra smartare sa¨tt, hur allvarliga de a¨r ocks˚a.
Eva Lina: –Men om du fick va¨lja mellan de fyra sa¨tten, att systemet bara tittar
p˚a vilka alarm du klickar p˚a och antar att du a¨r mest intresserad av dem du
klickar p˚a eller fo¨redrar du att man klickar men va¨ljer sja¨lv na¨r man sa¨ger a˚t
systemet varfo¨r n˚agot a¨r viktigt?
–Jag skulle nog vilja ha att na¨r man klickar upp ett larm, att man kan klicka i
n˚agra radio buttons, att man har kanske fyra niv˚aer eller n˚agonting, “hur viktigt
var det ha¨r?”. Och s˚a vill man kanske ha den ha¨r kategoreseringen p˚a n˚agot sa¨tt.
110
APPENDIX D. INTERVIEWS – Q&A
Kanske med fo¨rdefinierade kategorier och kanske kunna la¨gga till egna. S˚a att
man enkelt sja¨lv kunde sa¨tta informationen.
Eva Lina: –Det ha¨r med att systemet fo¨rso¨ker gissa sig till och ista¨llet fo¨r att du
sa¨ger till den uttryckligen, gissar den och ger anledningen, och s˚a kan du ange
“ja jag h˚aller med” eller “jag h˚aller inte med”?
–Det a¨r nog bra, s˚a la¨nge det inte a¨r dumma fr˚agor(skratt). Man kan ju bli
va¨ldigt irriterad.
Sebastian: –D˚a blir det som gemet i Word. “Du fo¨rso¨ker skriva ett brev!” ’.......
na¨e .......’ “Det ser ut som om du fo¨rso¨ker skriva ett brev. Vill du ha hja¨lp!”
’NEJ!’
–Man m˚aste nog kunna sta¨nga av det da¨r.
Tycker du det a¨r viktigt att kunan ge negativ feedback till systemet?
Att ett alarm a¨r viktigt just nu, men sedan kommer det inte att vara
viktigt efter att jag har patchat eller bytt ut den ha¨r servern. Att
man kan sl˚a ner det?
–I ArcSight, RSAenvision och a¨ven OSSIM s˚a kan du ha en s˚adan ha¨r inventory
list. Den vet vilka IP-adresser som a¨r servrar som faktiskt finns och den vet
vilka operativsystem de ko¨r och vilka tja¨nster som ko¨r p˚a maskinerna, vilka
programvaror som a¨r ig˚ang p˚a dem. Men det a¨r ocks˚a en massa konfiguration
och saker byts hit och dit, s˚a helst skulle det uppdatera sig sja¨lvt, helst skulle
det ha n˚agon koppling till n˚agot configuration management p˚a maskinerna s˚a
att man autmatiskt fick in det. Men det a¨r kackligt att f˚a det fixat.
–Men jag kan ta¨nka mig att man vill ha en agent ute p˚a maskinerna som faktiskt
vet vilka programvaror som ko¨rs p˚a dem, det finns ett antal s˚adana. Det go¨r
att du kan go¨ra en korrekt korrelering mot snortlarmen och prioritera upp dem
om det a¨r mot en s˚arbar version p˚a maskinen. Det tycker jag definitvt, just fo¨r
att sortera larmen. Sedan kanske man inte sla¨nger bort de andra larmen heller,
bara att de inte a¨r ho¨gt prioriterade.
Kan du komma p˚a n˚agra katastrofala nackdelar med rankning?
–Det a¨r risken att den tar vissa saker och placerar ho¨gt och det andra hamnar
da¨r nere och s˚a tittar man aldrig p˚a det. Om inte rankningen a¨r korrekt a¨r det
ganska stor risk att man missar n˚agot. D˚a uppta¨cker man bara det om n˚agot
ha¨nder fo¨r d˚a g˚ar du kanske in och tittar p˚a alla larm som ro¨r den maskinen
och fo¨rst d˚a hittar du det.
Eva Lina: –Fast det a¨r klart, den risken finns ju med felskrivna regler ocks˚a.
–Visst.
Eva Lina: –Undrar vad som a¨r la¨ttast att hitta, en felskriven regel eller felaktig
rankning?
–Testning a¨r viktigt na¨r det ga¨ller regler. Men det ga¨ller kanske a¨ven rankning-
en, att man beho¨ver en testmetod fo¨r att kontrollera vad som ha¨nder. O¨ver
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huvudtaget saknar jag att det inte finns n˚agon test bench da¨r man kan spela
upp trafik och f˚a ett facit p˚a hur det borde se ut, rankningsma¨ssigt och vilka
larm man o¨ver huvudtaget f˚ar av IDSen.
–Det a¨r ganska la¨tt egentligen det jag go¨r nu. Jag har f˚att n˚agra TCP-dumpar
na¨r jag g˚att kurserna som man kan spela upp och det skulle vara ja¨ttela¨tt att
go¨ra testning med dem.
–Men sedan a¨r det ju alltid s˚a att om det finns test bench-data s˚a kommer de
anpassa sig s˚a att de f˚ar bra resultat p˚a det. Men det a¨r ra¨tt sv˚art att enbart
installera de ha¨r verktygen och veta att allt fungerar som det ska. Bara det att
se att allt a¨r uppe och snurrar a¨r steg ett. Men att kunna ja¨mfo¨ra olika verktyg
och se vilket som a¨r ba¨ttre a¨n n˚agot annat blir ju sv˚art na¨r det a¨r ka¨nda data.
Man m˚aste ju ta fram nya data till varje test. Men bara det att kolla att allt a¨r
uppe och snurar och beter sig som det ska vore ja¨ttebra.
D.4 Ulf Larson
Interview with Ulf Larson from Omegapoint via e-mail in Swedish.
Vilka IDS system har du anva¨nt?
• Tillverkare?
• I hur stor utstra¨ckning ka¨nner du att man kan aggregera alarmen
i de system du anva¨nt?
• I hur stor utstra¨ckning ka¨nner du att du har kunnat p˚averka hur
systemen aggregerar alarmen?
• I hur stor utstra¨ckning ka¨nner du att du har kunna arbeta med
alarmen p˚a en ho¨g niv˚a / korrelera dem?
• Fo¨rdelar/nackdelar med det systemet?
Jag har jobbat en del med Snort. Sedan har jag tittat en del p˚a RSA envi-
sion, som snarare a¨r ett SIEM (Security Information and Event Management
System), vilket a¨r ett steroidstint logg- och analysmonster med en IDS-modul.
Jag har ocks˚a anva¨nt pentestningsverktyg som burp-scanner (webbappar) och
nessus (server/infra), vilken inneh˚aller beslutsmoduler (om a¨n la¨ttviktiga) fo¨r
att avgo¨ra om en mo¨jlig s˚arbarhet a¨r en mo¨jlig s˚arbarhet.
I enVision har man mycket stor mo¨jlighet att aggregera alarm. Mycket goda
mo¨jligheter att va¨lja bort och filtrera analysdata och larm, samt grafik, ex-
empelvis cirkeldiagram, som visar hur stor del av angrepp som kommer fr˚an en
viss IP-adress. Burp a¨r ett mer la¨ttviktigt verktyg och da¨r har man n˚agot sa¨mre
mo¨jligheter att p˚averka. Dock grupperar scannern sja¨lv resultat av ”samma” typ
och utnyttjar en tra¨dstruktur som fo¨ljer strukturen p˚a en skannad webbsite.
Mycket av iden med de stora SIEM-verktygen, som enVision a¨r att det skall
vara enkelt fo¨r en operato¨r att sa¨ttas framfo¨r verktyget. Om man bygger in
mycket vettighet i verktyget skall operato¨ren inte beho¨va vara expert fo¨r att
112
APPENDIX D. INTERVIEWS – Q&A
tolka vad som st˚ar (det hja¨lper, givetvis, men det a¨r inte no¨dva¨ndigt). Burp a¨r
p˚a la¨gre niv˚a och erbjuder inte korreleringsmo¨jligheter p˚a det sa¨ttet, eftersom
den bara jobbar med en typ av ”alarm”, eller vad den tror a¨r s˚arbarheter. Vill
man korrelera f˚ar man utnytta n˚agot annat verktyg parallellt. EnVision a¨r ocks˚a
ett Enterprize- system, vilket inneba¨r att den i mycket stor utstra¨ckning kan
korrelera information fr˚an andra servrar som st˚ar ”n˚an helt annanstans”, och
som ”go¨r n˚at helt annat”. Dessutom (och detta gillar jag MYCKET), kan det
korrelera in information fr˚an s˚arbarhetsdatabaser, dvs man kan utesluta vissa
alarm, d˚a den fo¨rmodade s˚arbarheten inte finns. Dessutom (igen) kan man ta
in information fr˚an sa¨kerhetsskanningar av ex. . . Nessus d˚ar˚a.
Fo¨r/nackdelar. . . I regel verkar det vara s˚a att man f˚ar det man betalar fo¨r, men
samtidigt s˚a f˚ar man ju ocks˚a vad man fo¨rtja¨nar. . . Mindre verktyg a¨r la¨ttare
att komma o¨verens med, men till en la¨gre finkornighet p˚a insta¨llningsfronten.
Sto¨rre verktyg tar la¨ngre tid att la¨ra sig, men kan erbjuda nanokorn(ighet).
Har ni stora problem med “false positives”?
• Hur hanterar du dom isf?
• Hja¨lper IDS systemet till med det p˚a n˚agot sa¨tt?
– Hur?
False positives i min nuvarande va¨rld a¨r en s˚arbarhetsskanner som sa¨ger, woo-
hoo, en XSS i rapportgeneratorn. Sen a¨r det upp till mig att avgo¨ra om det a¨r en
fp eller inte. Med aktiv skanning kan verktyget sja¨lv fo¨rso¨ka verifiera om det a¨r
en s˚arbarhet eller inte, exempelvis med stra¨ngen “45987276Isthisreflected234-”,
vilket skall fo¨resta¨lla en tillra¨ckligt unik stra¨ng som blir reflekterad till motta-
garen. (Oj, svarade p˚a na¨sta fr˚aga av bara farten).
Man skall givetvis skilja p˚a ett kritiskt larm, kritisk va¨rd. Jag skulle p˚ast˚a
att detta a¨r det la¨tt viktigaste o¨verhuvudtaget (se vidare diskussion ang˚aende
slipsnissar nedan). Det ba¨sta sa¨ttet att go¨ra detta a¨r att l˚ata systemet ta emot
feedback fr˚an anva¨ndaren. Systemet kan sja¨lv avgo¨ra om det a¨r en attack eller
inte (→ alarm), p˚a en teknisk niv˚a (den kan t.ex se att ett na¨tverkspaket in-
neh˚aller “/bin/sh”). Da¨remot hur stor p˚averkan paketet har p˚a just det egna
systemet skiljer sig mycket och det a¨r ytterst upp till operato¨ren att tagga upp
larmet i det specifika kontext han/hon sitter. (I extrem fo¨rla¨ngningen borde
man tjo¨ta ned affa¨rsansvarig som kan tala om att “om attack X g˚ar genom, d˚a
g˚ar v˚ar business a˚t helvete, direkt”). Det kan vara bra input ocks˚a, men fo¨rso¨k
f˚a slipsnissarna till det, f˚ar du se hur det g˚ar.
I mitt jobb m˚aste jag klicka p˚a intressanta larm fo¨r att go¨ra manuell uppfo¨ljning.
Vilka fo¨rba¨ttringar vill du se fo¨r att go¨ra det enklare att uppta¨cka
attacker?
Grafik a¨r alltid bra, och givetvis korrelering och aggregering. Feedbackbaserade
system som tar data fr˚an den miljo¨ de st˚ar i. Sen bo¨r man fundera o¨ver att
inte bara titta p˚a inkommande trafik utan a¨ven i viss utstra¨ckning p˚a utg˚aende
trafik. Om en stor ISP f˚ar m˚anga datorer infekterade av en trojan och da¨refter
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blir noder i ett botna¨t m˚aste ISPn kunna ma¨rka detta. Dels p˚a ing˚aende na¨r
kommandocentralen talar om fo¨r noderna att bo¨rja mangla, och dels p˚a utg˚aende
na¨r noderna bo¨rjar kra¨kas ut uppkopplingsfo¨rso¨k mot externa m˚alet.
Skulle du fo¨redra ett system som
1. “la¨r” sig automagiskt hur du vill ha det
2. ett da¨r man m˚aste konfigurera allt (har full kontroll)
3. eller kanske n˚agot da¨r i mellan?
Ett system ma˚ste givetvis la¨ra sig under tiden. Inte no¨dva¨ndigtvis bara av dig
som operato¨r, utan a¨ven av hur na¨tverkstrafik beter sig, hur va¨rden beter sig,
hur din webbapplikation beter sig. Normalbeteenden a¨r alltid ba¨ttre a¨n signa-
turer. Skall man bli filosofisk kan man givetvis mena att det g˚ar att konfigurera
upp “allt” s˚a att systemet tar full ha¨nsyn till allt dynamiskt beteende. Talar
man endast om interaktion med operato¨ren beror graden av interaktion p˚a hur
bra operato¨ren a¨r. En s˚an luffare som jag beho¨ver fo¨rmodligen ett ganska sta-
tiskt system eftersom jag inte kan avgo¨ra om larm X a¨r en 1a eller en 10a p˚a
allvarlighetsskalan, medan en analysguru som Ola fo¨rmodligen hade f˚att mycket
mer ut av systemet om han hade kunnat ge expertfeedback.
Vilket omr˚ade utav de fyra vi tar upp, tror du har sto¨rst framtidspo-
tential? A¨r det enbart ett utav dem eller a¨r det en kombination?
Jag sa¨tter min peng p˚a feedback, dvs alternativ 3. Jag h˚aller med er om funde-
ringarna kring alternativ 2.
Vad tror du om att systemet la¨r sig anva¨ndarens preferenser genom
att t.ex. fo¨ra statistik p˚a vilka typer av alarm som han/hon klickar p˚a
fo¨r att sedan kunna go¨ra antaganden om hur nya alarm skall rankas?
Klickning a¨r bra.
Samma som ovan men ista¨llet med en tumme upp och tumme ner
knapp fo¨r alarm man tycker a¨r viktiga/oviktiga?
Viktning a¨r bra. Man bo¨r fo¨rmodligen kombinera viktning med klickning. Fr˚agan
a¨r ju om man skall vikta bina¨rt, dvs bu (tumme upp) eller ba¨ (tumme ned),
eller om man skall ange en siffra mellan 1 och 10, eller snarare -5 till 5.
A¨r det viktigt att kunna ge “negativ” feedback? Att kunna ranka ett
alarm la¨gre och ange anledning(ar) fo¨r detta till systemet?
Det a¨r viktigt att vikta negativt. Man f˚ar d˚a en grupp larm som man normalt
sett kan strunta i (av olika anledningar). Det kanske till och med kan vara s˚a
att man kan vikta ett larm som irrelevant (motsvarar att man plockar bort
signaturen fr˚an konfig-filen. . . typ).
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Hur skulle man kunna tala om fo¨r systemet att fr˚an och med nu ska
den inte ra¨kna med de klick som gjorts p˚a ett alarm? T.ex. innan
en patch s˚a var alarmen som ha¨ngde ihop med det problemet viktiga
och man klickade p˚a vart enda ett. Efter patchen da¨remot, inte av
intresse och bo¨r inte la¨ngre tas i bera¨kning na¨r man rankar alarmen.
Man utnyttjar viktningsparametern, vilket inneba¨r att ett “irrelevant” larm
kommer att vara irrelevant oavsett om det tidigare har varit en 10a p˚a allvar-
lighetsskalan och blivit klickad s˚a ho¨ger musknapp totalhavererat.
Skulle det vara ba¨ttre/sa¨mre om systemet ista¨llet sta¨llde specifika
fr˚agor om hur den skall ranka alarm?
• I s˚a fall, vilka parametrar ska systemet ta ha¨nsyn till?
Vet ej. Hur kan ett alarm bara vara intressant fo¨rsta g˚angen (om det inte a¨r ett
specialfall av ovan fr˚aga)?
Vad a¨r din omedelbara tanke (bra/d˚alig) om de fyra sa¨tt att ranka
alarm som vi tar upp? (clicking, directed learning, feedback, explicit
questions)
Det a¨r ba¨ttre, men fo¨r att vara generell kan systemet fo¨rmodligen bara sta¨lla
fr˚agor utifr˚an rent teknisk p˚averkan (affa¨rsva¨rden a¨r specifika fo¨r specifik miljo¨,
ju). En s˚arbarhetsscanner talar om fo¨r testaren att det ha¨r angreppet som den
precis identifierat, fungerar p˚a “det ha¨r sa¨ttet” och det a¨r allvarligt “da¨rfo¨r”.
Parametrar som man bo¨r ta ha¨nsyn till a¨r hur stor potentiell p˚averkan en attack
kan f˚a. En attack som kan ge administrato¨rsra¨ttigheter eller lista tabeller i en
databas bo¨r viktas ho¨gt.
Klickning a¨r jag lite kluven till. Man m˚aste som analytiker fo¨rst˚a varfo¨r man
klickar innan man klickar, dock. Detta f˚ar man ingen hja¨lp av fr˚an systemet s˚a
vitt jag fo¨rst˚ar. Inget fo¨r nybo¨rjare d˚a systemet fo¨rmodligen kan bli fella¨rt om
man inte riktigt vet vad man klickar p˚a, eller varfo¨r.
Directed learning a¨r ocks˚a sv˚art fo¨r en nybo¨rjare. Ha¨r ma˚ste nybo¨rjaren sja¨lv
tala om varfo¨r han/hon klickar alarmet. Mo¨jligen kan en expert (som Magnus)
ge understo¨d genom att fo¨rst klicka sig genom en ma¨ngd testdata och sedan na¨r
systemet a¨r tra¨nat (och det fo¨rst˚ar varfo¨r), kan man utnyttja “feedback” fo¨r att
hja¨lpa mer juniora analytiker (som jag. . . ) att fortsa¨tta jobba med systemet.
Feedback gillar jag. Sa¨kert olika. Fo¨r nybo¨rjare tror jag att feedback a¨r den
starkaste kandidaten eftersom den a¨r den enda som hja¨lper analytikern att fatta
vettiga beslut. Detta a¨r superviktigt d˚a de flesta inte har tid att bli experter
(ett uttalande som f˚ar st˚a fo¨r mig, men ponera att det finns en sysadmin som
skall rodda brandva¨ggar, AD, IDSer, patchhantering, och som dessutom har 30
servrar som g˚ar upp och ned som en. . . karusell som g˚ar upp och ned).
Explicit questions tror jag blir lite samma problematik som directed learning.
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Ser du n˚agra nackdelar med rankning?
De tv˚a nackdelarna jag ser a¨r att systemet kan bli felinla¨rt, samt att om man
inte tar ho¨jd fo¨r trender, dvs har en korttids- och en l˚angtidsstatistik, kan man
missa viktiga trender.
1. Ett typiskt alarm har information om tid, alarmtyp, ka¨lla/destination,
etc.
• Ra¨cker denna information fo¨r dig eller beho¨ver du mer?
– Vad anva¨nder du i s˚a fall fo¨r verktyg fo¨r att ha¨mta mer
information? T.ex. tcpdump, full packet capture, f˚angar
all utg˚aende trafik, minnesdumpning? Sp˚arar du paket
genom na¨tverket?
– Vad a¨r det fo¨r information i s˚a fall du so¨ker efter?
• Hur ofta granskar ni alarmen na¨rmre?
– Vad a¨r det fo¨r information som spelar roll fo¨r dig d˚a?
– Har du tillg˚ang till verktyg som automatiskt hja¨lper dig
med alarm s˚a att du slipper go¨ra vissa moment sja¨lv?
• Om du anva¨nder olika verktyg fo¨r att komplettera informa-
tionen i alarmet, finns det n˚agon samverkan mellan de olika
verktygen och mellan verktygen och IDSen?
– Om verktygen samverkar, finns den funktionaliteten in-
byggd eller a¨r detta n˚agot du f˚att utveckla/go¨ra sja¨lv?
2. Hur skulle du beskriva ett typiskt tillva¨gag˚angssa¨tt fo¨r dig na¨r
du ser ett alarm?
• Vad f˚ar du fo¨r tankar na¨r du ser ett alarm?
3. Vad a¨r den vanliga arbetsg˚angen? T.ex. jag ser alarm X. Letar
efter ha¨ndelse Y. Om X & Y finns, starta verktyget Z (kanske
l˚ater tcpdump logga allt mellan source IP och dest IP?) fo¨r att
samla mer information fo¨r att bekra¨fta att alarmet sta¨mmer.
4. Hur kategoriserar du alarm?
• “l˚ag-niv˚a alarm”
• “ointressanta”
• “dubblett”, (orsak redan ka¨nd)
• “grad av tillfo¨rlitlighet”, t.ex. en regel som triggar alarm kan
vara va¨ldigt allma¨n och orsaka m˚anga alarm varav de flesta
inte beror p˚a intr˚ang och d˚a ha en l˚ag grad av tillfo¨rlitlighet
eller en regel kan vara va¨ldigt specifik och da¨rfo¨r a¨r alarm
som genereras utifr˚an den regeln av ho¨g tillfo¨rlitlighetsgrad.
• “bekra¨ftelse”, kan man hitta ett nytt event som bekra¨ftar
att alarmet a¨r korrekt?
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5. Bygger du sja¨lv kopplingar mellan olika alarm eller go¨r systemet
det a˚t dig?
6. Hur verifierar du alarm?
7. A¨r de grafiska interfacen p˚a de IDSer du anva¨nt ok?
• Finns all funktionalitet du vill ha da¨r?
• Saknar du n˚agon funktionalitet i dem?
8. Hur g˚ar din interaktion till med interfacet?
• Klickar du p˚a alarm?
• Tittar du enbart utan att klicka?
• Brukar du so¨ka mer information a¨n vad interfacet presente-
rar?
Ser ut som om fr˚agan a¨r h˚art kopplad till na¨tverksbaserade IDSer. Sannolikt
beho¨ver man information om vilken enhet som genererar larmet (om man har
en korreleringsmotor och flera insamlande enheter, och vill ha mo¨jlighet att fo¨lja
flo¨den genom na¨tet). Sedan a¨r det va¨l ocks˚a viktigt att se vilken process som
tar emot paketet. Fo¨r att kunna avgo¨ra vad som finns i paketet beho¨ver man
sannolikt ocks˚a lite applikationslagerinfo.
Wireshark a¨r alltid vettigt att plocka fram, i och med att den har s˚a pass mycket
mapp till olika protokoll och liknande.
Fo¨ljande fr˚agor besvaras utifr˚an mitt perspektiv som s˚arbarhetstestare och bo¨r
tas med en nypa salt. Dock finns likheter.
Tittar man p˚a min situation med s˚arbarhetsskanningar tittar jag noga p˚a varje
larm. Nu a¨r ju detta inget kontinuerligt jobb utan ett jobb som utfo¨rs under en
begra¨nsad tid, vilket ger fog fo¨r att titta p˚a allt noga.
Om jag hade anva¨nt olika verktyg hade jag satsat min sista surt fo¨rva¨rvade slant
p˚a ett verktyg som enVision som har mo¨jlighet att plocka in data fr˚an na¨ra 300
olika enheter. Sedan hade jag spikat en datainsamlingspolicy (med avseende p˚a
att fo¨lja compliance-regler och samtidigt ha mo¨jligheter att uppta¨cka angrepp).
Slutligen hade jag kopplat i de olika enheterna och sett till att de samlar in den
datan som policyn fo¨reskriver.
Na¨r jag ser ett larm ta¨nker jag: Go¨tt! Verktyget hittade en s˚arbarhet, jag
fo¨rsvarar min orimlig ho¨ga timpeng. ;-)
Kategorisering – l˚ag, medel, ho¨g. Det a¨r sv˚art att ge r˚ad ang˚aende huruvida en
s˚arbarhet skall a˚tga¨rdas eller inte. Jag anva¨nder ocks˚a graderingsmodeller som
CVSS v2.
Verifiering av alarm inneba¨r oftast i mitt fall att man fo¨rso¨ker bygga en Poc, dvs
bygga en metodik fo¨r hur s˚arbarheten kan utnyttjas, och sedan visa att med me-
todikens hja¨lp kan man p˚alitligt a˚terskapa attacken som utnyttjar s˚arbarheten.
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